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1LABOUR THEORY AND
PRACTICE AND THE
MAKING OF A MARKET
An Introduction
1.1 The Issue
What is labour? To what extent did the continuous yet contra-
dictory evolution of theoretical understanding in this field affect
the process of reform of existing socialism in China from the late
1970s to the early 1990s? Why is the theory of labour so intimately
intertwined with the Chinese socialist policymaking process, and
why did the ability of public policy to intervene as a regulatory tool
in the reality of the labour economy diminish with the passing of
time and with the emergence of new, different, and contending
interpretations of the labour issue? To what extent is the evolution
from a full-employment policy and full state-led allocation to
labour market theory and practice the result of conscious policy
options rather than merely of the 'retreat' of public intervention
and the growing importance of 'market forces'? What does the
word 'labour' mean at the end of this process and what purpose
does this meaning serve?
Questions arise at the beginning of every research study. The
questions I have listed above emerge from my difficulties in
tackling separately the two streams of economic reform, that is, the
political/theoretical debates resulting from political struggles and
elite politics on the one hand, and the transformation of economic
and social life in Chinese urban centres on the other.
1
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The histories of theory and practice are generally kept separate,
as they usually stem from different backgrounds and social circles,
opposing or contradictory forces. This is impossible in the context
of Chinese socialism. In the case of China, the claim to coordinate
theory and praxis, thought and action, has been a challenge in the
field of policy ever since the basic assumptions of all-embracing
theories proved insufficient to address the social changes after the
beginning of reform in 1978. The theoretical debate under social-
ism is an integral component of policymaking and, in most cases,
players in the theoretical arena are involved directly in policy
elaboration. It is hardly conceivable that any public theory on
labour is not the formal result of political efforts.
The 'theory' I will deal with in this study is therefore a prag-
matic (sometimes, however, only in its premises and not in its final
outcom.e), policy-oriented concept, the ground for evaluation of
which is - rather than its coherence with ideological frameworks -
its ability to lead towards the formation of guiding principles of
policymaking and to synthesise different positions into political or
economic guidelines. The 'practice' to be investigated, in contrast,
is the outcome of policy action, a result both of the implementa-
tion of planned guidelines and of general (economic, social, and
political) constraints.
China's economic reformist leadership claims that today's
labour economy is the achievement of coherent and unaltered
policy options taken by the government during the twenty years'
experience of gaige (reform). Yet many factors beyond the control
of the central authorities and many unexpected and indirect out-
comes have combined to shape the socialist market economy that
is found in China today.
Many works appearing in the 1980s investigated both the
nature of labour institutions and the power relations embedded in
the traditional industrial labour system, and the evolution of
labour institutions in the post-Mao era. These studies benefited
from the larger availability of material and eyewitness accounts of
the Chinese industrial system, and by the greater facility to inves-
tigate Chinese factories directly.
One major focus of research on the transformation of labour
relations in the 1980s has been the peculiar nature of the Chinese
work-unit. Some studies focus on the resistance met by the leader-
ship in implementing the central directives on labour reform on the
shop floor, thus concluding that the steps taken have been largely
ineffectual. I
2
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While some authors re-evaluate the role of workers' movements
and the working class in determining policy options during the
entire history of socialist labour organisation/ others instead pre-
fer to investigate the way in which the work-unit, taken as the
basic element of socialist China's social organisation, has faced the
reforms and how the peculiar nature of internal bargaining among
workers, management, and the state or Party has been affected by
the transformation of the economic meaning of labour;3 the origi-
nality of the social role of the danwei, in the context of the organ-
isation of urban life in socialist countries, has also attracted a great
deal of interest.' More recently a new stream of research has
focused on the informal side of the labour issue, on rural-urban
migration and on the informalisation process, as a consequence of
the crisis of danwei employment and of increased mobility and
insecurity in the workplace.s
The labour reform process portrayed in the international
literature is generally one in which the extensive effort in policy
formulation has not been matched by a radical transformation of
institutions and in which practices have largely remained
unchanged. This portrait is probably the result of different factors,
the most important of which is a substantial separation between
the study of institutions and their roles and that of society.
Institutions have undoubtedly maintained a fundamental position
in Chinese urban organisation, and their role - now that the initial
years of reform have passed - is probably being reinvigorated by
the consolidation of urban society and the completion of the
reform of state-owned enterprises; nonetheless, many social 'con-
straints' hinder institutions from having overwhelming power over
individual life and over the organisation of the economy. These
constraints are the result of policy no less than of the social forces
that have been released. This has become much clearer in the
1990s, when the contradictions between labour marketisation and
bureaucratic control, though clearly perceived by both Chinese
and foreign analysts, are far from being resolved and the attempted
'institutionalisation' of labour market forces seems progressively
less likely.
Such phenomena as the informalisation of the economy are
viewed today as a positive outcome of the reform policy but
nevertheless present themselves as a difficult challenge to the insti-
tutional culture.
The present work intends to investigate processes rather than to
portray situations, in an attempt to verify whether and to what
3
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extent theory and policy options have been the outcome of the
other. The process envisaged for labour reform (and this might
well apply to other fields of the Chinese reform as well) consists of
three steps: decentralisation (that is, an informal release of public
power that allows for greater independence), informalisation
(market-driven experiments inside and outside institutions and
work-units) and ex-post institutionalisation (a recognition of
important experimental achievements and their transformation
into policies).
As noted by Peter Lee
Chinese policy-makers adopted an incremental approach
to policy-making which was closely bound to policy prece-
dents and was guided by feedback of each phase. In most
cases they adopted a 'sequential decision model,' by
making choices of alternatives on the basis of a limited
review of existing pilot schemes.6
The question arising from this deconstruction of the policymaking
process is whether we can assume a certain degree of rationality
in the behaviour of the Chinese state or not. My assumption in
this respect is that the rationality that drives labour reform is one
with limited liability, as it only entered the arena once the real
economy had already expressed its judgement and designated the
winning strategies for the short term. This is evident from analy-
sis of the theoretical efforts vis avis policy formulation, and even
clearer if the twenty years are considered as one historical period
and the method of historical narration is utilized as I try to do in
this book.
I agree with Barry Naughton, that there is no recognizable and
rational strategy in China's reform,7 if not the one emerging as a
later acknowledgment by the winners, and from the constraints
imposed to restless experiments. Nonetheless, contradictions in the
lines and the distance between debate and reality in labour reform
define a sort of 'rationale of postponement,' that - while history
draws a line between theory, practice and policy - makes clear that
decisions were indeed taken with some lucid (albeit contradictory)
long term objectives, which might be ex-post recognised as 'stabil-
ity' and 'gradualism'.
The historical perspective chosen here (although the proximity
of the events described might compromise the use of this method)
should therefore help to highlight the far-reaching effects of this
4
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process on the one hand, and of its continuous reproduction, with
increasing difficulties and growing informalisation on the other.
The investigation has been conducted on a double track: the first
is that of the theoretical debate, which has changed drastically from
a rarified and ideological discussion in the initial years to an open
acknowledgement of the social effects caused by the unrelenting
emergence of a market-driven economy after a mere dozen years.
The second track takes into account the progressively decreasing
importance of policy in the organisation of the urban labour
economy, from initial, danwei-centred reform steps to the almost
uncontrollable dynamics of a labour market and informalisation.
This work represents an attempt to put the historical method at
the service of an understanding of the dynamics that determine the
process of state-led development. Issues that sociologists and devel-
opment studies specialists might find relevant are touched upon only
marginally, and my work tries to integrate some of their findings
within the narration and to use them to discover contradictions.
Since the key I have chosen for my account is to expose the para-
doxes of the labour policy during the Chinese reform, I have
attempted to summarize the major terms of these contradictions
within the framework of conceptual 'pairs', which·will weave the
fabric of the analysis.
The first pair has a historical taste and is composed of moderni-
sation and continuity. It is indisputable that the foundation of
Chinese reform lies in the idea of 'modernisation,' that is, the
rationalisation of economic and sociaVorganisational processes.
This is not simply because the slogans of the post-1978 leadership
are moulded around Zhou Enlai's earlier idea of 'four modern-
isations' (agriculture, industry, defence, and science), but more
practically because the fast pace of recent Chinese development has
been paralleled by a steady rationalisation of production. The re-
organisation of labour practices has played a pivotal role in this
process, not only because of its central importance as an economic
factor - given the critical state of the Chinese economy after the
years of leftist radicalism - but also because of the major impor-
tance of labour in a socialist theoretical and political background.
Labour has therefore been central during Chinese reform: at the
beginning, when the egalitarian redistributive policy was finally
challenged by productivist views, after the Cultural Revolution had
slashed the workers' purchasing power and their 'motivation' to
work; and later, when considerations of production growth and the
need to drastically reform state-owned enterprises favoured a
5
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deregulation of labour relations, mitigated only by the fear of social
unrest and disruptive effects on central control of the economy. As
much as 'modernisation' was the propelling principle of reform,
'continuity' (of leadership methods, of central control over political
and economic factors, of the structure of interest networks) was the
condition that allowed it to overcome crises without serious conse-
quences and to learn progressively from different stages and
experiences. Therefore, although the initial objectives and the final
outcomes of the reform transformation process seem to be strik-
ingly different, evaluation of it in a historical perspective inevitably
focuses on continuities rather than on discontinuities.
The coexistence of these two terms in the ideology underlying
policy formulation is the basis for the very existence of China's
market socialism, and constitutes the ideological reference for
what I shall later call 'double orthodoxy'. This is, however, rather
the outcome of a slow adaptation and continuous reformulation of
policies than of a consciously planned path of development.
The orientation of the policymakers that governed reform
introduces a second set of related concepts: flexibility and
decentralisation. This pair simply points to the two paths appar-
ently followed by the reform. The flexibility of the labour reform
policies clearly appears in the continuous balance between exper-
imentation and implementation, within the framework that
imposed productivity (first) and marketisation (later) as general
references for the reform and as counter arguments to the
previously dominant idea of central control. 'Decentralisation'
meant enterprise autonomy and a reduction in the role of public
actors in allocation, management, and regulation of labour
relations. Flexible reform steps could be experimented with and
later implemented due to the increased autonomy of enterprises
and local departments, to greater freedom in the process of
interpreting central policies and directives, and to increased
interest on the part of the centre to consider changes going on in
the localities and to appropriate the most successful cases for
national policy.
At the same time it meant greater exposure for enterprises to the
instabilities and uncertainties of the market and a transformation
of the entrepreneurial behaviour of cadres, who, according to the
original intention, were to be transformed from executors of
central policy into self-reliant and business-oriented managers.
It is disputable from the point of view of reform politics, that
state policy played a largely developmental role in China's rapid
6
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economic growth. The fact that the Chinese state managed to
foster development by taking a capitalist path but without col-
lapsing or releasing political power, engenders the expectation
that centralized policymaking is able to maintain tight control
over the gradual implementation of its policy and plans.
However, this is not the case. The implementation of labour
policy reveals how this process was not a linear, hierarchical,
univocal stream beginning with ideological relaxation and lead-
ing to market deregulation. Rather - to a certain extent - it was
the other way around. The role played by local governments of
agencies of the principal's policy allowed for an increasing role
for local administrations and enterprises, and central planners
often reacted only later to experiments by enforcing regulations.
From experiences far away from Zhongnanhai, policymakers
came to understand that there were ways for China to become
part of the world economy and they gradually adopted policies
aimed at maintaining control over the fast moving economy.
After the 'market economy' received official blessings from the
centre, policymaking was devoted essentially to controlling the
dramatic transformations in the economy and in society. At the
same time it was the deeply rooted local bureaucracy that took
control of economic levers and was able to 'restrain the private
sector from becoming an independent economic class.' As noted
recently by Jean C. Oi
local state corporatism managed to channel resources
towards development, exhibiting a 'noteworthy flexibility
... in adapting to changing political and economic condi-
tions while at the same time keeping at least indirect
control of the development process. 8
The process of decentralisation should not be seen as an outcome
only of the reform policy and the subsequent disruption of the
totalitarian structure of the 'classic' socialist state and its omni-
present redistributive bureaucracy. Many today tend to exclude the
totalitarian pattern and to portray the Chinese socialist state as a
'functionally fragmented bureaucracy which contains tensions,
bargaining, and conflicts of interest between different sectors and
different levels.'9 Such a structure is indeed an advantage for the
decentralisation boom and the emergence of differences among
places and within analogous institutions, without preventing the
bureaucratic structures of the socialist state from maintaining
7
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control over the key features and ideology of the reformed system.
This approach attaches priority and importance to the interaction
at the local or shop floor levels and to greater dependence of social
organisations such as work-units on personal or group networks
and low-level bureaucratic interventions rather than on some dis-
tant centre.
Andrew Walder's analysis of the classic period of socialist indus-
try focuses on the high degree of dependency at the danwei (work-
unit) level, based mainly on the 'foreman's empire,' that is, on the
great influence wielded by unit level personal networks and shop
floor cadres on industrial relations and worker dependency.lO The
reform, according to the initial analysis of the later period
contained in Walder's 1986 book, did not change the situation
dramatically: labour relations, shifted 'from ascetism to paternal-
ism,' that is, from a focus on politics to a focus on economics and
produ~tivism, without fundamentally modifying the levels of
dependency.
Through the study of work-unit transformation, later works
helped to understand the segmentation of the labour market and
the evolution of market behaviour, with the process of labour
reform drastically modifying (though not yet completely) the
patterns of dependency of Chinese workers and the methods of
adaptation to a more hostile environment, throwing them into a
'sea' beyond the shores of the unit-island. Ching-Kwan Lee argues
that the increasing social complexity (the consequence of a larger
supply and a more articulated demand) in the labour arena funda-
mentally changed the basic assumption of Walder's organised
dependency, leading to the emergence in the 1990s of a pattern of
disorganised despotism, where disorganised reflects the 'lack of
coordination among diverse reform measures' and despotism is the
outcome of economic pressure on workers, that (as we shall see),
is derived from both the labour market and administrative power. 11
A third conceptual pair (redistribution and market) embodies
the changing and contradictory role of labour institutions. Labour
changed from a tool of social redistribution of wealth into a pro-
duction factor, increasingly exposed to the tyranny of the market.
The institutions were forced to playa totally different role, both in
the realm of employment (the allocation system, control of geo-
graphic mobility, etc.), and in the protection of workers' rights and
the welfare system. The market has been among the most power-
ful and appealing points of reference in the Chinese reform (often
appealingly prefaced by the evocative word 'socialist'), but one of
8
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the most persistent taboos was its association with the word
'labour'. The marketisation of labour relations had already taken
place in many practical fields when labour contracts were reintro-
duced into Chinese state industry, de facto recognizing that man-
power could be sold just like any other 'production factor,' or, as
a lengthy debate later concluded, as a 'commodity.' Despite the
rampaging marketisation of labour relations, the state has not yet
renounced its claim to a redistributive role and to a direct role in
the organisation of labour allocation. This has resulted in a 'highly
institutionalised' labour market, in which the role of institutions
(either direct, as employer, or indirect, as service organiser) is
extremely important and sometimes contradictory to the anarchy
of market behaviour. The role of institutions (that is, of public
bodies or enterprises) has been decoupled from the state's ability to
maintain control over the employment system. The labour market
(with the exception of certain sections, such as managerial and
skilled personnel) is almost entirely independent from labour allo-
cation plans. Nonetheless, local institutions and work-units, and
the system of employment agencies, still play the major role in
determining hiring practices, as shown by the prevalence of insti-
tutional practices for the hiring of personnel in the formal indus-
trial sector. Clienteles and cronyism, once embedded in the upward
mobility processes internal to the danwei, are now at work from
the moment the unit is accessed, thereby anticipating and moving
labour conflicts outside the work-unit and implying a higher rate
of open competitiveness among workers.
1.2 Chinese Labour and the Making of a Market:
An Overview and Some Basic Assumptions
Labour Policy and Institutions
China's labour market included over eight million private workers
in 1952, almost three years after the Communist takeover, that is,
over 35 percent of the total industrial work force. The traditional
family-based labour market that dominated allocation patterns
since ancient times - and had been challenged only in the nine-
teenth century by an increasing presence of foreign enterprises -
had always been characterized by a high degree of informality, and
had relied heavily on kinship and friendship.12 After the founding
of the PRC - and even more so after the nationalisation of Chinese
industry in 1956 (that is during the so-called 'classic'13 period of
9
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socialism) - the number of Chinese private workers was reduced
progressively, until they virtually disappeared from the national
statistics in the last years of the Cultural Revolution. As a conse-
quence of the focus on state industry China assigned paramount
importance to full-employment policies as a criterion for the allo-
cation of the work force: work was considered a general right,14
like food and housing, and policies fostered egalitarian access to it.
A job, and an urban job in particular, represented a door to
participation in the distribution of wealth throughout society.
Food rations, free housing, and centrally planned work allocations
were the basic parts of socialism: in this context work was not a
production factor but rather a major component in the distribu-
tion system; work was not based on an individual choice guided by
economic conditions, but the representation of social status.
During the initial steps of socialist construction and until the
1958' Great Leap Forward (GLF), the development of China's
labour institutions was based mainly on the post-war 'high
Stalinist' Soviet model, calling for the implementation of a wage-
grade system, with income gaps for different duties among staff
and workers. This system was widely implemented, but it was not
always effective, resulting in the emergence of egalitarian practices;
it was also one of the main reasons for the discontent during the
intra-unit conflicts of the late 1950s,15 until the implementation of
the 'rational low-wage system' (a high-benefits low-wage scheme)
which characterised China's salary policy until the end of the
Cultural Revolution. 16
The Soviet-style attempt to implement the principle of 'distribu-
tion according to labour' in the wage system is one - but not the
only - feature inviting a comparison between the 1950s and the
initial stage of labour reform in the 1980s. During the years prior
to the GLF, temporary workers in fact were widely employed in
industry and infrastructural construction, either for particular
labour-intensive production needs or as seasonal workers in dif-
ferent locations and in response to manufacturing necessities.
Finally, the sharp increase in urban population during the 1950s,
before the anti-urban policies (aimed in particular at defending
urban privileges) came into effect, was analogous to a deregulated
labour allocation situation, similar to that experienced in the
1980s. Urban administrative re-organisation and strict control of
migration flows were the solutions adopted at the end of the GLF;
deregulation and market development were part of the post-
Cultural Revolution solutions.
10
CHINESE LABOUR AND THE MAKING OF A MARKET
The reform drive starting at the end of the 1970s changed
China's planned economy into a state-controlled market system,
the main scope of which was to boost the efficiency of the pro-
ductive system and to prepare the economy for international
competition. In the new political climate of economic reform,
questions of labour organisation, recruitment and allocation
became increasingly important, engendering many contradictions.
On the one hand, labour was among the few economic factors
China could rely on extensively; on the other, the entire social and
economic equilibrium was based on bureaucratic, centralised, and
'unified' labour management.
In the initial years of reform, it very quickly became obvious that
the attempt to maintain bureaucratic control over population and
labour movements would conflict with the problem of the
increased geographic distribution of work opportunities and thus
create problems for the idea of state supervision over the market
economy.
The production needs engendered by the opening up of the for-
merly closed and self sufficient Chinese economy - also in the
field of labour - to international markets, meant the Communist
leadership faced the challenge of undertaking a major re-writing
of regulations, a radical modification of ideological assumptions,
and a fundamental downgrading of the political involvement of
the state in the field of economics, in order to attract the flow of
foreign capital.
Mobility and opening to the outside world are useful here only
as examples to help understand the paths along which the trans-
formation effort of labour politics in China has been moving
during the last twenty years: continuous revision of social and
economic policy under pressure of practical contradictions is
accompanied by theoretically 'justified' deregulation to respond to
(internal and) international interests.
The official final aim of economic reform has never been the
implementation of 'private free markets' (ziyou siren shichang -
even though it might appear so currently) but rather of a 'socialist
market economy under the conditions of socialist public owner-
ship.'!7 Indeed, the larger part of the financial and productive
potential of China is still under the control of the state, although
the growth of the private sector is progressively overtaking the
leading role of poorly-performing state industrial plants; however,
the most dynamic sectors of the booming economy are all found in
the private or 'collective' industries (most of the latter are hidden
11
LABOUR THEORY AND PRACTICE
private enterprises in local state enterprises), while the state-owned
enterprises are struggling to be profitable entities (44 percent expe-
rienced losses in 1994; in 1997 total losses in state sector exceeded
total profits but these are now beginning to decline)Y But, critical
for the state and for its policy choices, these enterprises still pro-
vide 50 percent of state revenue.
The reform of labour institutions and the introduction of new
administrative tools, such as the contract system, were aimed at
differentiating allocation channels and at controlling the increasing
labour mobility. The growing availability of labour outside the
traditional recruitment channels progressively reduced the impor-
tance of the system of 'central-unified allocation' (zhongyang
tongyi fenpei). This dual market took clear shape during the
1980s, when full employment and market opportunities clashed
openly, negatively affecting the hiring and development plans of
Chinese state enterprises. Prior to the reform, the number of
workers employed in an enterprise was based on financial consid-
erations by management. New allocations according to the plan
accompanied by new funds were normally welcomed by enter-
prises that accepted the advantages of new financial means
without direct costs for the unit.
Even in the first years of the reform - when enterprises still faced
limited budget constraints - recruitment from the open (out of
plan) market (which had grown during the economic reorganisa-
tion) was limited as the enterprises were plagued by redundant
personnel and preferred to hire from inside, giving higher priority
to the satisfaction of the internal needs of their own unit rather
than to productive skills. 'Back-door' (hou men) hiring and a pref-
erence for the children of workers in the unit remained among the
guiding principles of the State-owned enterprise (SOE) recruitment
strategies.19
As noted by Granick,z° the requirements for recruitment and, in
particular, the priority given to certain skills or the profile of hired
personnel differ according to the administrative level of the
decision maker: quality and skills are preferred when local admin-
istrative criteria are involved, while allocation equalities are more
highly valued at higher or central levels. The administrative nature
of hiring procedures and the limited interest of enterprise manage-
ment in market opportunities remained strongly influenced during
the reform period by a preference for internal recruitment (neizhao
or dingti 21 - substitution) of women danwei de erzi ('sons of our
unit'), mainly for reasons related to the mayor-like role played by
12
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the manager of large state units and their need to avoid internal
struggle.
Granick also suggests that competition among people entitled to
new jobs is a sign of the existence of a labour market in which indi-
viduals are willing to participate 'even if only at a single stage' of
their working life.
A characteristic of employment in state enterprises which
persisted after the reform is the contemporary excess of an unnec-
essary (principally unskilled) labour force and the shortage of
necessary (skilled) workers; this is one of the features (together
with the phenomenon of hoarding staff) which Janos Kornai asso-
ciates with the chronic 'shortages' of socialist economies.22 In such
a situation (which changed considerably later in the 1980s and was
dramatically reversed during the 1990s), the fundamental influ-
ence of interpersonal relationships and interest networks (what the
Chinese usually call guanxi) in recruitment practices could not
be ignored.
The effectiveness of informal networks - able to influence the
evolution of work relationships and access by enterprises to skilled
labourers or access by workers to the best enterprises - are,
according to Christiansen,23 a demonstration that the existence of
one or more markets does not imply that labour mobility is
governed by market forces.
Work-units and the Working Class
Reform of labour started as a way to alleviate the burden of state
industry caused by the enormous costs of redundant personnel and
by the low productivity of plants and individual labourers result-
ing from the egalitarian practices of the radical Maoist years. The
closed labour system built around the comprehensive role of the
danwei resulted in extremely low levels of labour mobility that
continued well into the reform period. During the early 1980s,
state enterprises continued to be a source of attraction to outsiders
and newcomers to the work force (particularly the skilled among
them), and prevented highly qualified labourers from leaving the
unit (contributing decisively to this, was their politically privileged
position in the unit). Only later did the rapid development of indi-
vidual entrepreneurship make the 'dive into the sea' (xia hail of the
individual or non-state economy more attractive to workers, as
labour mobility and flexibility become accepted features of the
new approach to labour policy.
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Aggravating the burden of labour immobility were the long-
term consequences of the policies on administration of the popu-
lation. For almost two decades, from the end of the 1950s
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, China's anti-urban policies
had been successful in controlling and partially reducing the urban
population. This achievement in controlling geographic mobility
was to some extent due to the forced rustication process, but a
major role was also played by such bureaucratic means as the
'family registration system' (hukou dengji zhidu) - hereafter hukou
- the basic registration document of any Chinese, defining his or
her status according to place of residence, with the main distinc-
tion being agricultural or nonagricultural, and under the strict con-
trol of the party's reach to the countryside. But, by the late 1970s,
the population began moving into the cities and the earlier eco-
nomic equilibrium changed rapidly, increasing the entropy of the
system and its complexity.
Acknowledgement of the re-emergence of the concurrent actions
of marketisation and urbanisation threw open an important ques-
tion concerning the existence, formation, and role of a Chinese
working class, as well as the process of proletarianisation of
Chinese workers during the 1980s.
According to the 'classic' three-phase proletarianisation process
proposed by Charles Tilly,24 and applied to China by Walder the
process takes place in industrial economies through 'the expropri-
ation of rural producers, a reclassification of the rural population
from peasants to wage labourers and the transfer of the rural pop-
ulation to urban areas.'25
Although much of the working class was a 1950s creation of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China's socialism formally
opposed the process of 'making' a working class (a large class of
wage labourers resulting from modernisation of the economy and
industry), while facing, in practice, the necessity of increasing the
number of workers involved in industrial production.
One of Walder's conclusions was that what differs in China's
making of a proletarian working class is the absence of an accom-
plished urbanization process during the phase of classic socialism.
Since the time of the Great Leap Forward, the industrial popula-
tion in the cities had become an increasingly closed group, and the
forced urban-to-rural migration policies of the 1960s were prob-
ably a result of the endogenous growth of the working population
inside the cities, and not of further immigration.26 In the actual
process of making a Chinese working class
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the taming of the transformative power of markets and
capitalism has been accomplished by a bureaucratic
system that channels mobility into the narrow bounds of
a status system based on residence and birth.27
Bureaucratic intervention during the 1960s and 1970s was appar-
ently a way to 'channel' mobility and productive forces. But what
happens if the bureaucratic control over local processes progres-
sively decreases or changes its shape and objectives while market
forces are allowed to exercise a higher (although 'socialist' and
'mechanical') influence?
Though labour flexibility was only gradually implemented, its
theoretical acknowledgment and the implementation of practical
policy steps are the major reasons why the issue of full proletari-
anisation was reintroduced in the evaluation of the years following
the Cultural Revolution. I would call this process - which is only
partly related to the traditional influence of industrial development
- a re-proletarianisation, as it is the result of a second start (the
first was interrupted by the deepening of the socialist planned
economy in the late 1950s) of a process based also on (a) the
massive floating of the rural population due to a relaxation of
bureaucratic controls, a crisis in agricultural employment,
geographic differentiation between development strategies (caused
in part also by policy decisions and not simply by the moderniza-
tion drive); (b) the progressive decentralization and informalisa-
tion of the economy, that is, the transformation of the aims and
objectives of the work-unit and the emergence of an independent
sector with less interest in production plans and more interest in
profit-making activities; and (c) the re-emerging role of the family
as a unit of production and household accumulation, whose readi-
ness to work hard for money has become proverbial.
Sally Sargeson recently contributed an anthropological work on
the transformation of the discourse on the proletariat in China,
that correctly portrays how reforms - that at an increasing pace
turned the socialist paternalist state into a quasi-capitalist, market-
regulating, bureaucratic mechanism - 'have created the ideologi-
cal, political, economic and institutional tools by which China's
proletariat has been reworked' and, eventually, has passed from
being the 'master' to being the exploitable sector of industrial soci-
ety. 'The long term significance of these reforms' in Sargeson's
words, 'is that China's proletariat has been reworked as a cheap,
"manageable" work force that will produce profits for investors
and enterprise owners.'28
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Different and contrasting interpretations have been put forward
regarding the ability of Chinese workers to stand up to various
exploiters (be it the bureaucracy or the new despotic disorder of
the labour market). The history of worker conflicts in the 1950s
has been re-evaluated by Francois Gipouloux29 and later by
Elizabeth Perry,J° who notes that the obsessive search for class con-
sciousness in studies of the Chinese working class has led many to
ignore how - although organized around such 'feudal' tools as
'regional gangs, guilds, and native place associations - workers
joined other urbanites to protest as citizens or consumers, rather
than as members of a working class,'31 and that native place net-
works should therefore not be excluded from investigation as a
form of organisation of an otherwise relatively unconscious work-
ing class' protest and participation in political life.
Along the same lines and more recently Jackie Sheehan has con-
sidered a longer period of China's worker history to conclude that
intra-unit disputes and other conflicts 'tend quickly to develop into
a confrontation between workers and the Party,'32 and that their
antagonistic nature is of utmost importance, despite the lack of an
orthodox class construction.
An impressive and complex record of conflicts recently shed new
light on the influence of worker unrest on the direction of political
campaigns under CCP leadership (such as the sudden turn around
of the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1957 or the 1989 crackdown
on the student movement). Different forms of indirect action - inten-
tional inefficiency, production slowdowns, non-compliance with
assigned duties, second jobs - that have been referred to as 'unor-
ganized but collective inaction'33 also have to be considered among
the determinants of labour policies. While the existence of signifi-
cant - visible and invisible - conflicts does not make Chinese
workers an organised class and a conscious antagonistic move-
ment, the history of labour unrest and resistance34 is relevant to this
study as it helps validate the basic assumption that most of the
policy steps taken by the reform leadership were a response to a
generalized demand and were taken under the threat of discontent
more than as an outcome of an all-encompassing drive towards
social and economic planning. Policy decisions and regulatory
measures were efficient in setting the hurdles for labour market
development - more than in boosting its development - in particu-
lar by maintaining almost intact the administrative divides that after
twenty years of reform still determine individual opportunities to
participate in the market and tie the distribution of wealth to status.
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The instability of labour relations and draconian exploitation
encouraged the speeding up of mobility and, coupled with the
preservation of administrative barriers, transformed the proletariat
from an ideological elite into a multifaceted, complex blend of
unprotected and often displaced wage workers.
Migration and Infonnalisation of the Urban Economy
In recent extensive research on the quest for citizenship among
new urbanites who are increasingly migrating from the country-
side to fill the ranks of an army of unemployed, Dorothy Solinger
notes that 'both the extant state and the market were blocking the
achievement of urban citizenship' and that this peculiar interaction
basically contradicted the generally accepted assumption that
development and marketisation produce an extension of citizen-
ship to wider sections of the population.35
The hukoU 36 had always been the main component of demo-
graphic policies, but it proved a major economic disadvantage as
soon as the centralized system faced the challenge of an increas-
ingly deregulated society and it was a constraint on the mobility of
the workforce in a free labour market. In the hukou system, the
rural population is registered and administratively dependent on
its rural territorial unit; the population registered as urban, on the
other hand, enjoys the advantages of the larger urban labour
market and is given free access to the public sector under the protec-
tion of the state. After the process of deregulation began, demands
for work were concentrated in places other than the countryside,
or changed from one agricultural area or mining compound to
another from season to season. Agricultural work opportunities
decreased steadily after the contract system was implemented in
the countryside (1980); unemployed farmers were therefore forced
to leave their homes to seek temporary jobs in distant counties or
cities, or to engage in different strategies of development, invari-
ably beginning with migration. Very soon, the outdated hukou
system could no longer control migration flows, and its abolition
has since then been on the agenda of Chinese reformers. 37
The contradiction between a stable residence and floating work
opportunities caused, on the one hand, a sharp increase in the
availability of cheap and unskilled labour, engendered by the
inflow of the rural population into cities of all sizes (where a bendi
hukou -local hukou - is still a major advantage in job seeking,J8
while it is also an administrative definition of the divisions within
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the labour market); on the other, the emergence of a parallel labour
market which ignores the hukou registration as well as labour
rights protection, and is based on informal practices. The con-
tinued direct influence of the hukou in the organisation and
segmentation of the labour market is also a major reason for the
higher competition among different players in the market (espe-
cially along the insider-outsider divide) and for the lack of a self-
organised common interest among the re-born Chinese proletariat.
'The workers, when entering the factories are already differenti-
ated as the bearers of distinctive, potentially antagonistic non-class
identities and relations.'J9
The critical and contradictory situations created by the crisis of
household registration were initially tackled by emergency actions,
such as the issue, during the 1980s, of temporary urban certificates
to incoming rural workers to allow them to sell their labour in the
urban labour 'market' without allowing them access to the associ-
ated welfare benefits.40 Only later, did more stable forms of regis-
tration (ID cards and working permits) become available to non
residents. For migrants, the corresponding increase in status
granted by a permanent urban hukou and employment in a SOE
invariably was mere wishful thinking; the probability of entering a
state enterprise as a permanent worker decreased significantly as
the reform moved towards a full marketisation of labour relations.
Work in an SOE long remained the divide between people with
and people without access to public services and facilities, and to
goods available only by work-unit distribution. Recent major
changes in housing allocations and welfare distributions pose
gloomier prospects also for large numbers of urban dwellers. Their
ability to get the greatest comparative advantages over migrants
from the marketisation remains, however, unchanged, due to their
traditional status and networks of connection.
As a result of the increased labour opportunities and restrictions
on the redistributive role of the work-unit, labour relations during
the reform period have undergone a process of informalisation.
Informalisation and second or 'grey' economies, as some
authors have already pointed out,41 greatly influenced the econ-
omy even during the radical years, when the number and nature
of activities on the border of legality - not formally acknowledged
but largely accepted by the authorities and therefore 'informal'-
was significant. This process accelerated the re-emergence of
large-scale individual private economies in rural areas after the
beginning of reform and led to the transformation of the grey
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economies into a lively and flexible private sector. This trans-
formation sometimes occurred with the complicity of historical,
economic, and political factors, which granted some areas advan-
tageous positions (as was the case in the coastal areas or the
faster, and unexpected, growth of private economies in such areas
as Wenzhou)42 or simply more social motivation and cultural
capital to make the change less disruptive and more profitable.
From the point of view of policymaking, informalisation should
be considered a part of what Naughton calls the 'ex-post coher-
ence'43 of China's modernisation drive, as it was the result of
tolerant behaviour on the part of the central and local state
towards some sectors of the economy, under the consideration of
peculiar situations, and not the result of coherent and conscious
steps taken by the policymakers.
Indeed, after the reform process began, the second economy in
the rural areas rapidly extended to the once monolithic and state-
led cities, where the organisation of production and services had
always been a monopoly of state-owned units; a market for
services and labour rapidly emerged, profiting from the crisis of
the urban state's redistributive functions.
I define informalisation as a progressive release of administra-
tive power by the state that allows, under imperfect and largely
deregulated market conditions, activities by non recognised market
actors. While their status and rights are denied by social and polit-
ical rules, their existence and activities are necessary to the fulfil-
ment of certain requirements of capitalist development (the supply
of basic services and of cheap labour, for example).
In addition to modernization theories of development, David
Stark suggests 'an alternative interpretation of the relationship
between modernity and informality, in which informalisation and
proletarianisation grow in tandem rather than through mutual dis-
placement.'44 Progressive informalisation opened alternative paths
to participation in production and the distribution of social wealth
to the 'new proletarians' of the 1980s. This followed the develop-
ment of 'second' urban economies in petty commerce and small
workshops of the individual sector and marginal, illicit activities of
an illegal economy (the entire range of unregistered enterprises,
not only criminal activities).
It is my opinion that the process of debureaucratisation con-
tributed to the emergence of informal economic players, and that
the explosion of a yinxing jingji (shadow economy), which is not
only an urban phenomenon, grew in response to widespread
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efforts to extend labour opportunities. The policy struggles against
the second economy and economic informalisation targeted only
smuggling and related tax evasions (even though migrant eco-
nomies, for example, became major contributors to local public
coffers45 ). But these struggles were challenged by unexpected fac-
tors, such as increasing organisation and quality of production
(technology and commercial networks in particular) and by the
number of people involved in informal activities (including many
state workers who took on secondary activities). Some official data
from the early 1990s put the share of total production 'coming
from obscure roads' (lailu bu ming) at about 20 percent of total
national output. Smuggling activities also changed the composition
of the urban market with respect to commodities generally not
associated with illegal activity - in the 1990s, alcohol has been sur-
passed in output value by, for example, leather shoes.46 This seems
to demonstrate that urban consumer markets are able to absorb a
much larger quantity of consumer goods than those marketed by
formal producers, and that the shadow economy is competing with
the official productive structure not only in marginal and simple
production but also in major consumer sectors. In particular, unreg-
istered workshops rely on the increasing availability of a cheap and
unprotected work force, and on expanding and concentrated urban
markets, to produce and marketise popular, small goods with rela-
tively low technological content. Productive and spatial organisa-
tion sometimes take the classic shape of the 'industrial districts'
already observed in earlier stages of capitalist development and
during the passage from craftsmanship to small industry in Western
countries (the concentration of production, a family structure, a
sharing of basic services, and self-organisation of distribution).47
The informalisation of the economy is yet another major com-
ponent of proletarianisation, as it contributes to the deterioration
of working conditions in urban centres and to unrestrained
exploitation of privately contracted wage labour and maintains an
'informal population' in the cities - that is, a 'reserve army' of
labourers 'waiting for employment' - at survival leve1.48 The
growth of the above in urban centres and the bureaucracy's inabil-
ity to regain direct or indirect control are probably the reasons for
the tacit agreement between the formal (bureaucratic and state-led)
and informal (private and shadow) economies, as demonstrated by
the well-known cases of the ethnic enclaves in the cities, where
commercial activities grew as a result of the reduced ability of the
state to play its distributive role.49
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1.3 Labour Theory regarding the Market:
Some Preliminary Notes and a Breakdown into Periods
China is a socialist state and a reforming socialist economy. This
duality reflects the double nature of the ideological 'environment'
in which debate has been shaped.
The Chinese definition of socialism is deeply rooted in the
socialist state as well as in Maoist tradition. The orthodoxy of
state socialism and of the proletarian dictatorship has never been
formally abandoned, although many major political decisions and
ideological statements over the last twenty years have resulted
from a much less strict definition of the term 'socialism.'
Nevertheless, a situation I would call double orthodoxy was oper-
ating for the most part during the period of this study. On the one
hand, socialism means a fully planned economy, public ownership
of the means of production, and the political leadership of the
CCP as the vanguard of the working class, whose political activity
is the result of the leading role of 'Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought.' On the other hand, pragmatic orthodoxy
based on formal adherence to productivity and market-driven
state-socialism advocated 'modernisation,' the development of a
'legal system,' and a 'socialist market economy' into the next
century. These two frames of reference constituted the battlefield
for the internal struggles in the party between 'reformists' and
'conservatives' who suggested two opposing and independent
paths of development, but who often acted simultaneously in the
formulation of policy options.
This was the founding paradox of the theoretical debates of the
late 1970s and early 1980s. No wonder that, having to move in a
glass house, the debate became mainly 'factionalist' {opinions
were rarely individual}, and 'specialistic' (on single fields of
research) as the existence of a double orthodoxy (together with a
harsh and dangerous environment for outspoken theorists in the
initial years of reform) was generally enough to inhibit any
attempts to advocate general or comprehensive theories. Both refer-
ential 'orthodoxies' had an influential role, as did their political
sponsors and representatives, resulting in an even more complex
framework.50
But the difficulty was not only connected with two (or more)
conflicting lines inside the party; it often involved the forced
coexistence of sometimes antithetical ideas on development that
progressively weakened the ideological foundations of the debate.
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The existence of a double orthodoxy had practical conse-
quences in the background of the debate. Particularly in the initial
years of the reform period, the basic references were to Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, and rarely to Chinese economists, party lead-
ers or even Chairman Mao. There were two main reasons for this
attitude: the first was the attempt to find justification for the new
economic policies as much as possible in the socialist tradition,
sanctioning them as the result of a traditional interpretation, from
which Mao was clearly considered to have diverged in his later
years, thus making him a difficult source of reference (this was the
process of re-establishing the old ideology); the second was that,
once the 'people's enemies' (namely the members of the 'Gang of
Four') had been eliminated, no one dared to criticise anyone, as
the political climate was still extremely sensitive. The use of
Marxist texts was not only the result of the statements about the
nature of 'reform' and of Deng's pragmatic economicism, repeat-
edly defined as the 'actual socialist system of thought,' that suited
Chinese tastes as an alternative to the leftist putschist attitudes of
the 'gang.' It was also the outcome of a general difficulty in
identifying 'enemies' and 'friends' in the wake of the collective
nightmare of the Cultural Revolution.
Later on, when it became clear that the initial uncertain steps of
the gaige (reform) had become a definitive ideological path of
development and codified slogans, the issue gradually became less
sensitive, but the need for a double justification of ideas remained,
and the terms of reference diverged even more sharply.
In an attempt to describe this twenty year-long debate, my pri-
mary classification is based on a breakdown of the post-Mao years
into three main periods (and their practical consequences).
Before introducing the specifics of each period, the limits and
common features of such a problematic division must be pre-
sented. A breakdown into periods never has general validity and,
in this case, as I state at the beginning of this study, the linearity of
time (as a component of the historical method of process analysis)
has an autonomous importance in the methodological approach.
Periods are therefore divided along the lines of: (a) frequency of dis-
cussion of some basic issues in the debate; (b) major development
in economic policy, policy cycles, and general policy language;
(c) major political campaigns accompanying policy implementa-
tion, and (d) turning points in labour policy implementation.
This means that the identification of periods is based on the exis-
tence of homogeneous features in these four fields of analysis
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(debate, policy, campaigns, and implementation). Burit also means
that instead of the major discontinuities in the historical cycle
generally used for a breakdown into periods, I will use major
developments along the lines of continuity as time markers.
Thus, the period from 1977 through 1995 will be divided into
three main parts: (1) the period of re-establishment (1977-1983),
during which an orthodoxy based on pre-Cultural Revolution
socialist practices was implemented and harsh criticism was
directed at policies driven by class struggle. The main topic of
debate during this period was the theoretical evaluation and tech-
nical implementation of the Marxist principle of 'distribution
according to labour;' (2) the period of contractualisation
(1984-1991), characterised by the beginning of a structural reform
of state enterprises, by the emergence of generalised contracting in
the Chinese economy, and by theoretical disputes regarding
whether or not labour is a commodity; and (3) the period of
marketisation (1992-1995, and thereafter) of the Chinese econ-
omy and greater deregulation of social and economic mechanisms,
paralleled by a debate -largely economic in nature - on the imple-
mentation of labour market (laodongli shichang) policies, and
on a more pragmatic though populist acceptance of the issue of
unemployment.
In order to be the first critic of my own divisions, it must be
clearly understood that while this periodisation reflects a three-
stage economic development of Chinese reform (planned economy
- planned commodity economy - socialist market economy), no
such clear-cut division can be accepted for the debate. Actually, the
three characteristic topics (the law of 'distribution according to
labour', the commoditisation of labour, and the labour market) are
not exclusive to the debate in each phase, that is, topics often over-
lap. The time segments chosen here conform to the periods when
each issue was supported by contending positions, while the ends
of the periods roughly correspond to the resolution of the disputes
and general acknowledgement, in turn, of the three successive
principles. Not irrelevant to this pre-assumption is, of course, that
each period is linked to relevant political events and to the
approval of major political documents!
As for the definition of the periods, at the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, I have decided to use the categories generally associated
with the idea of 'market socialism' (socialist state, contract
system, market mechanisms)51 to mark the evolution towards a
specific model of Chinese development which after its twentieth
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anniversary and after the death of its major advocate, Deng
Xiaoping, appears in historical perspective as a single, though
complex and contradictory, path. Market socialism is the attempt
to let 'fire and water' interact to build an economic system able to
apply the 'rationality' of the market to the 'superiority' of the
planned economy and public ownership.
The 'Restoration' Stage (1977-1983)
The first period starts with the end of the Cultural Revolution and
ends with the Third Plenum of the Twelfth CCP Congress in
October 1984 that affirmed the transformation of the Chinese
economy into a 'planned commodity economy.'
This is the period when the foundations of reform were laid, as
the .economic and social system of socialist China underwent
dramatic changes.
Even in the labour debates (as in other theoretical issues) the
founding event was the defeat and political condemnation of the
'Gang of Four,' culminating in the 1980 trial. 52 This political act
was the basis for any criticism of 'previous' views, the factor cre-
ating the ideological distinction between 'yesterday' and 'today,'
and the symbolic element identifying a collectively condemned
enemy. During this period, the debate over labour was very gen-
eral. The Marxist category of 'distribution according to labour'
(an lao fenpei - hereafter DATL) had been widely and extensively
replaced during the years of Maoist egalitarianism, at both a
theoretical and practical level, by the practice of 'to each accord-
ing to his needs' or, as Deng himself later depicted, 'distribution
according to politics' (anzheng {enpei).s3 The reassessment of a
Marxist interpretation and the condemnation of previous distribu-
tion practices accompanied elements of the initial steps to reform
labour to pre-Cultural Revolution organisation. DATL was a
central topic in the overall discussion of the reform process.
Particularly in the initial years of economic recovery (namely
1977-78) the issue was given increasing attention, to the point that
the newly mobilized intelligentsia convened four major confer-
ences on this topic between April 1977 and October 1978, all
assessing the fundamental role of this economic law in the 'social-
ist' (i.e. precommunist) stage of the Chinese revolution.
This was a period when theoretical debate was mainly shaped by
the need to go beyond earlier ideological constructions, negating
issue by issue the negative interpretation of the objective economic
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law of DATL. Many of the ideas raised in these months of lively
(though obsessively repetitive) academic discussions were to
become very important for the reassessment of economic and
political reform. For example, the reintroduction of the concept of
bourgeois rights (das biirgerliche Recht)54 which had been associ-
ated by Cultural Revolution theoreticians with DATL according to
a rather peculiar interpretation of Marxist texts, allowed an
opportunity to discuss wider and more complex Recht-related
issues of China's economic and legal reform.
The reinstatement of DATL -as the guiding principle of the
economic distribution of social wealth was accompanied by the
emergence of several other issues: general egalitarian distribution
was compared with labour-based egalitarianism; the hierarchical
implications of DATL advocated during the previous decade were
openly criticised and instead the non-hierarchical nature of eco-
nomic relationships under DATL was affirmed; the capitalist or
bourgeois nature of economic relationships and of the political
mentality or attitude under the influence of 'bourgeois' DATL was
denied; the question of property rights was cautiously raised, as
DATL law allowed for the private possession of consumer goods.
There was no real contention about the superiority of the old
Marxist principle of distribution in itself, as most of the 'enemies'
were serving prison terms or were not taking part in the discussion.
During these years, the debate on labour became a powerful tool
for legitimation of the new policy; despite a general consensus on
the central issue (the adoption of DATL as the guiding principle
and the consequent functional link between labour performance
and remuneration), at the level of policy decisions, the contradic-
tions between different lines of thought were much more evident.
The topic of DATL dominated the discussion during the entire
period and had both ideological and practical implications. One
side of the debate concentrated on its nature, its superiority as a
guiding redistributive principle under socialism, and its origin and
meaning; the other discussed the applicability and computability
of DATL, with particular reference to understanding and calculat-
ing the basic term 'labour.' The major theoretical point was in fact
the measurement of labour (lao), that is, whether labour has mon-
etary value, the meaning of wages, how to calculate wages and what
'quantity and quality' mean as far as wage levels are concerned.
Some source of theoretical dispute was represented, for example,
by the tools needed to make wages and distribution formally non-
egalitarian (the issue of production bonuses, the reform of the
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rational low-wage system and piece-rates) and by the link between
the performance of the individual and that of the enterprise in the
calculation of wages.
A major turning point in this period was the Third Plenum of
the Eleventh Congress of the CCP at the end of 1978. Until then,
the debate over DATL had been mainly academic, aimed at a re-
evaluation of the concept, while denying the capitalist nature of
both its basic principle and its mechanisms. After the plenum, that
is, after the official public declaration of the exclusive socialist
nature of DATL, the term was generally recognised as a guiding
principle and the main foci became how it was to be implemented
and what its real meaning was 'under the new conditions of a com-
plex economic system,'55
This shift had consequences not only for the substance of the
issues already on the table, but also for the implementation of the
initial steps of the labour reform policy. The main concern of
policymakers at that point was distribution and wages: since the
end of the 1950s, Chinese workers had been working under a so-
called 'rational system of low wages and high employment,' an
egalitarian distribution mechanism based on a significant quota of
subsidies, for which the main justification was the low level of
development of Chinese productive forces and the need to solve
the structural unemployment problem. Subsequently, during the
Cultural Revolution, wages had been progressively linked to
noneconomic factors, such as the so-called zhengzhi biaoxian, or
'political performance.' With the re-adoption of DATL as the guid-
ing principle China could re-evaluate such industrial labour wage
mechanisms as bonuses and piece-rates, that had previously been
rejected as 'capitalist petty bourgeois.'
The re-evaluation of bonus and piece-rate wages was struc-
turally connected both with the reform of the relationship between
the central authority and enterprises, and with the restructuring of
unit-level organisation in the production system.
As early as the end of 1978, some enterprises had already started
experimenting with a 'profit retention system.' The first of many
successive steps aimed at granting local enterprises financial auton-
omy, this measure allowed enterprises to retain a small percentage
of their resources (initially 5 percent of total payroll) as welfare
and bonus funds.
To complete the recovery of pre-Cultural Revolution practices,
in 1978 the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the
official workers' organisation which had been dismantled during
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the Cultural Revolution, was finally re-established to become a
tool of the new policy.
Later, in 1981, the reform of industrial enterprises was deepened
with regulations on the so-called Economic Responsibility System
(jingji zeren zhi). The increased autonomy accorded to enterprise
management implied an interpretation of DATL in which the term
labour, as well as the question of productivity and consequently of
wages, were closely linked to enterprise performance, and not only
to individual or group performance.
This initial period of labour reform featured the re-establish-
ment of a labour system and of a labour theory that were quite
similar to those of the 1950s, the initial years of the socialist eco-
nomic construction. The theoretical assumptions, as well as the
organisation and distribution, confronted many structural prob-
lems comparable to those of the late 1950s; many common
features of the two systems allow us to refer to this period as a
restoration.56 These years also featured the emergence of the terms
and practice of economic modernisation. This was stated at the
1978 Plenum, when the focus on class struggle was replaced by a
focus on modernisation of the economy. The initial steps in the dis-
cussion of the nature and the practice of socialist labour were
propaedeutic for major and faster development of the labour
reform after the 1978 Plenum sanctioned the nature of the
'planned commodity economy' in the Chinese system.
The 'Contractualisation' Period (1984-91)
From the point of view of labour reform, the most important
element during this second period was the formulation and imple-
mentation of a 'contract labour system' (hetong laodong zhidu) for
all state workers and the consequent transformation of labour
relations inside enterprises. It is important to underline here that
the new employment mechanism after 1986 required state-owned
enterprises to hire workers on a contract basis and to limit the
length of the period of the contract. Some major consequences
were soon apparent: (a) a temporary (though long-term) differen-
tiation among the workforce, between newly hired contract or
temporary workers and those previously hired on a life-tenure
basis. This resulted in labourers doing the same work while enjoy-
ing different status in the same unit; (b) despite resistance and
informal networks greatly influencing the recruitment process,
competition was stimulated among the growing number of unem-
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ployed workers outside the factories (a premise for the formation
of a labour market); (c) contracts eventually forced an acknowl-
edgement that enterprises and workers are bound by an employer-
employee relationship, therefore casting doubts on the position of
workers as 'masters' of the enterprise.
The policy shift resulted, during the initial years after the reform,
in firm resistance from the established 'elites' of fixed workers, who
felt threatened by the prospect of having to share the privileges of
urban residence with a growing mass of newly arrived farmers.
The debate accompanying the initiation, formation and imple-
mentation of this policy can be summed up by the question: 'Is
labour a commodity?'
If during the Maoist period, under the effect of Leninist state
ideology labour had been considered a 'general right', during the
post-1978 reform, labour was generally thought of as a 'commod-
ity' '(shangpin). The Leninist concept is based on the assumption
that industrial workers have multiple roles, that is, they are at one
and the same time buyers and sellers of their workforce, owners of
the means of production and masters of the enterprise in which
they are working. In the description of the production process, this
classic mechanism resulted in less interest in economic parameters
such as labour productivity per worker, and in the ideological
assumption that progress and development are mainly the result of
subjective attitudes such as enthusiasm, engagement, mutual help
- in a word, the mass line. Nothing was considered impossible;
economic laws governing labour allocation were generally ignored
and extraordinary cases, providing evidence of the superior moral
values of socialist labour, became the models. This was one of the
obvious reasons for the defeat of the egalitarian model of the
Maoist period, when labour intensity was considered a panacea
that could ignite the increasing development of Chinese society,
regardless of quality in manufacturing, gaps in technology, and
lack of raw materials. People have always been China's major
resource and the idea of sharing formal ownership while granting
a job, as well as housing and food, were considered a way to tackle
underdevelopment, aimed at a positive exploitation of 'available
factors,'
The years after 1949 were characterised by two different pat-
terns of industrial development and production management. The
First Five-Year Plan can be considered the most comprehensive
attempt to learn from the Stalinist model of industrial management
and to modernise underdeveloped Chinese industry,57 This first
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period saw party control over management, militarisation of pro-
duction, and mass methods to raise productivity. The scientific
attitude towards capital accumulation and labour allocation - the
Soviet road58 - distinguished the policies of this period from those
of the later 'Great Leap Forward' when mobilisation through mass
campaigns and an attempt to create the double oxymoron of the
'urban-rural' 'worker-peasant' socialist labourer gained privileged
status in the organisational theory of people's rural and urban
communes.
The change in the general line of the Chinese leadership after the
Cultural Revolution, prompted a re-evaluation of the interpreta-
tion of the 'labour force' (laodong Ii) in terms of production
factors (shengchan ziyuan), and an evaluation of its rational allo-
cation, not only or no longer based on the common interest, but
also with an eye to productivity indicators.
Labour allocation became the target of a new 'scientific'
approach based on recognition on the ideological front of:
(a) unemployment as a 'necessary' prerequisite under the new eco-
nomic conditions;
(b) the worker as a party to the contract (no longer a mere
buyer/seller of the workforce), with obvious implications for
his/her position as master of the enterprise;
(c) the state as 'supervisor' of a multiple-actor allocation system,
rather than general and sole employing agency: the 'clay' rice
bowl was seen as increasingly fragile;
(d) work as increasingly associated (at least 'technically') with a
commodity, as value and use-value began to differ progres-
sively, and ownership of the means of production extended
from only national and collective (both state and collective) to
international and private;
(e) labour as a tool for accomplishment by the individual rather
than the common interest of socialist society, as moral values
traditionally associated with socialist work changed dramati-
cally after the reforms and the party-state was unable to deter-
mine work behaviour.59
Debate intensified in the years of most intensive contract-oriented
reform - starting with the 1986 regulations - when a major focus
of intellectual activities on these questions was stimulated by the
existence of a practical, daily-life reference (the implementation
of the contract labour regulations) and by the sharp contra-
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dictions they introduced in the newly re-defined Marxist ortho-
doxy, as well as by the consolidated practice of enterprise
allocation of labour.
The debate on contracts originated from analysis of 'labour
mobility' (laodong Ii liudong). Labour mobility rates have always
been very low in China, not only in absolute terms but even com-
pared, for example, to those in the USSR and other East European
socialist countries.60 The state allocation plan and the workers' high
rate of dependence on enterprises were among the reasons for the
limited interest of workers (in particular those working in the urban
industrial state sector) in changing their jobs or moving from one
unit to another. The need for higher production flexibility in accor-
dance with the changing necessities of society and economic cycles
during the reform period resulted in a theoretical hostility to work-
force immobility, which was seen as a limitation on the possibility
of achieving rationality in factor allocation in the Chinese econ-
omy.61 In fact, irrational overemployment policies were often
accepted by enterprise managers who saw the assignment of new
workers as a steady source of income from the state and, despite the
counter-economic contribution of surplus worker, they were not
willing to release workers as long as they received financial help in
exchange;62 while the workers' micro-economic behaviour tended
to keep the level of satisfaction of their needs as high as possible
without their leaving the unit. 63 The method of contracting was
generally viewed as a rational tool to solve the issue of both low
mobility and of the internal 'softness' of labour factor constraints.
The debate on labour reform in this period was therefore
focused on two principal theoretical issues with clear policy impli-
cations:
(a) the intrinsic nature of individual labour, that is, the question
of a human being's possession of his/her working capability,
and the economic relationship between the person and labour
- elements that are hardly distinguishable and that can, neither
jointly nor separately, become the object of trade;
(b) the transformation of the nature of socialist enterprises,
in which market relationships were allegedly transforming
workers from masters of the enterprise into suppliers of
labour.
This framework also influenced the question of whether labour is
or is not a commodity under 'socialist market' conditions, and the
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debate followed the rapid modifications in the official answer from
'no' to 'yes,'64 despite the fact that both thesis and antithesis were
still mainly based on Marxist-Leninist textbooks.
I set the Fourteenth Party Congress as the endpoint of this
period, when market socialism was eventually adopted without
restrictions and the structure of the economy again entered a new
stage. The final decision to adopt labour market policies required
a clear statement that labour is a commodity;65 thereafter the dis-
cussion turned more concretely to what a socialist labour market
had to be like.66
The Stage ofMarketisation (1992-1995)
The years since 1992 are characterized by deepening economic
reform and by a further bifurcation between the policy line and the
dramatic movements of the labour markets.
Since the Fourteenth Party Congress (1992), China has
acknowledged that the developmental model of its economy is
'market socialism.' This model grants equal status to the 'socialist
state' and 'market mechanisms', a status that has allowed a
dramatic increase in market-driven activities, as well as the further
internationalisation of the economy, with far-reaching conse-
quences for the labour market.
This period has been characterised by - if possible - even faster
economic development of the Chinese economy, a growing role of
the market, and a decrease in the role of the state. As a conse-
quence of a more pragmatic attitude, the debate on labour has also
abandoned most of its previous ideological assumptions, but has
not been separated from its organic ties with the policymaking
process. Once the nature of individual labour as a commodity
became an accepted concept, discussion rapidly turned to the need
for a 'market of production factors.'
The use of the term 'labour market' (laodong shichang), or
'labour force market' (laodong Ii shichang) was still contentious
prior to the Fourteenth Congress. Actually, the dispute was less
about the word 'market' than about the word laodong (labour)
and the economic relationships it involved, such as the relation-
ship between workers and their labour capacities. In fact it
was only in 1992 that the alternative term laowu shichang (labour
functions market) was replaced by the term labour market,
eliminating the last theoretical resistance to the marketisation of
labour.67
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After 1980 China's labour discourse generally accepted that the
labour force is allocated 'under the guidance of a state unified
plan, through the combination of activities of labour departments,
voluntary employment organisations, and self-employment.'68 It
was called a 'three in one' (sanjiehe) allocation system, featuring
the existence of a general employment plan, as well as bureaucratic
intervention of state agencies such as labour bureaus (laodong jul.
In the early 1990s, this picture of an efficient mixed allocation
scheme was maintained, with one major evolution, the combina-
tion between 'market' and, not plan but, 'administrative adjust-
ment,' (xingzheng tiaojie). Market actions are based on free labour
mobility and autonomous decisions regarding employment, while
the 'administrative adjustment' consists of the bureaucratic inter-
ventions of state bureaus influencing decisions by workers and
enterprises about hiring and firing, work conditions, and labour
relations.69 This situation is a consequence of the general features
of the contemporary path of the Chinese economy, precipitated by
the definition of a 'double-track system' (shuanggui zhidu) to
represent the present transitional stage, somewhere between a fully
planned socialist system and a market economy. The identification
and recognition of a transitional stage has been a further step to
allow theoretical disputes to focus on the economic and social
problems related to the issue of the labour market, without any
longer having to be justified in the narrow frame of purely social-
ist ideology. After the Fourteenth Congress, market socialism
became a 'major development in Marxist theory,' a definition that,
on one side, reiterates the Marxist origins of China's socialism and,
on the other, establishes a (probably definitive) distinction from
the Marxist-Leninist understanding of labour and production
relations and allows for 'further development' along an autono-
mous path.
In order for the role of market mechanisms to grow, a clear
statement was required concerning who the actors in labour rela-
tions are: these were identified as 'free workers' (ziyou gongren)
and enterprises; the latter were named 'units employing people'
(yong ren danwei) in the 1994 Labour Law.
The debate focused on the making of free workers. Major diffi-
culties in this respect were the high dependency of workers on
enterprise benefits, such as housing facilities and services and the
lack of a national social welfare system (quanguo shehui baozhang
jigou). In fact, while dependence can be considered an advantage
for individual workers, the difficulties in finding individual access
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to services outside the bureaucratic allocation by employing units
is instead a disadvantage for the employer. Housing, medical care,
and a protection system for the elderly and the retired are areas in
which non-factory based welfare is underdeveloped/o
At this point, the term 'free worker,' which some Chinese
authors use in a Marxist sense/1 lost its significance as a person
'liberated from wage labour' and took on a meaning that can be
summarised as a person free to act in the market and to make eco-
nomic decisions without political and bureaucratic constraints.
The reform policies originating from such a turning point in the
guiding economic assumptions involved are, on one side, the insti-
tution of new labour markets and, on the other, the implementa-
tion of fundamental legal tools to govern the market and rewrite a
largely inadequate and old labour legislation.
On the institutional front, great attention was paid to the devel-
opment of a wide net of urban service organisations of different
kinds, with slightly different functions: urban 'labour markets'
(laodong Ii shichang), administrative tools aimed at easing the
demand and supply of labour, both skilled and unskilled; 'talent
exchange centres' (rencai zhongxin), in charge of the 'rational
mobility' (heli liudong) of skilled personnel as well as of training
activities (talent exchange centres formally existed since 1983 but
have grown in number and quality only in the 1990s, constituting
an apparently more efficient system of recruitment for skilled
labour); 'introduction bureaus,' (laodong jieshao suo) generally
managed by local trade unions or by other mass organisations;
'labour service companies' (laodong (uwu gongsi) the original
purpose of which was to help solve urban and rural
unemployment, but have since developed on some occasions into
autonomous organisers of productive activities and self-reliant
'units employing people.'
On the other major reform path, that of the creation of a legal
system, a new labour law was approved in 1994 and implemented
in 1995. This new law not only adopted legal mechanisms to man-
age labour markets and labour disputes but also provided an
opportunity to introduce 'legal labour relations' (laodong (alii
guanxi) and 'labour relations' (laodong guanxi). More than for
other reasons, this distinction was important because it was a
formal statement of the existence both of persons acting rationally
in a market according to 'rights and duties' regulated by law, and
also of workers acting in the production process according to
economic 'advantages and disadvantages' formally defined in
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the agreement (contract) with the enterprise and protected by the
law.72
Furthermore, the 1994 Labour Law contains a formal definition
of 'collective contract and bargaining,' assigning to trade unions the
unusual role of collective contractor in the name of the workers.'3
This was the first, albeit only formal, recognition of the role that the
ACFTU had been seeking since its own 1988 congress.
Theoretical, institutional, and legal reforms constitute only the
'formal side' of a dramatic transformation of practices and of the
social role of labour during the entire reform period. This change
has been much faster and has had much deeper consequences for
living standards in recent years than expected, and the emergence
of a formal side can be seen as an acknowledgement of the new
features of the reality of urban labour. During the years of con-
tractualisation and marketisation, in fact, the labour economy
moved towards the goals of progressive deregulation of adminis-
trative controls, while the corresponding downgrading of the role
of the bureaucracy boosted the development of informal forces,
whose influence has been an important factor in reshaping eco-
nomic, political, and cultural labour behaviour.
China's development is still progressing and any attempt to pro-
vide a comprehensive explanation of the entire process always
generates problematic questions and contradictions. Nevertheless,
the labour reform offers a complete set of parameters which can be
used as a lens for viewing, and thus as an aid to understanding, the
entire transformation of the 1980s and 1990s.
This work deals with only a few of these contradictions and uses
only some of the lenses at the disposal of China specialists during
these years. By collecting and presenting documentation as well as
empirical data, I have tried to bring a long-neglected theoretical
debate on labour back into the general picture of the contradictory
roots of labour policy, of its development and of its achievements,
where a sometimes Byzantine approach to theoretical analysis was
accompanied by a pragmatic and incremental approach to policy-
making. China, with its rapidly changing society and economy
driving the fearful hand of the policymaker, is in the background.
To complete this picture there is a need to further investigate the
way institutions (those involved in industrial labour relations,
such as work-units, trade unions, and families; and those involved
in the market, such as local governments, and the agents of labour
distribution and mobility) deal with policy. By dealing with labour
reform this book thus firstly devotes its attention to the way
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socialism in China successfully eliminated its own basic features
without abandoning the ideological framework that had created
and legitimated its power; secondly to how deregulation made this
demise possible in a constant loop of experiment, justification and
crisis; and lastly to how this process is relevant for the evaluation
of the recipe of the reform strategy, its apparent success, and its
contradictory paths. For this reason, I will pay more attention to
how the processes take shape and can be described during the
entire period, rather than focusing on the structure of Chinese
society and its components; I will use the amplifying effect of time
to magnify the growing gaps between theory formulation and
policy outcomes. To do this I am - partly illicitly - borrowing the
eye of the historian in a field of analysis that belongs more to the
sociologist and the economist.
1.4 Precis of the Research
I devote two chapters to each of the phases introduced above. The
even chapters within each period (that is, Chapters 2, 4, and 6) are
intended to address the political and ideological relevance of the
steps of the labour reform, to report on the major ideological evo-
lutions and to focus on the debates about the central issues.
Chapter 2 deals with the re-emergence of a theoretical line based
on the principle of 'distribution according to labour' that had been
abandoned after the Great Leap Forward. Chapter 4 is largely a
discussion about the nature of labour relations, and the theoretical
question of whether or not labour can be considered a commodity.
Chapter 6 reveals the surfacing of a clearly more economy-driven
approach to the issue of labour, and the recognition of its nature
of production factor, under the condition of the socialist commod-
ity economy.
The odd chapters (3, 5, and 7) contain a parallel attempt to
investigate how the evolutions in ideology and the gradual aban-
donment of the Leninist interpretation of labour became conscious
policies of the state, how these policies often pushed much further
than their theoretical premises and faced social and economic
developments that created difficulties and engendered paradoxes.
Chapter 3 investigates the economic rationale behind the initial
steps of the labour reform, mainly related to wage and salary
composition and distribution, after a decade of immobility and
egalitarianism. In Chapter 5 the contractualisation of labour
relations is considered, including the contradictions due to the co-
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emergence of an incomplete reform of the allocation mechanism
and an increasing demand for flexibility from the 'buyers' of
labour. The Epilogue (Chapter 7) presents final considerations on
the most recent developments in the labour markets and analyses
the role of labour in a phase of the transition in which the market
is in full swing but bureaucratic intervention is still attempting to
reduce the domino effect of a fully deregulated market. Drawing
from different sets of data on labour markets this chapter attempts·
to present an understanding of the roles of the market and the state
in the emerging labour allocation patterns, and to draw some con-
clusions on the divergence between socialist discourse and market
deregulation in the 1990s.
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2DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING
TO WHAT?
From Politics to Labour
2.1 Ownership and Distribution:
The Limits of the Chinese Debate
The shape and mechanisms of the capitalist labour process as
described by Marx long remained unchallenged in the Marxist
system of thought, and existing socialist systems assumed this
particular analysis of labour as a point of reference for all that is
most evil in a production process based on exploitation. That evil
side of the old societies was, however, according to a Marxist
interpretation, also the highest expression of the capitalist phase of
an inexorable evolution towards socialism, the role of which was
to develop the forces of production.
Socialist labour theory was characterised by two major points.
At the production level, acknowledgement of the 'technical' supe-
riority of capitalist labour organisation, together with an emphasis
on technological improvement of production methods, made the
socialist labour process implemented on the shop floor very similar
to the capitalist labour process, at least in the sphere of industrial
production. Indeed, Lenin's admiration for Taylorist production
techniques was frequently referred to in the labour process debate,
as well as his condemnations of the alienating effects of such wage
systems as full piece-rate, without focusing on the substantial,
apparent contradiction.
37
DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO WHAT?
At the higher level of the labour economy, the 'superiority' of the
socialist system was mainly justified within the framework of the
two issues of ownership and distribution; the nature and contra-
dictions of production relations were mainly ignored, as it was
assumed that they were no longer problematic in societies that had
eliminated conflicts between labour and capital.
These general features of the attitude of later Marxism endured
for a long time after Marx. Actually, Marx's analysis of the labour
process under capitalism in the first volume of Capital did not
evolve substantially during the next hundred years and not at all in
the socialist countries after 1917. In the Soviet Union the approach
was inclined towards a positive evaluation of capitalist achieve-
ments in the organisation of production, while it contributed to the
emergence of a mystique about Marx's description of capital-
labour relations.
Outside the Soviet Union, the socialist theory of labour organi-
sation instead became an idealised model. As argued by sociologist
Michael Burawoy, who was among the major voices in the
renewed debate on capitalist and socialist labour relations in the
1970s, the general Marxist view of the socialist labour process
developed along an irrational path.
Whatever was taken to be the defining nature of the
capitalist labour process was mechanically inverted to
yield a productivist vision of socialism. Work became the
arena of emancipation to the exclusion of all else. Thus if
the capitalist labour process was defined by the separation
of conception and execution, then the socialist labour
process had to be the opposite - the reunification of con-
ception and execution; if the capitalist labour process was
defined by de-skilling, then socialism had to herald the
restoration of the craftsman - a romantic resurrection of
the past; if the capitalist labour process was defined by
hierarchy, then the socialist labour process was defined by
the abolition of hierarchy; control by capital gave way to
control by workers. And if capitalist technology made it
impossible to realize worker control, the abolition of hier-
archy, or the reunification of conception and execution,
then a new technology would be required to inaugurate
socialism. In each instance, the realities of capitalism were
juxtaposed with some utopian construction of socialism
obtained through the miraculous abolition of alienation,
atomization, subordination, or whatever.!
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It was only in the 1970s, after some comparisons between labour
relations under capitalism and under socialism were publicly
advocated, that the international debate about the Marxist inter-
pretation of capitalist labour relations was reinvigorated and
developed. That such contradictions as alienation and subordina-
tion also existed in socialist countries was made evident by the
famous work of Miklos Haraszti2 who reported his experience in
a Hungarian tractor factory3 where labour relations were domi-
nated by the 'despotism' of a piece-rate wage system. Although
some regard the particular nature of work relations in that factory
to be 'unusually despotic,'4 this was probably the first time that
socialist labour relations were looked at realistically.
The widespread debate on the labour process under monopoly
capitalism and state socialism that developed after Haraszti's
work as well as after the 1974 groundbreaking work by Harry
Braverman5 involved an evaluation of such general features as
de-skilling and the separation of conception and execution in
capitalist production, and rapidly expanded to include socialist
labour systems. The latter debate was based particularly on the
works of Hungarian sociologists and economists6 who initiated a
discussion on socialist economies and labour society that was to
extend its influence also into China, but only in a much later
phase. In fact, although this debate was in full swing during the
years of the Chinese economic recovery from the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976), it had no real influence on China until
the second half of the 1980s, and was probably largely unknown
to policymakers, at least in its initial years/
The main reason for this can easily be identified as the cultural
isolation of China not only from the West, but also from other
socialist countries after the door had been closed to the outside
world during the radical years between 1966 and 1976. But other
factors also contributed to defining the framework for the
Chinese labour debate in the initial years after the Cultural
Revolution.
To understand these factors, and to safely navigate through the
long pages of Chinese characters written on this argument during
these years, a preliminary evaluation must be made on the basis of
what is and what is not found in this period of the debate, that is
in the years after 1977.
The first distinction is one that has already been mentioned:
the debate over labour concentrated on such issues as ownership
and distribution; we should not expect to find a direct discussion
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of 'labour relations,' of 'production relations,' or of 'labour
conditions.'
Furthermore, even the policy measures that were intended to
affect the labour process directly, such as the re-introduction of
piece-rate wages, the re-organisation of individual and group
bonuses, and the assignment of material incentives, were generally
seen as tools of socialist distribution, and their controversial, non-
egalitarian, and partially despotic nature were generally justified
by a belief in the intrinsic superiority of socialist ownership of the
means and modes of production.
Nor was there any theoretical reference in the debate other than
to Marx and to the Leninist interpretation of his works, or any
other scientific tool of analysis other than that of Marxism-
Leninism. Such 'bourgeois' sciences as labour sociology had not
yet been developed and it took several years before the scientific
community was able to fully recover from the devastation to aca-
demic and research institutions caused by the Cultural Revolution.
This was a clear disadvantage in systemic and political analysis
as well, as Marx's framework for evaluation of a socialist system is
rather weak and limited to some asystematic notes on future social-
ism which penetrated China through Lenin's interpretative work.
Consequently, the socialist nature of the Chinese system had to be
demonstrated at the theoretical level by its anti-capitalist nature, in
a dialectic way that recalls Burawoy's 'mechanic inversion' of capi-
talism quoted earlier. A significant example of the pervasiveness of
this influence can be found in a work by Su Shaozhi and Feng
Lanrui, among the most astute and most critical intellectuals of the
reform period, who in 1977 expressed their view on the 'Gang of
Four's accusation of the 'capitalist nature of distribution according
to labour' (DATL). Their defence of the principle was mainly based
on Marx's description of the capitalist production and distri-
bution processes, concluding with the statement that capitalist and
socialist production are 'basically different in nature; the first is
based on exploitation, the second is not based on exploitation'P
This 'quick exit' from the problem characterized the entire
debate during 1977. Thereafter, greater attention was focused on
the mechanisms of the distribution system, while production prob-
lems and labour analysis in a larger economic context were not
considered until implementation of the contract system in
1983-86.
What are the reasons for such a narrow dimension to the labour
debate?
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China's isolation has already been mentioned, but another con-
sequence of the previous ten years of turmoil was a sort of
homogenisation of arguments raised by commentators; whatever
the argument, it could be reduced to criticism of the 'Gang of Four'
and the re-establishment of the socialist truth about egalitarianism
and non-egalitarianism through reference to Marx's 'Critique of
the Gotha Program' and Lenin's 'State and Revolution'. The latter
is the classic Bolshevik interpretation of the former, and both were
maniacally quoted. The three pages containing Marx's statement
about social labour as the only criterion for the allocation of
wealth in a socialist state were cited an infinite number of times,
together with criticism of Lassalle's 'integral labour profit' prin-
ciple.9 This was a self-imposed limit on the entire debate during a
period when political instability and uncertainty about the future
party leadership suggested caution in developing new and far-
reaching theoretical initiatives.
The attitude towards theory and the consequent political prac-
tice during 1977 and the initial months of 1978, before the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress defined the objective of
modernisation as the guiding principle in the economy and society
and gave Deng Xiaoping sufficient legitimacy to lead the CCP, was
mainly destructive: it was aimed at destroying the apparatus, polit-
ical networks, and ideological influence around such leaders as
Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan, the
members (along with Jiang Qing, Mao's widow) of the clique
embodying all the negative products of radical leftism, namely, the
'Gang of Four.'IO
At times, some of the participants in the debate seemed to forget
their 'scientific' demeanour and the 'natural superiority' of the
principle of distribution according to labour and to embrace the
weapons of anti-radicalism in order to label the gang's members and
supporters with such apparently common designations at that time
as 'traitor' or 'Nationalist spy.' Although this reflected a consoli-
dated style of debate inside the CCP, sometimes such behaviour went
beyond the scope of political struggle, and personal accusations
became scientific demonstrations of the illegitimacy of theoretical
points. The violence of such attacks is but one of the expressions of
the political and cultural climate of that period, when personal
resentment over the tragedy of Cultural Revolution policies was par-
alleled by manoeuvring in the bureaucracy and political takeovers.
In this context Mao's 1956 discourse 'On the Ten Great
Relationships' was republished, which became an important
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formal point of reference for the debate, at least for some months
between 1977 and the Third Plenum of December 1978, under the
auspices of Mao's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, who was
willing to prove the theoretical independence of Mao's (and con-
sequently his own) political line from the leftist radicalism of the
gang. The political struggle and the violent diatribes of dialectic
criticism against the gang were also aimed at maintaining the only
autonomous theoretical basis still existing after the disaster of the
Cultural Revolution, namely, Mao's 'socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics,' a legacy of the early revolutionary stage of China's
socialist experience.
As at other moments of radical change in revolutionary soci-
eties, a re-elaboration of orthodoxy led to a null-point in theory,
that is, a moment in which even the most obvious among the basic
concepts needed to be restated and accepted, not so much for their
founding importance as to destroy the legitimacy of the previous
(ancien) regime.
Further reducing the range of issues in the debate was China's
traditional limited knowledge of Marxist texts and Marxist tradi-
tion. In the 1950s, China had learned how to build a socialist state
from Soviet manuals (and from the unidirectional visits of Soviet
technicians to China) rather than from Soviet 'experience,'ll while
knowledge of Marxism and Marxist texts was always limited by
the comprehensive role of the so-called Maoist adaptation of
Marxism-Leninism.
Is distribution according to labour a socialist or a capital-
ist principle? This seems a laughable question: we already
experienced twenty-eight years of socialist revolution and
someone who supports the Gang of Four still doesn't
know what principle this is! But, in fact, so it is!12
Li Honglin put the question for a different objective, but in fact the
lack of knowledge of Marxist theory and evolution sometimes
turned the debates into scholarly exercises that lacked the tools
with which to analyse a complex reality and thus could not further
an understanding of the social and economic evolution until the
industrial labour and production systems were faced with the need
for a radical reform based on economic factors.
The focus on issues mainly related to distribution and ownership
was also a sign of a poor understanding and lack of investigation
into the dynamics of all the components of the labour process
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(organisation, technology factors, role and nature of the bureau-
cracy, influence of external factors, etc).
Since the 1980s, the internationalisation of the Chinese econ-
omy has shown that technology and organisation in China were
plagued by many of the same problems found in the monopoly
capitalist system. Mao's statement that 'the difference between
now and before is in the ownership of the means of productions'
rapidly became insufficient to justify the superiority of the social-
ist labour process vis avis the competitive western enterprises with
their culture of efficiency and hard-budget constraints. But during
the initial years of the debate ownership remained a central topic,
and the main difference between the socialist and capitalist con-
ceptions of labour.
2.2 'Distribution According to Labour' (DATL):
Rehabilitation of a Socialist Principle
While emphasis was focused on economic modernisation after the
end of the Cultural Revolution, the origins of the new drive were
political, so that the economic reassessment of DATL as the guid-
ing distributive principle was still mainly considered a result of
political decisions rather than of simple economic or social con-
siderations. The economy-first approach did not correspond -
during the first phase - to a larger independence of the economy
from politics, but, on the contrary, it contributed to the devolution
of further political attention to economic issues.
Ironically, the explosion of DATL, both in terms of ideological
relevance and of the 'quantity' of words expended, was to provoke
a downgrading of the redistributive functions in socialist economic
construction. In fact, it was important that fundamental and
radical opposition to such issues as income and wage differentials,
the rationalisation of production, and the decentralisation of
industrial decisions be eliminated. This could be done only by
placing the redistributive principle in the appropriate place within
the general ideological framework, whereby distribution was
featured as a part of the economic production process rather than
as the characteristic feature of socialism. This theoretical effort
resulted in a dialectic reduction in the importance of the redistrib-
utive principle and in a reassessment of the positive role of
'unequal' distribution (as opposed to purely egalitarian distribu-
tion) to stimulate the 'liberation of productive forces' (shengchan
Ii de jiefang).
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DATL was re-evaluated at a time when the role played by
Chinese academics in the policy process was growing significantly.
In 1977 alone (the year the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences -
CASS - was founded), three major conferences were held in
Beijing to 'Discuss the Socialist Principle of Distribution
According to Labour' (lun an/ao fenpei shehui zhuyi yuanze). The
conferences took place in April, June, and October-November,
and were organised mainly by former leading cadres and members
of the State Council Political Research Office (Guowuyuan
zhengzhi yanjiu suo), a think-tank inspired by Deng Xiaoping in
1975. A critical role in the 1977 conferences, as well as in the
fourth and fifth conferences (in 1978 and 1983, respectively) was
played by Yu Guangyuan, a senior cadre in the office and later a
vice president of CASS, who wrote the opening and closing
addresses of each conference.13 The conferences and the debate as
a whole led to a mobilisation of policymakers and academics, as
demonstrated by participation both in the events themselves and
in the public follow-up, of such leading intellectuals as the econ-
omists Su Shaozhi14 (later director of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought at CASS), Wu jinglian (one
of Su's most prominent students), Feng Lanrui (later a deputy at
Su's institute), Zhao Liikuan, and others. Among the party lead-
ers, Yu Guangyuan represented other major figures involved in
the Political Research Office, such as Hu Qiaomu and Deng
Liqun, who became leading ideologists of the post Cultural
Revolution CCP (although their views were soon to diverge
greatly).15 'Academics were mobilised by an academic member of
the policy elite,'16 such as Yu Guangyuan, while theoretical dis-
putes were not only a simple step in policy formation but also
contributed to rehabilitating and supporting Deng's position
within the party.
The conferences and their results were accompanied by a large
number of influential essays and articles in the major scientific
journals, as well as in the official party newspapers. An authorita-
tive article signed by an anonymous 'People's Daily special
commentator' (Renmin ribao teyue ping/un yuan) on 5 May
197817 summarizes the results of the debate during the 1977
conferences. Not surprisingly, the article opened with a positive
affirmation of the socialist nature of DATL as a socialist principle,
and with a paradigmatic quotation from the three leading refer-
ential texts:
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Under socialism each individual producer obtains from
society - after due detractions - exactly as much as he con-
tributed. [Marx18]
.. , Human society can only develop from capitalism to
socialism, that is to evolve towards public property of the
means of production and towards distribution according
to labour. [LeninI9]
.. , Under socialism, material distribution must also be
based on the principle 'from each according to his capa-
bility, to each according to his work', there cannot be an
absolute egalitarianism [Mao20].21
The three references are familiar to any follower of the debate in
those months, and - despite their conciseness - actually constitute
a notable part of what has been written about this principle in
what we will refer to as the 'classic' Marxist-Leninist literature.
Due to the dimension of the debate itself, which involved a large
number of actors and resulted in the publication of thousands of
pages in the Chinese press (as well as many books), it is sometimes
impossible to distinguish original statements from slavish repro-
ductions of generally recognised and propagandistic ideas.
Before evaluating its contents, some kind of schematisation must
be undertaken - even if a bit forcibly - of the issues, structure, and
aims as well as of the general path followed by the debate in
correspondence to policy shifts and the various phases of the inten-
sifying political struggle:
(a) As already noted, the debate was mainly negative and aimed
at the prosecution and condemnation of the leftist positions as
expressed by the members of the gang. Two major interests
played concurrent roles: those of the new leadership emerging
after the end of the Cultural Revolution, with the standing of
a feeble Hua Guofeng progressively challenged and finally
replaced by Deng Xiaoping's behind-the-scenes political
manoeuvres; and those of a re-emerging cultural elite, slowly
recovering from disgrace during the Cultural Revolution and
willing to lend the new leadership their effective support
through massive participation in the re-Iegitimation effort.
(b) During the 1977 conferences this concurrence generated an
almost monolithic line around solid, politically justified
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positions. DATL had to be reinstated, mainly because it had
been one of the major targets of the egalitarian drive publicly
identified with the gang.
As noted by Sheehan, the old system was itself linked to the 'era of
Cultural Revolution leftism, so that it became difficult to defend
egalitarianism or social security without appearing to be defending
late Maoism... .'22 This often was more relevant than the rational
economic reasons behind it: the rigidity of the centrally-planned
wage system, as well as the deterioration of living standards
among workers as a consequence of the economic crisis, had to be
alleviated, and while a major wage reform was immediately
approved on the policy front,z3 the open visibility of this debate on
the propaganda front became the principal vehicle to 'prepare'
public opinion for the major changes in the labour system to be
decided in and after 1978.
For these reasons (converging interests and propagandistic pur-
poses) the debate in 1977 was deprived of real disputation, and
was generally based on nearly static and unsupported opinions
attributed to the gang. Attention was focused on such apparently
hollow issues as the alleged nature of 'bourgeois rights' (zichan jieji
quanti) in DATL, the role of public ownership in defining whether
or not industrial labour falls under the label of exploitation, and
the role of DATL in creating income differentials and producing a
'division into two classes' (liangji fenhua).
(c) A larger controversy emerged when the discussion (after the
fourth conference in 1978) turned to the policy steps to be
taken, and included such labour-process related issues as the
reinstatement of piece-rate wages, production bonuses, and
so-called material incentives (wuzhi cizhi). At that point, the
discussion became a more direct component of the policy
process, specifically of the preparatory work for the coming
Third Plenum, coinciding with experimentation inside pro-
duction units, for the reform of both labour and management
systems. The debate at the 1978 conference served a purpose
that paralleled that on the pragmatic nature of socialism,
which resulted in the resurrection of the famous slogan 'prac-
tice is the sole criterion of truth.' Many references were made
to the criterion discussion during this conference,z4 which in
terms of its size, involvement, and political participation had a
decisive influence on the elaboration of the economic policy of
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modernisation and reform that was discussed and approved
only a few weeks later at the plenum.
(d) The entire period of Chinese reform until 1984 was character-
ized by the absence of legislative measures or 'definitive'
regulations. Most of the policy measures were experimental
steps and there was a relative fluctuation and differentiation in
the application of generally recognised principles. The debate
was therefore increasingly influenced by the need to express
both proposals and evaluations of the policy process, as well
as by the existence of referential experiments already under-
way. The line was set by the party's central bodies but major
shifts and adjustments took place at the local level, both in the
field of wages and distribution and in that of management and
enterprise autonomy.
This shift from justification to evaluation appeared clearly at the
fifth conference held in Beijing from 18-23 July 1983. At that
time, the political struggle had apparently subsided and the five
years of experimentation were leading the economic strategy of
Chinese socialism on a more stable reform path. DATL remained
the principle and the classic literature remained the reference, but
the discussion took account of the method of evaluation of the
economic results of policies. Similarly, the technique of diaocha
(investigation) became fashionable and was used extensively, but it
remained a nominal practice for some time, with a mainly
'organic' point of view. Eventually, the focus moved to 'what has
been done' and 'what remains to be done.' The policy measures
taken heretofore appeared to be 'initial steps' on an already
defined path, that would be followed further with the decisions of
the 1984 plenum and the opening of a new phase.
2.3 The 1977 Conferences: The Rehabilitation of
Dismantled Ideologies
As already mentioned, one of the purely theoretical disputes at the
origin of the debate on the nature of DATL was raised by the inter-
pretation of Marx's words in his 'Critique of the Gotha
Programme:'
Here [in socialist society] obviously the same principle
prevails as that which regulates the exchange of com-
modities, as far as this is exchange of equal values.
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Content and form are changed, because, under the altered
circumstances no one can give anything except his labour,
and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass to the
ownership of individuals except individual means of
consumption. But as far as the distribution of the latter
among the individual producers is concerned, the same
principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity
equivalents: so much labour in one form is exchanged for
an equal amount of labour in another form. Hence the
equal right here is still in principle bourgeois right,
although principle and practice are no longer at logger-
heads, while the exchange of equivalents in commodity
exchange only exists on the average and not in the indi-
vidual case.
In spite of this advance, this equal right is still stigma-
tised by a bourgeois limitation. The right of the producers
is proportional to the labour they supply; the equality
consists in the fact that measurement is made with an
equal standard, labour.25
This brief statement and the concept of bourgeois right laid the
foundations for the attacks on the principle by the gang. The stress
on egalitarianism by Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen in
1975 was consistent with their historical evaluation about what
point socialist evolution had reached at that time. The socialist
nature of the 'initial phase of socialism' was debated and denied by
Zhang and Wang on the basis of the bourgeois right (das biirger-
Liche Recht) described in Marx's booklet; this position was the
main political target during the 1977 conferences and later.26
One of the academics who actively took part in the discussion
pointed out in a later book that the discussion was partially
affected by a problem of terminology arising from difficulties in
the translation and understanding of the term.27 In the Chinese
edition of 'Gotha,' first published in 1950 as translated by He
Sijing and Xu Bing, the German words das biirgerliche Recht were
translated as zichan zhe quanli (literally, right of the bourgeoisie),
while in the following revised version it was changed to zichan jieji
faquan (legal rights of the bourgeois class). A special meeting of
the Bureau of Translation of the Works of Marx, Engels Lenin, and
Stalin' was held in 1956 to discuss this specific issue but no
solution was reached and the word legal (fa) was not replaced until
the 1977 debate and a comparison with the English translations.
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According to Feng's interpretation, this misunderstanding might
have resulted from the several meanings of the word Recht:
The German word Recht has many meanings, such as law
(fa), right (quanli), correct (dui), justice. (gongdao) . ...
Marx, when raising the point of das biirgerliche Recht in
his Critique of the Gotha Programme, was comparing the
exchange on the basis of equal quantities of labour and
the principle of equal price commodity exchange; that
means he was dealing with quanli (rights) relationships
and not with legal (fa) relationships.29
This was probably not the first time that mistakes in translation
have lead to wrong policy formulations, but Feng is probably trying
to blame Cultural Revolution theorists not only for their limited
knowledge of Marxist literature, but also for their narrow attention
to nothing but words, instead of 'seeking truth from facts.'
Apparently basing their ideas on this 'wrong' translation, the
members of the Gang of Four started to build an 'all-embracing
theory of bourgeois legal rights'30: their criticism of DATL devel-
oped along three major lines: (a) the nature of the principle as an
'old thing' (jiu shiwu), that is, a product of the old, bourgeois
society and not of the socialist revolution; (b) the risk of a growth
in income differentials, that is, of the separation of the two social
strata and, consequently, (c) the inevitable emergence of a new
bourgeois class.
The attention of later critics concentrated on these three main
points. The debate constituted a major conflict between two main
interpretations of socialism, not merely a technical dispute
between different policy options. Actually these options were
determined by the struggle that took place within the party, while
justification for the new attitude was less simple than today's
account of that period might lead us to expect.
The 1978 article in the People's Daily was very careful to search
for Mao's own ideas on the issue, and the result was that all the
quotes come from the pre-Cultural Revolution years, sometimes
ironically re-evaluating the Great Leap Forward radicalism.3 ! This
enthusiasm for Mao's understanding of the very features of social-
ism was not coincidental as it corresponded to Hua Guofeng's
attempt to redefine his weak political' position in the shadow of
the Great Helmsman. It was later gradually abandoned as Deng
solidified his position and a new ideological environment was
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created whereby Mao became more of a symbol than a cultural or
political reference.
In fact, after the 1977 conferences there were still controversial
attitudes towards DATL, not only in regard to the way to imple-
ment it, but even in the nature of the principle itself.
Summing up the positions at the 1977 conferences, Wen Min
wrote in 1978:
... DATL has a posltlve effect but also some negative
effects. DATL is the direct result of public ownership of
the means of production. It abolishes exploitation and any
distribution system of the previous societies based on pri-
vate ownership. The implementation of DATL makes
positive contributions to the elimination of capitalism and
to the development of socialist production. Nevertheless,
DATL has not yet cast off the narrow mentality of bour-
geois rights and has some negative effects. Some comrades
believe the negative effects are secondary to the positive
effects. Some comrades also think that income differences
are a step backward from the Communist principle of 'to
each according to his needs,' but still an advance if com-
pared to the wide gap between the rich and poor under
capitalism.32
Later, 'unstable' positions such as this were doomed to be criticized
as theoretical errors.
There were cases of essays in which the first part claimed that
DATL had no negative effects, while various defects were pointed
out in the second part; others in which piece-rate wages were
initially supported and then defined as no more than an accessory
form of salary; and yet others in which, after claims that distribu-
tion must not rely on politics, the idea of distribution according to
political attitude was supported. Timid and mitigated analysis
often resulted in self-contradictory theoretical positions, indulging
in vagueness and ambiguity.33
Criticism of the radical positions was not yet accompanied by a
redefinition of the guiding policies for labour and distribution; nor
was there a clear reassessment of the scope and aims of Chinese
socialism. These became clear only in the months immediately
preceding the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in
late 1978. This was still a transitional stage in which signs of
continuity were probably more important than historical breaks.
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2.4 The 1978 Fourth Conference on DATL:
Writing the Line for the Plenum
As seen earlier, there was a significant difference between the three
initial sessions of the DATL conferences and the fourth, held from
25 October to 3 November 1978. This difference originated not
only in the subject, organisation, and issues that the conference
dealt with, but also in the different political environment and
strategic tasks determined by the imminent path-breaking Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress.
It is probably fair to go so far in evaluating the organic role of
this eight-day conference as to consider it a part of the 'working
meeting' which prepared for the plenum that started only seven
days later, and was to last for about one month.
The leadership and equilibrium as well as the policy line were
going to be dramatically changed within a few weeks and a defin-
itive re-evaluation of Deng Xiaoping was to once again make him,
the most powerful among the new reformists. At the opening ses-
sion of the plenum Deng released a powerful and appealing speech,
focusing on pragmatism in politics ('seeking truth from facts', was
the new slogan), flexibility and economic decentralization.34
The DATL conference, with its increasingly pragmatic attitude,
also resulted in a sort of preparatory policy statement for the
plenum. This is evidently why a reappraisal of such tools as mate-
rial incentives, piece-rate wages, and bonuses accompanied the
theoretical redefinition of DATL as a guiding socialist distribution
principle.
The discussion, as well as the experimental implementation of
material benefits, had already begun in 1977, but an acceleration
of both the experiments and theoretical developments became
evident during the following year.
A major thrust came, on the one hand, from Hu Qiaomu's
speech on economic guidelines, published in October, advocating
the concurrent re-implementation of DATL as a distribution prin-
ciple35 and the expansion of the autonomy of enterprises 'so that
enterprise leadership as well as staff and workers would take a
more active interest in economic results, '36 and, on the other, from
Deng Xiaoping's earlier condemnation of the practice of 'to each
according to politics,' that is the policy of granting wage differen-
tials only for political correctness or 'performance' (zhengzhi
biaoxian). It is significant that the official guidelines for the 1977
wage adjustment still explicitly referred to zhengzhi biaoxian,
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while the term disappeared from all labour documents following
the Third Plenum.37
Consequently, the origins of the 1978 debate were deeply rooted
in previous political statements of a theoretical (political) as well
as economic nature. The topics that had not yet 'achieved a
thorough comprehension' were at this point not only 'the general
law of DATL,' but more specifically its 'relations to material incen-
tives,' 'the most suitable form of salary,' as well as the extension of
the principle to the agricultural sector.38
Although stilI focusing on distribution, this conference devoted
much more attention to the mechanism rather than to the prin-
ciple. Thus, it clearly appeared, that the implementation of DATL
was intended to increase labour efficiency; a way to deal with the
labour concept, to determine its role and meaning within the
DATL formula such that it was overtly considered as a measure-
ment unit for the calculation of individual and collective contribu-
tions to production.
This helped to focus part of the discussion on wage rates
and their positive or negative influence on such parameters as
productivity, performance, worker motivation, participation, and
on recently addressed issues such as workers' individual eco-
nomic interests. Furthermore, Hu Qiaomu's speech was largely
used as an official endorsement of the initial steps of economic
decentralisation of the distribution process through enterprise
autonomy.
Individual interests (geren liyi) as well as material incentives
(wuzhi ciji) were at the centre of the 1978 re-evaluation, while
many commentators, believing the theoretical issues were already
settled, turned to slightly more technical problems in the imple-
mentation of piece-rates and bonuses.
As for piece-rates, initial experiments induced optimism among
observers about the possibility of raising worker motivation, and
pushed the focus to the fields of possible application (hard manual
labour only or mechanized and intellectual, labour?), to ways of
implementation (limited to extra-quota production or unlimited?),
and to the basis of calculation (individual or collective perfor-
mance?). The result was an assessment of the 'protection of work-
ers' individual interests' as the main task of socialism, on the one
hand, in reaction to the ten years of radical negation of individual
benefits, and, on the other, of a different approach to the role of
individual and collective economic entities:
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Socialist 'material benefits' have the workers' own labour
as a basis, under the conditions of public property of the
means of production and collective labour.... Regardless
of whether they are individual or collective workers, their
material benefits are decided by the quantity, quality, and
efficiency of their labour. In other words, public owner-
ship of the means of production is decisive for the
socialist nature of material interests and all objectives of
socialist production aim at protecting and increasing the
workers' material interests; the principle of distribution
according to labour, consequently, is the correct measure
for calculating the part of global production to be
distributed to single or collective workers. The more and
the better their work, the higher their material benefits;
the lower and the worse their work, the lower their
material benefits.39
This position, adding the quality factor to the principle of duo/ao
duode, shao/ao shaode ('who works more gets more, who works
less gets less'), accompanied the first steps of an 'economy-first'
wage policy, in which 'economic interest is an objective economic
category' and 'all individual interests have an economic nature.'40
A description of the economic characteristics of 'non-developed
socialist society' ((ei (ada shehui zhuyi shehui) can help provide an
understanding of the basic features of this new economic, develop-
mental attitude towards socialist labour:
Non-developed socialist societies have the following
major characteristics:
1. There is still a large quantity of manual labour, in par-
ticular in the agricultural sector ....
2. Due to the low level of the productive forces, workers
have low cultural and technical skills, while their dif-
ferences in natural labour ability are also very great;
the outcome of individual labour is, by consequence,
also very different .. ,.
3. The means of production are still under two different
ownership systems ....
4. The socialist commodity economy and the effects of
the price law still exist.
5. The capitalist economy, classes and class struggle, as
well as exploitation of man over man, still exist.41
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This evaluation, which considers socialism to be one of the histor-
ical phases of economic development, was to be a part of the
'modernisation' approach, the winning trend at the Third Plenum.
Development and growth of the economy was the correct road to
advance to the stage of a 'developed socialist society' ((ada shehui
zhuyi shehui). The idea that generally came to be accepted during
these months focused on increasing the flexibility of administrative
measures and extending the independence enjoyed by each unit,
which needed to be free
to choose the most suitable form of salary for its workers
in accordance with its specificity in the fields of product
characteristics, production duties, technological condi-
tions, [and] administrative levels,42
The matter of the independence of production units and of income
distribution had practical implications for DATL:
After a short period of discussion, some problems [con-
cerning DATL] were made clear (e.g., DATL is not the
economic foundation of capitalism; socialist society has to
implement material incentives together with spiritual
incentives and time rates together with piece-rate wage
systems etc.). But on some other points there was not yet
a complete opening ..., 1) how to create a link between
individual income and the economic management of the
enterprise, and 2) how to implement material incentives
for cadres ....43
The socialist economy is organised in the entire society
through planning; this is the root of its superiority over
capitalism. But we cannot use this point to deny the role
and position of enterprises. Enterprises are the constituent
units of a socialist economy, as well as the economic foun-
dation of the society as a whole.44
This is only one of the earliest statements that cleared the path for
the theoretical demise of the long-lasting central policy of 'rational
low wages' and for the introduction of a new enterprise policy in
the following months and years.
To sum up, from the point of view of an outside observer, the
labour debate, before and after it passed the 'historical turning
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point' at the Third Plenum, was characterised more by what it did
not deal with than by what it did deal with. While the importance
of labour as an economic factor was becoming increasingly clear
in the minds of commentators and in the official line, distribution
issues were still of overwhelming importance, and economic con-
tradictions at the level of labour relations continued to be ignored.
The reasons for this direction in the debate are partly to be found
in the dogmatic nature of the ideological references as well as in
the assumption of the fundamental superiority of socialist property
and production. But still it is surprising not to find any reference
(either positive or negative) to the debate on the socialist labour
process that was developing in the same months in Eastern Europe
and among Western Marxists.
That is why the definition of labour most suitable for summa-
rizing the present stage of the debate remains one of pure Leninist
origins:
... Under DATL, labour is the quantity and quality of
labour translated into its mobile shape, that is the time
worked.45
The specific importance of the 1978 conference lies in its policy-
oriented approach. The scientific community was collectively organ-
ised to help write the new party line, to set the concrete objectives of
the reform. While the written results of this collective effort were still
full of ideological references and political aims, the attempt to sub-
mit 'objective' (keguan) economic analysis seems to be the major
innovation in the methodological field. The conference was pre-
sented as one in which the institutional and the production world,
as well as other elements from economic circles (jingji jie), were
called to contribute their experiences. It was what we would call a
lobbying activity, with a specific political reference to those people
due to shortly take over the leadership of the CCP. It was one of the
first initiatives that involved the newly founded CASSo There were
also some organisational difficulties and 'unofficial' features; bloom-
ing ideas and contending intellectuals were mobilised in the common
effort of the political takeover, with some evident contradictions to
Hua Guofeng's line of continuity, and against it.
As Yu Guangyuan himself later recalled:
You all still remember that our situation at the time of that
conference was still very hard: we had no funds; the
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meeting hall, materials, and personnel were up to the ini-
tiative of the participants and relied on the help of the
individual work-units. Comrades from outside of Beijing
all paid for their own board and lodging. At that time, the
CCP leaders were maintaining the 'two whatever'46
approach, and there was no other way [to discuss]:7
Yu's comments clearly indicate that the problem was more than
one of logistics. These were years of intense political struggle that
resulted in the final success of Deng Xiaoping and his reformist
supporters. Labour was one of the issues at the top of the reformist
agenda, because of the need to face the general discontent among
workers due to the long-standing stagnation of salaries, and of its
great political importance as an anti-leftist approach. Furthermore,
this, together with the almost contemporary debate on 'practice as
the sole criterion of truth,' was probably one of the first public
appearances of the alliance between party reformists and intellec-
tuals that characterised the initial years of economic reform. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the associated difficulties in organising such
a conference were much greater in 1977 and 1978 than they were
to be in 1983 when this alliance was well established.
2.5 Towards an Enlargement of the Labour Debate
In the following years, labour reform kept advancing along the
lines of economic reorganisation and decentralisation and was
mainly associated with wage reform and wage adjustment. By
January 1979, as a direct consequence of the new line set down by
the Third Plenum, a 'Forum on Labour and Wages' discussed how
to eliminate the 'low wage, high employment policy.'
Some important steps in a redefinition of labour policies took
place in the five years between the fourth and the fifth DATL
conferences. In October 1978 the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU) was re-established. The re-establishment of the
ACFTU was part of the recovery of mass organisations after
the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution, and corresponded
with the emergence of a more conflictuallabour economy. After
a decade of dismantlement, and lacking revolutionary status
(unlike the Russian Unions after the 1917 Revolution), the posi-
tion of the unions was extremely weak. The leadership of the
ACFTU did not advocate any independent role for the unions
until very late in the 1980s, and instead aligned itself with the
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Leninist role of a 'transmission belt' between the party and the
working masses. 48
The wage system evolved towards progressive diversification,
the main reason for this being the increasing independence of
enterprise management and the different strategies in the central
allocation of resources to the localities and to enterprises. The
main steps in this evolution were the so-called 'profit retention'
policy (1979-81), which allowed enterprises to decide indepen-
dently on the allocation of a portion of their profits, and the new
'factory director responsibility system' (1981), which gave
managers responsibility over their enterprise's performance. Both
systems allowed for more independent behaviour in the field of
labour allocation (although the allocation of general resources,
including labour, was still mainly a central prerogative).
The new policies also provided an occasion for many local
leaders to climb the ladder of central power. The success of the
reformers at the Third Plenum was soon followed by the replace-
ment of the leftists in the party with new leaders, culminating in
the removal of Hua Guofeng from his post as prime minister and
his replacement by Zhao Ziyang in 1980. While leftist attitudes
and central planning still played an important role, there was lim-
ited contention over the general needs expressed by the reformist
line. The renewed debate in the labour field was characterised by
attention to emerging economic contradictions and political and
economic evaluations on the ongoing experimental stage.
As already argued, the Chinese debate over labour was not
independent of policy options or the political struggle. Even the
choice of issues to be raised during these years, in the frame-
work established by the reappraisal of DATL, did not deviate
from this rule.
As an example of this functional link, the insistence on a dis-
tinction between productive and nonproductive labour between
1979 and 1980 reflected a need to deepen the understanding of the
general rule as applied not only to 'labour processes' (laodong
chengdu) and 'labour relations' (laodong guanxi) , but also to some
practical difficulties in the growing industrial structure in China.
In fact, the extension of the definition of 'productive labour' -
from 'direct production activities' (zhijie shengchan) to 'social
activities that satisfy any material or cultural need of the society' -
responded to specific economic and social requirements: the need
for technology and consequently for skilled and motivated techni-
cians to boost the development of modern industry, and the need
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to eliminate the ideological superiority of manual labour over
management and white-collar workers.
A third factor in the re-evaluation of intellectual labour was the
recognition of the economic rights of the intellectual elite who had
supported the initial steps of the economic reform. At the 1983
conference, where, as mentioned, great attention was devoted to
evaluation of the results of labour policy since 1977, several
authors criticized the paradox of the existence of sharp income
gaps between non-skilled manual labour and intellectual labour,
arguing that 'intellectual labour is not a simple type of labour
force. It is skilled, developed, and educated labour,'49 and as such
it has to be considered and remunerated.
Some important new issues characterised the labour debate dur-
ing these years. Some of these were merely theoretical reassess-
ments, others were a more direct response to social and economic
phenomena. An interesting statement on the state of the art in the
labour debate was issued at the founding meeting of the Chinese
Labour Research Association (Zhongguo laodong xuehui), held in
Beijing from 14 to 19 January 1982.
A much more complicated dimension of the labour issue
emerged from that discussion. The labour issue was extended
beyond the field of distribution; for the first time the principles of
central 'unified allocation' (tongbao tongpei) of the labour force
and employment (jiuye) were problematic.
What is the meaning of 'waiting for employment' [daiye]
and 'unemployment' [shiye]? Some believe they have the
same meaning, because they both indicate people whose
working ability cannot be integrated with the means of
production, whose labour force cannot become a means of
life. But the distinction between the two is in the social
conditions that create them, in the methods for solving
them .... Unemployment originates from a capitalist crisis,
as a result of capital accumulation. It is an irresolvable
problem under that system and its increase or decrease
depends on the cycles of the economic crisis.
The phenomenon of people 'waiting for employment' in
our country, in contrast, is a consequence of the rapid
growth of the labour force and of economic development.
The increase or decrease in the number of people waiting
for employment depends on control over reproduction of
the labour force and the development of the national
58
ENLARGEMENT OF THE LABOUR DEBATE
economy. The cycle is [at present] relatively long, but the
problem can be solved under a socialist system.50
There was still no admission of the emergence of such phenomena
as unemployment or the hoarding of the workforce in the indus-
trial sector, but 'full employment' (chongfen jiuye), the unchal-
lenged policy option since 1958, was being contested. The dispute
was mainly over the influence of full employment on the produc-
tivity rate of industrial labour. On the one hand, some believed
that the contradiction was not between the two needs, but
'between the practices used to solve employment problems on one
side and the growth of productivity on the other.' Such practices
included 'substitution' (dingti), that is, the custom of leaving the
father's workplace to another member of the family, and the 'iron
rice bowl' (tie fanwan) (that is, almost unconditional life tenure).
The possibility of increasing productivity was linked to the elimi-
nation of such practices. This interpretation focused on the work-
unit's internal organisation and bargaining with the state. On the
other hand, a view that put more emphasis on 'external' factors,
that is, on the economic role of demand and supply of labour, was
slowly emerging.
One aspect is that the increase in labour productivity
might reduce the demand for labour and, consequently,
the total number of employed people; another aspect is
that, if fixed assets are given, the creation of new work-
places might reduce the coefficient of equipment exploita-
tion per worker, also affecting the productivity of labour.
There are two points that must be carefully evaluated:
(1) if, in a situation of labour supply balanced with
demand, and without regard to the state of financial and
material resources, social unemployment (daiye) is turned
into excess labour inside the enterprise, the result will be
overstaffing, and the consequent reduction of productivity
rates; (2) low-capital labour-intensive activities must be
developed to create even more workplaces.51
As we shall see, some ten more years of theoretical and economic
development were needed before this initial admission became a
definitive recognition of the mechanisms of the socialist labour
market. Although the issue was still very much disputed, the fields
involved in the labour debate were growing to include the recruit-
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ment system and the implementation of a labour law, while in the
theoretical field some initial steps were taken regarding the 'nature
of labour relations under socialism.'
The main question at this time concerned the existence of an
'ownership relation' between the worker and his own labour force,
and three positions were debated during these years:52 one sup-
ported the idea that the labour force belongs to the field of public
ownership (gongyouzhi) as it is a 'condition of production;' the
second argued that it is 'part public and part individual;' and the
third claimed that the labour force is an individual ownership.53
The first position insisted on a 'strict interdependence' (miqie
huxiang guanxi) between the ownership level of the means of
production and that of the labour force. This implied that 'only
society is responsible for the production and reproduction of the
labol.lr force, and the right to allocate and use labour belongs
exclusively to the society (state) [sic] and to the enterprise.' This
position was the necessary starting point for the 'central planners'
to justify the policy of the 'joint allocation' of the labour force, and
the intervention of the state in the worker-enterprise relationship
at the 'market' level.
The midway attitude was a sort of mediation in which, 'as the
responsibility for production and reproduction of labour force is
partly with the state and partly with the families,' the ownership
of labour is also divided between individuals and the state.54
A major criticism of both these positions was based on the idea
of a 'determinism of distribution' (fenpei jueding fun).
The nature of ownership, no matter whether we deal with
labour or ownership of the means of production, is
decided by the nature and level of the production forces.
The question of who is responsible for the reproduction
costs is a distributive issue, and it is decided jointly by the
ownership of labour and by that of the means of pro-
duction. Explaining the forms of ownership through
analysis of who is responsible for reproduction costs is
like putting the cart before the horse, it is a 'dictatorship
of distribution.'55
The third and well supported position, which emerged from this
criticism, represented not only a theoretical step toward the future
debate on the commodity nature of labour, but also an enlarge-
ment of the theoretical outlook, which was probably a result of the
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greater involvement of the academic world in the policy process
and in analysis of the advancement of labour reform.
The fifth conference on DATi, in July 1983, took place in the
middle of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and followed the work report
released by Zhao Ziyang at the end of 1982 upholding the breakup
of the 'iron rice bowl' and the 'big pot'56 in Chinese industry. The
conference faced a very different situation: the economic system
had already undergone a deep transformation (not least of which
was the building of a nonstate sector), and the experimental stage
of labour reform was creating a wide range of examples, both pos-
itive and negative. A multifaceted reality, as well as a much more
consolidated role for academic and research institutions, resulted
in the emergence of contending ideas, although the main driving
concept remained that of DATi, with increasing attention, on one
side to the mechanisms of its implementation and on the other to
the theoretical issues emerging from the progressive decentralisa-
tion and autonomy of the productive processes. A great deal of
attention was still placed on distribution (and on the wage system),
but the conference was far more specifically focused on an
evaluation of concrete cases rather than on the earlier justificatory
approach.
The conference expressed, in particular, supportive opinions for
the so-called 'floating wages' that had been strongly endorsed by
Party Secretary Hu Yaobang.57 This was a broad term referring to
systems that linked wages to both individual and enterprise per-
formance. While the concept of floating wages was relatively
short-lived, the principle was nonetheless a summary of the
achievements in the debate of this initial phase of reform:
[Wages] must first of all be 'floating,' that is not fixed.
Second, while they must be floating they can be partially
or totally floating, but, third, they have to respect the
principle of DATi and their quantity must be determined
not only by individual performance but also by the good
or bad results of the enterprise.58
Unlike at previous conferences, discussion of DATi was no longer
sufficient to encompass all that was going on in the field of labour.
As early as February 1983, for example, new provisional regu-
lations for the hiring of contract workers were issued.59 This was
still a small step but the direction would be followed in future
years, that is, the contractualisation of the demand and supply of
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labour and the progressive abandonment of central allocations of
labour.
The entire debate until this point mirrored both the evolution of
the political struggles and the formulation of experimental poli-
cies. These were moulded on the experiences of the 1950s and
early 1960s, the only tangible source of inspiration for policy-
makers and economic actors of this period, as opposed to the
egalitarian policy of the Cultural Revolution. But this common
experience did not prevent the emergence of contradictory paths
and of different forms of adaptation to the changing economic and
administrative environment.
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The Initial Paths of Labour Reform
(1977-1983 )
3.1 Productivity Boost and Social Discontent:
The Contradictory Roots of Labour Reform
The Chinese leadership on the eve of the decisive 1978 CCP
plenum was facing serious difficulties in coping with the conflicting
needs of restarting the engine of the Chinese industrial economy
through rationalization while, at the same time, limiting the effects
of rampaging social discontent among those groups that had been
the preferred target of the egalitarian policies during the Cultural
Revolution. No comprehensive assessment of the decisions taken
during 1977 and 1978 could avoid considering the risks implied in
a restrictive redistributive policy in the cities. In 1977, when the
first wage adjustment for workers in SOEs took place, the changes
introduced in the criteria for distribution were insignificant with
respect to both the social needs and the already proposed aims of
the reform. No adjustment had taken place since 1971, and mone-
tary wages had been reduced to an even smaller proportion of
workers' income, while dependency on the danwei system of
employment and welfare had peaked. Average monetary wages
steadily decreased every year until 1977, during the last five years
in particular. Despite the increase decided upon in 1971, the aver-
age annual monetary wage of SOE workers was 602 yuan - (478
yuan in collective units - COEs) in 1977, whilst it had been 661
yuan in 1964.1 Although always low and relatively unimportant
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with respect to non-monetary benefits in the redistributive system
of Chinese socialism, monetary wages remained the only parame-
ter of workers' economic conditions that the government could
rapidly act on in order to calm societal pressures.
During the 1960s and 1970s, industrial enterprises were the
most important contributors to state coffers, as their productivity
(as a result of favourable central policies and the absence of
competition) soared. Despite their proverbial economic ineffi-
ciency, per-worker profits and taxes remained above 2,500 yuan
per year between 1965 and 1978, almost four times the average
worker wage.2 Part of this surplus was reinvested (both formally
and informally) by the enterprises for welfare and services, but it
never entered the workers' pockets in the form of cash. Workers in
large, heavy industrial SOEs enjoyed far better services than those
in small and medium light industrial enterprises (larger housing,
better health care, education and recreation facilities).3
An unbalanced distribution of resources (2 percent of the enter-
prises accounted for two thirds of profits and taxes), control of
monetary income by the central government, and the precarious
and varying ability of enterprises to assign non-monetary wage
items further necessitated centrally-initiated adjustments, even
though the general indicators of China's state economy (industrial
and agricultural production) were not encouraging.
The 1977 wage raise can be considered to be the first step in
labour reform, at least in as much as the State Council circular
which defined it contained - for the first time after the Cultural
Revolution - a positive reference to the principle of 'distribution
according to labour.'4 Nonetheless, the adjustment also targeted
the 'livelihood of the people' (according to the Maoist slogan
quoted at the beginning of the circular), and only formally stimu-
lated the application of more 'rational' distributive principles.
Significantly, the differences between each rung of the nationwide
Soviet-style wage ladder were very limited, to the point that the
adjustment remained 'limited to a range of 5 to 7 yuan.'s Slightly
more significant adjustments were assigned to those workers who
had 'participated in production' (canjia shengchan) since before
1966, as their purchasing power had suffered from the egalitarian
policies for a longer period.
Although the revitalisation of DATL inspired this circular
only with regard to the introduction of new criteria for the
assignment of wage increases, some of the criteria still referred
to political 'merit' and 'performance' rather than productivity.
64
PRODUCTIVITY BOOST AND SOCIAL DISCONTENT
The contradiction between the social and political objective of
'improving the livelihood of the people' and the economic
imperative of increasing productivity and rationalising produc-
tion was openly apparent in the circular. The adjustment
(tiaozheng) was to be granted only to those workers who 'per-
formed well or relatively well,' while it was to be 'postponed'
(huantiao) for the others. In any case, the circular prudently
stated that the 'proportion of workers who will see the increase
postponed should not be higher than 10 percent of the total'!6
The implementation of this policy, that due to these premises
was to express the contrast between evaluation of individual per-
formance and the context of 'common interest,' generated numer-
ous intra-unit conflicts; in fact, from the point of view of the indi-
viduals and of the enterprises, it was hardly imaginable that a large
part of the workers could be excluded from the wage increase.
Furthermore, the initiative to raise salaries was taken only after
violent protests over the decrease in purchasing power had
occurred in cities during 1975 and 1976, as workers organised
spontaneous demonstrations and hoisted big-character posters
(dazibao) even in such major cities as Shanghai and Hangzhou in
mid-1977/ The situation in the cities and in many important
industrial units was serious and the risks of larger-scale repercus-
sions on stability urged intervention on the very sensitive question
of wages. Issues relevant to the position of workers within social-
ist society, as well as their material discontent also had been
regularly raised in the unofficial publications of the Democracy
Wall movement (1978-1980).8
Although the campaign for a raise in monetary salaries was
launched under the auspices of the new principle of DATL, its lim-
ited results reinforced the stagnation. This initial step towards
changing the quantitative aspects of salary (mainly its neglected
monetary part) was followed by other measures that affected its
form and composition (differentiation of the wage system, revital-
ization of bonuses and piece-rate wages). But all these steps
targeted only the issue of distribution, and did not take into con-
sideration the reform of labour relations, both inside and outside
the enterprise, for which a different economic environment and a
more stable political situation were necessary.
The first serious step towards 'nonegalitarian' labour policies
came in May 1978, some months before the plenum, at the climax
of a wave of experiments targeting the redistribution mechanism
of the Chinese danwei system. The revival of the practice of
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distributing bonuses and production rewards for outstanding per-
formance was coupled with the re-establishment of piece-rate
wages for 'above quota production.' The circular published by the
State Council on 7 May corresponded with a central decision to
implement a large-scale experiment with these two wage systems,
involving 30 percent of the productive units in the new system.9
This testifies to the experimental character of the new system and
probably also to the difficulties in implementing it, which clearly
appeared between the lines even of the text of this first major doc-
ument on labour reform. The circular stressed the need to 'build
conditions and set norms' for the functioning of the system, in
order to avoid 'continuous rediscussion and reappraisal' of the dis-
tributive criteria. The experience of intra-unit conflicts during the
1977 adjustment was good reason to be cautious about the process
and the criteria for assigning productivity bonuses (for quality as
well as for quantity). At the same time, the re-introduction of
piece-rates benefited from earlier experience which indicated that
the major obstacles to a rational use of labour time at the produc-
tion level were the relaxation of controls over labour attendance
and production quality. Finally, to avoid the risks of a rapid
increase in the income differentials, the circular set the maximum
wage difference allowed within the enterprise at 20 percent. 10
It is hard to assess the effectiveness of this first circular (imme-
diately followed by others gradually enlarging the scope of the
reform) from empirical data. However, the State Statistical Bureau
estimates that the proportion of bonuses and above quota piece-
rate wages of total wages was only 2.0 percent in 1978, but grew
rapidly to a more significant 7.5 percent in 1979.11 If we consider
that the data is calculated on the basis of total wages of all SOEs,
while the system was implemented in only a limited number of
them,12 we can infer that bonuses and piece-rate wages (para-
doxically still grouped together in the statistics, despite their
difference in both nature and form) were extremely popular and
overused in the initial years after the plenum and the May 1978
circular.
This overheating is also demonstrated by a subsequent circular
published in 1979, urging the control of waste in the process of
implementation of the 'bonus and piece-rate wage system' (jiangjin
he jijian gongzi zhidu)Y
The target of this official document was some 'erroneous
tendencies' (pianxiang), such as the 'arbitrary enlargement of the
context of bonuses, the increase in bonus levels and bonus rates,
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the confusing distribution of subsidies, of additional wages (fujia
gongzi) and commodities.'14
The circular critically argued that the bonus system was applied
within the parameters of egalitarianism and not on the basis of
DATL. No attention was paid to productivity, quality, per-
formance, or skills; the funds allocated for bonuses were being
distributed without serious attention to the necessary precon-
ditions, and were generating an effect (further waste of materials,
reduction of worker motivation, and lower productivity) contrary
to that anticipated by the policymakers. In substance, the new step
was probably having effects on the shop floor strikingly similar to
those of a centralised wage adjustment, with all the same conflicts.
The reaction to implementation of the policy set down in the
1979 circular can be described as 'resistance.'15 In fact, reform of a
highly egalitarian and bureaucratically concentrated distributive
system like that in China invariably faced opposition from both
workers and cadres. The abolition, for example, of 'additional
wages' (fujia gongzi) - that unlike bonuses and piece-rate wages
had a long history of implementation and had become a fixed part
of the labourers' incomes16 - and the introduction of piece-rate
wages, meant to favour younger and more skilled sectors of the
working class, were harshly opposed by older and less skilled
workers.
To make the situation even more difficult, the transitional stage
of the political struggle added a third element to the twofold
contradiction between improvements in livelihood and economic
performance: the entire process was imposed over the heads of a
disorientated cadre bureaucracy that was often unwilling to under-
take initiatives that might become risky in the case of any change
in the balance of power within the party. A 'wait-and-see' attitude
that was not conducive to the changes in the system was reportedly
adopted by many cadres, while some 'natural' or systemic resis-
tance to the nonegalitarian distribution emerged, which largely
influenced the pace of policy implementation as well as the exten-
sion of the new policy to all enterprises. According to Takahara:
Some work groups distributed bonuses equally to all,
while others went to restaurants and literally ate up the
bonus from the same 'big pot.' In assessing staff and
workers for bonus distribution, some units used only two
or three categories with small differentials, while in others
everybody took turns in receiving bonuses. All reports
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criticized such egalitarian distribution because it nullified
the policy objective of motivating the workforce.17
A second wage adjustment took place in 1979, placing more
marked attention on the application of DATL, not only in shop
floor distribution, but also in the assignment of funds to enter-
prises, de facto linking the ability of units to assign bonuses to an
enterprise's overall performance. Although this can hardly be
accepted by theorists as a proper application of DATL, it never-
theless increased the efficacy of the measures taken to stimulate
productivity, as it was designed to favour workers with higher
skills and most profitable enterprises.
3.2 Distribution and Wages:
The First Focus of Labour Reform
While the measures introduced by the 1978 circular limited the
incidence of bonuses and piece-rate wages to a maximum of 20
percent of salaries, the debate at the fourth DATL conference of
October 1978, as mentioned in the previous chapter, went much
further in discussing the issue of limited and unlimited bonuses,
'full' or extra-quota piece-rate wages and individual or collective
production rewards. The objective of these initial steps of the
reform was more the distribution of national wealth than the
improvement of economic performance.
The reform of labour started with a step backward along a path
leading to a restoration of the situation that had existed inside
units prior to the Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958 to 1960, but
it did not target any of the fundamental rights of state workers.
The focus slowly changed from 'moral' to 'material' incentives, but
the purpose remained 'motivating the workers.' The wage reform
that started in an experimental way in 1978 could not rapidly
change the close economic relationship between state and enter-
prise, nor could it modify the internal equilibrium of the unit. On
the contrary, wage adjustments and reform were intended to rein-
force the equilibrium by giving air 'to breath' (more money) to the
micro social system of the unit, thereby favouring the idea of its
economic and budgetary independence.
The 'rigid' structure of the Chinese wage system, which dated
back to the nationalisation of Chinese industry in 1956 and the
beginning of the 'low salary - full employment' distributive policy
(also known as the 'rational low-wage system' - heli di gongzi zhi),
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remained basically unchanged during this initial phase. But a full
correspondence between 'total wages funds' (that is, the total
amount of money allocated by the state to pay wages) and 'total
wages' (that is, the money actually distributed as salaries), which
was evidence of the total central control by the state, was no
longer possible. Elements of flexibility depending on specific situ-
ations and the behaviour of enterprises, as well as on 'local'
bargaining, were introduced into the salary structure.
Nonetheless, it is significant to note that reliance on monetary
wages as the sole lever to increase worker motivation in the local
context, as well as labour productivity in the macro-economic con-
text, was not borne out by economic results in the following years.
Although monetary wages grew by a significant 25.5 percent
between 1978 and 1981 (while the component of bonuses and
piece-rate wages was already 11.3 percent in 1981), the labour
productivity index officially marked a mere 6.5 percent increase
over the same period, suggesting that productivity growth could
not simply rely on reform of the wage system. Although it was
wrong to expect that reforming wage distribution alone would be
able to assure a major increase in productivity, as many other fac-
tors (technology level, organisation, know-how, infrastructure,
etc.) are needed to raise productivity, the general conditions
contributed to taking the initial steps of the labour reform in the
direction of wages and distribution mechanisms.
First of all, the hardships experienced by the Chinese working
class during the Cultural Revolution were strictly related to the
'political' nature of distributive criteria at that time.
The 'new' leadership ('new' in terms of strategy for economic
development, but not new in terms of individuals and factions in
the government) faced very serious threats of instability in urban
areas. To cope with this situation, the leadership acted as would an
employer who fears a further decrease in plant productivity, that
is, by increasing wages and, only later, acting on the wage compo-
sition to increase internal competition and production. But, as we
have seen, the Chinese state was not a normal or rational employer
and these moves were far less effective than expected.
Second, the ideological legacy played a role in slowing down
the practical implementation of labour policies that had already
been outlined in the theoretical debates on the labour issue. The
tendency towards greater independence of the enterprises and
towards the transformation of the nature of labour in the context
of production relations was therefore anticipated by a 'soft'
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attitude that gradually began to erode egalitarian practices
through the application of the correct principle of 'distribution
according to labour,' and by concentrating exclusively on the
issues of distribution and productivity. Employment, labour rela-
tions, and the labour market were not dealt with at first. The
reform of distribution was also the first step in the reorganisation
of the danwei system and of the relationship between the unit and
its owner, the state, but not yet of the relationship between the unit
and the economic environment (market, property rights, legalisa-
tion, contractualisation) in which it was going to act.
Third, although the goal of modernisation stressed efficiency,
the backwardness of the Chinese industrial sector, isolation from
major technology providers, as well as a lack of infrastructure,
dynamic light industry, and a consumer market, forced policy-
makers to believe that the only factor China could realistically rely
on for visible economic improvements in the short term was
labour. Yet, although a major resource in the Chinese economy,
labour could not achieve the immediate expected returns in pro-
ductivity, as the composition of China's labour force was largely
inadequate to support fast economic development, and the phe-
nomena of hoarding and overstaffing were common in most of the
state-owned sector which employed 78.4 percent of the total
workforce in 1978.18
3.3 A New Contradiction: Employment and Efficiency
It was not until 1981 that a new set of regulations gave more pre-
cise shape and direction to the practice of labour reform and to the
entire economic system. The regulations affected two different eco-
nomic relationships. The first involved ownership, as an individual
economy (geti jingji) was re-established after years of having been
considered 'forbidden and illegal' during the Cultural Revolution. 19
For the first time this allowed the hiring of labour from outside the
narrow boundaries set by central allocation plans, as several forms
of non-state enterprises began to emerge. In particular, the
Cultural Revolution practice of creating 'large collective units' (da
jiti) by merging collective enterprises into state-type collectives
became a target of criticism, and the founding of 'collectives run
by the people' (minban jiti) was strongly encouraged as a means of
increasing the number of available urban workplaces.
The second involved the relationship between enterprises and
the state as a first step in decentralisation (the 'tax-for-profit'
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regime) and introduction of a mechanism to favour the autonomy
of fund and labour management (the 'management responsibility
system' - guanli zerenzhi), which largely influenced the subsequent
direction of labour reform.
The two relationships featured a new contradiction between the
need to solve the growing problem of unemployment in the urban
areas and the systemic need for economic efficiency.
At the end of the 1970s, China was facing its first serious urban
employment crisis of the reform period (two other crises - one in
1989 and the most recent beginning in the late 1990s - were to
follow). As the structural causes were all related, Chinese policy-
makers identified four major structural factors that would shape
employment policies as a new component of labour reform.
The first was population growth and the increasing availability
of a workforce, coupled with the urbanisation process. The state-
ment that China is 'big' (da), the Chinese 'many' (duo), and the
situation 'complex' (fuza) has often been a simple and reasonable
way for Chinese policymakers to justify policy options and major
slowdowns along the reform path. But, in fact, if we look at the
population growth experienced by China in the radical years of its
Communist history, we see that this assertion is something more
than a mere excuse and, if coupled with the limited rate of indus-
trial development, population growth was a significant factor in
evaluating the country's performance.
It is well known, but nevertheless useful to remember, that China
had a total population of 541.67 million in 1949, at the time of the
Communist takeover, and that figure had grown to 962.59 million
by 1978 (a net increase of over 77 perceneO). The years immediately
following the end of the Cultural Revolution were even more
exceptional, not only for overall population growth (the one billion
mark was reached in 1981, with a net increase of over 60 million
within a four-year period), but also for urban population growth.21
The forced rustication and anti-urbanisation policies (together with
the development deficit suffered by the entire economic system)
during the 1960s and 1970s had kept the figures for urban popula-
tion low (18.4 percent in 1959, 17.9 percent in 1978), but the end
of the Cultural Revolution re-ignited the urbanisation process. In
the first six years after the Third Plenum (1978-1984), the urban
population jumped to 23 percent of the total population (it was
28.6 percent in 1994).
These figures on urban population surely do not justify talk of a
classic urbanisation process in early reform China. The particular
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configuration of management of the population through the
hukou system, which tied residence and productive activity either
to urban areas or to the countryside, does not allow for specula-
tion on the global figures of the urban vis-a-vis rural population,
as the phenomenon of unauthorized migration has not yet been
seriously considered in the statistics. Nonetheless, there was a
dramatic change of direction.
The second recognized structural cause of unemployment (the
word still used is daiye renyuan - 'people waiting for employ-
ment') was indicated as being the predominance accorded to heavy
industry and the relatively small quota of light production. The
first Soviet-style Five-Year plan had given free rein to this bias,
which was later stressed during the long leftist interludeo22
According to one estimate,23 in the actual conditions of the
industrial economy, each million yuan invested in fixed assets in
state eOnterprises could create 257 new workplaces if invested in
light industry, but only 94 new workplaces if invested in heavy
industry.24 It is neither a mystery nor a novelty that light industry
and services have a much more effective employment/capital ratio,
but the relation between labour and capital in the 'labour-intensive
heavy industry' of the radical years of Maoism has been thor-
oughly discussed. Different opinions have emerged as to how the
'classic' Chinese system can be defined in terms of labour usage.
Whyte and Parish25 argue that it was 'capital intensive,' and that its
low productivity was due to the 'egalitarian policies, combined
with the official wage freeze and high job security,' as well as to the
consequent 'problems of absenteeism, shoddy work, and simple
laziness [that] mushroomed in work units.'
In contrast, another author sees the full usage of the labour force
during the low wage-full employment policy period as necessary
for the Chinese economic system and the only way to mobilize and
develop an economy with scarce natural and financial resources.26
One of the ways full employment has been achieved has
been the utilization of cheap and inferior technologies and
labour intensive methods of production. Naturally this
results in levels of labour productivity that are lower than
in nations that can afford capital- and knowledge-inten-
sive technologies. The literature on appropriate technolo-
gies is full of convincing arguments as to why such a strat-
egy is rational and efficient in a context of labour surplus
and capital shortage.27
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It should be argued here that the substitution of labour for capital
and technology is a sort of extrema ratio that cannot generate long
term development (as shown by development in other East Asian
NICs that rapidly turned to capital and technology investments
after the exploitation of their cheap labour force), as eventual tech-
nological advancements are in contrast with the major goal of full
employment. But the issue is not whether it is appropriate to base
the foundations of development on labour-intensive activities, but,
rather, whether it makes sense to base heavy industrial develop-
ment on labour intensity, as this appears to be a paradox, or at
least an open contradiction that led China to the verge of collapse
in the late 1950s and had consequences for later stages of devel-
opment. The economic system of the years of the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, in fact, can hardly be
depicted as 'capital intensive.' I would prefer to use the Chinese
expression 'large and collective' (yi da er gong), which better
depicts the objectives of enlarging production, enlarging dimen-
sions and hoarding labour that characterized the strategy of work-
units at that time. Full employment was the final aim rather than
a precondition or a production factor.
Furthermore, and this is the third structural cause, the predom-
inance of heavy industry was coupled with that of SOEs and semi-
SOEs (large collectives), seen as the result of industrial policies
during the years of Maoist radicalism and the Cultural Revolution.
Their effectiveness in reducing unemployment was challenged after
the beginning of reform, since the cost of creating one new work-
place in 1978 was much lower (2,000 yuan) in a collective enter-
prise than in an SOE (9-10,000 yuan).28 The focus on national
industry and on public ownership during the radical years also
contributed to the dismantlement and decline of almost all eco-
nomic activities of the lower middle class (petty commerce and
craftsmanship in particular), thus further reducing the efficiency of
labour allocation and increasing the concentration of labour in
state industry.
The fourth structural cause lay in the rigidity of the allocation
system, which still largely limited the possibility of finding alter-
native sources of employment. The system of mixed allocation that
Was to emerge as a response to this situation (partly from the state
and partly through rational exchange and 'recommendation' -
jieshao) was not at all new in the history of Chinese socialist
labour, as it had been put into practice both before the Great Leap
Forward and in 1963-64 when, for example, 'labour recommen-
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dation offices' (laodong jieshaosuo) were organised to tackle the
dramatic increase in unemployment before the high tide of the
Cultural Revolution initiated the central method of labour alloca-
tion which lasted until 1978.
In addition to these structural causes, at least one further con-
tingent reason is to be found here, that is the waves of 'returned
youth' from the countryside. The rusticated young students from
the Cultural Revolution were demanding to return to the cities
dramatically increasing the number of young people 'waiting for
employment.' As just one example, in the city of Shenyang in
Liaoning province, 25,000 of the 33,000 youths waiting for an
assignment in 1981 were 'educated youth returned from the coun-
tryside.'29 Whyte and Parish estimate that 'more than half of urban
young people' were involved in the recruitment system during the
high ~ide of the Cultural Revolution, implying both 'thought
preparation' and 'up to the mountains and down to the country-
side' (shangshan xiaxiang) experiences. 3o The percentage of the
'registered' urban population that had stagnated during the 1960s
and 1970s grew significantly between 1977 (12.59 percent) and
1984 (16 percent), mainly as a result of the reallocation of urban
youths that succeeded in officially recovering their urban status.31
Although the word 'educated' did not always correspond to a full
education cycle (which was often cut short by the trip 'down to the
countryside'), this segment of unemployed youth was particularly
important for the Chinese economy, with its abundant reservoirs of
unskilled labour but shortage of skilled workers and experts.
Indeed, the issues outlined in the foregoing analysis deeply influ-
enced the results of the 1980 central conference on labour and
employment sponsored by the Central Committee of the CCP.32
The major policy suggestion that emerged from the conference
had to do with the structural problems of employment, the diver-
sification of ownership and production activities, the progressive
abandonment of unified allocation, and the encouragement of
individual and cooperative economic activities; it also defined the
parameters for a redefinition of the state-enterprise relationship. In
order to solve the issue of labour efficiency and employment, an
economic system that gave priority to labour-intensive activities
instead of capital accumulation, as well as to services instead of
direct production, was sketched. In particular, the following prac-
tical suggestions, which largely corresponded to contemporaneous
or later policy decisions in this first period of readjustment, were
formulated at the policy conference:
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• Develop all types of 'cooperatives' (hezuo she) and 'small
cooperatives' (hezuo xiaozu);
• Actively support the creation of small cooperatives of SOE
young workers who are in a position to do so;
• Develop collective production units based on educated youth
as well as 'agriculture-industry-trade' joint enterprises;
• Encourage and foster the development of the individual econ-
omy (geti jingji) in the cities;
• Diversify the employment system and the working time for
some specific work positions and industries;
• Reform the system of middle schools and develop vocational
and technical education;
• Create labour service companies (laodong fuwu gongsi);
• Solve the issue of allocation of employment funds. 33
At this point, the attention of policymakers was focused on a re-
establishment of economic institutions and policies that had already
been part of the pre-Great Leap Forward labour system in socialist
China. This had also been the case for the wage adjustments and
reform in 1977-79 (bonuses, piece-rates, and material incentives)
and was even more the case for this set of policy suggestions con-
cerning employment. A positive model was formed, based on the
more flexible and mixed (for ownership and forms of economic
organisation) system of the early 1950s, rather than on the para-
meters of a market economy. Many direct references to that period,
as opposed to the negative examples of the radical years, appeared
in both official documents and academic discussions.
The years between 1949 and 1955, before state intervention in
the economy was completed, were characterized by the existence
of a labour market, by the co-existence of different forms of
ownership, by the use of contracts in industry, by a flexible wage
structure, and by an unusually high level of mobility. Many of the
institutions that once again became familiar to young Chinese in
search of employment during the eighties (such as the labour
recommendation offices and talent exchange centres), were part of
the labour system in the 1950s, as were mobility, contracts, and
temporary labour.
During the transitional period up to the launch of the Great
Leap Forward, the nationalisation of industrial plants featured a
transition from a 'flexible to a rigid allocation system,' a progres-
sive disruption of the labour market, and centralization of a
scattered recruitment system to a system fully in the hands of
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labour bureaus.34 The reform of the late 1970s was intended to
restore the earlier flexibility, market relations, and decentralisation
in labour relations.
The origins of the decentralisation scheme, as noted by Peter
Lee, can be traced back to the policies suggested in 1957-58 to
cope with excessive central control following the First Five-Year
Plan.35 In particular, four sets of policy recommendations were
advocated that largely recall the schemes of the early reform
stages: the first concerned the 'improvement of macro-managerial
systems,' redefining roles and competencies between the central,
local, and enterprise levels; the second established a 'profit reten-
tion policy'; the third concerned decentralisation of control over
working capital (from departments to enterprises and banks); and
the fourth outlined a responsibility system of capital investment.36
The. fiscal reform of the 1980s re-established for enterprises and
local authorities the 'right to the residual'37 that was a first step in
the reform of property rights and 'gave localities positive induce-
ments to promote rapid economic growth, which became not only
a necessary strategy for bureaucratic survival, but a viable strategy
for getting ahead.'38
Thus, both at the level of economic and administrative reform
and at that of labour institutions, the principles presented as new
to Chinese reform in the crucial years between 1978 and 1983 had
all already been present in the previous policy experiences of
Chinese socialism.
In the field· of labour institutions, among the novelties of the
reform period was the creation of labour service companies (LSCs)
(laodong fuwu gongsi), the main duty of which was to organise
unemployed urban youth (later also workers dismissed from SOEs)
into collective enterprises and production activity. Originally
intended as mutual-help actions or temporary parking for youths
'waiting for employment,' they soon became important economic
units able to create employment and profits independently.
LSCs were first described in the 1980 document on national
employment. They could be run by local labour departments or,
more frequently, by large state enterprises. Similar to small urban
collective enterprises, they enjoyed several advantages, the most
significant being substantial tax exemptions. This fostered their
growth. They were further encouraged by the new profit-
maximizing attitude of state enterprises, which often transferred
profitable activities to such side-enterprises that enjoyed a
preferential administrative and fiscal regime. In the first years,
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special benefits were also awarded to those LSCs that employed
among their staff and workers at least 60 percent of 'returned
educated youth.' LSCs were therefore the 'very embodiment of
extra-plan economic activities within the ambit of the state-owned
enterprises,'39 and allowed a consistent transfer of production
activities to privileged production centres; although under the con-
trol of mother enterprises, they were largely relieved of the burdens
of welfare and services connected to permanent workers, while
providing access to employment opportunities for the 'children of
the unit' (women danwei de erzi), otherwise no longer entitled to
'substitute' (dingti)40 for their mothers and fathers in the enterprise.
This urgency of the state sector to free sections of its productive
activity partially explains the unexpected economic success that
transformed LSCs into important elements in both the urban and
rural economies.41 According to official statistics, these centres,
intended to be labour-oriented and only marginally profitable,
achieved an impressive economic record in the 1990s: in 1994,
188,000 companies employed 8.7 million workers and produced
an output value of nearly 172 billion yuan, with a profit of 5.8
billion, while only 2004 percent of them faced deficit.42 LSCs
played a role which involves both employment/allocation policies
and the revitalisation of the non-state sectors of the economy.
As of 1983, the idea of a 'rational flow' also suggested the
implementation of new administrative and organisational mea-
sures and structures dealing more specifically with the distribution
of highly skilled workers or technicians, a scarce commodity in the
Chinese labour arena at that time. The State Council regulations
on the rational flow of technical personnei,43 the first of a series of
such regulations focused on the planning activities of the State
Council, the local administrations and the departments, as well as
on the monitoring of technical human resources (renxuan) in order
to improve the distribution of skilled technical personnel in both
cities and the countryside.
The major problem to be tackled was the reluctance of state
enterprises to allow the worker 'aristocracy' to leave the unit. This
was coupled with the technicians' unwillingness to undertake major
changes in their working and living situations, generally implying a
radical reduction in status, especially when moving to less devel-
oped areas or the countryside. The regulation was therefore very
careful to establish, on the one hand, the planning power of state
departments and, on the other, the possibility of maintaining the
same political and economic status in the new location or job.
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After the departments singled out individuals eligible for talent
exchange or transfer, the conditions (duration of transfer, condi-
tions of payment, and benefits) resulted from the contracting
(shangding) between the two enterprises were spelled out. From an
administrative point of view, the state could confirm that hukou
status (generally an urban hukou for the most skilled industrial
workers or technicians), as well as related prerogatives, would not
be jeopardized when moving to a rural or border area. Preferential
treatment for talented workers moving to border or rural areas
was also accorded.44
The regulation also introduced an 'experimental' measure that
allowed for a so-called 'bi-directional choice.' For the first time
(with all the administrative restrictions on hiring procedures, such
as the hukou), enterprises were allowed to hire and fire technical
or skilled workers independently (outside of the plan), while
skilled workers could formally choose whatever enterprise they
preferred, potentially the same way as they would in an open
labour market.
The first contradiction mentioned at the beginning of this sec-
tion (employment) was, therefore, tackled through initial reform
of the allocation system and implementation of the 'three-in-one'
(sanjiehe) scheme; the second contradiction (efficiency of the enter-
prise) was to be addressed after initial marginal adjustments in the
wage system by means of reorganisation of the administrative rela-
tionship between state and enterprise and by the release of prop-
erty rights to enterprises now able to retain part of the profits and
resources they had produced.
3.4 Enterprises: Reforming the Danwei System
Before turning our attention to the situation created when the poli-
cies that radically changed the relationship between state and
enterprise began to erode the importance of the 'micro societies'
(work-units), thus opening a path for a remaking of labour rela-
tions in the context of Chinese urban societies, it is worthwhile to
attempt a general assessment of the situation of Chinese urban
labour institutions in the initial years of reform.
According to one famous definition, up until the reform period
the Chinese socialist urban system consisted of two parts: neigh-
bourhood organisations (in the form of resident committees or
urban communes) and production units:45
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For complete organization of the urban population, then,
there has to be a production unit administrative system as
well. In this second mode of organization we see the central
stress in Chinese thinking on the work-unit (danwei),
which is seen not simply as a place to punch a time clock
and earn wages, but as an entity that plays a central role in
organizing lives of those employed there.46
Many authors have devoted great attention to the overlapping
roles of society and the work-unit in the urban administrative
system in contemporary China.47 The danwei has generally been
understood as a particular feature of Chinese socialism, with an
autonomy, independence, and self-reliance as a social organiser
that contrasted with its high level of dependency (on the state and
local branch departments) as a production, management, and
financial unit. The two major social, economic, and political
relationships (state-enterprise and enterprise-worker), which made
the danwei system particular to the cell-structured socialist society,
were both challenged at the beginning of the economic reforms.
The attack on the soft-budget constraints in SOEs implied that the
enterprises were going to lose the advantages of a secure balance
of accounts, but also that they would be able to enjoy greater
autonomy of decision making and to re-invest more of their
profits, with the help of the local and more accessible bureaucracy.
Worker families, for their part, would miss the security of life
tenure and iron wages, but were able to exploit more fruitfully the
possibilities offered by the individual economy, while still relying
on state-unit sponsored welfare.
Work-units, and in particular large industrial units, were aII-
encompassing structures in which workers found almost all their
needs met, from social services to education, housing, health care,
and recreation. Work-units emerged from the years of radicalism
as the major social reference point for workers: the very existence
of a society outside of the danwei was beyond the perception of
the Chinese urban worker. 48 The Chinese system was more immo-
bile and rigid than the Soviet industrial employment system, as
well as more extreme in terms of ties between workers and units
than the Japanese, as it did not properly hire employees, who
Were mainly assigned by administrative offices according to plans
and skills.49
As the work of Andrew Walder, among others, has revealed, the
importance of the traditional work-unit in Chinese society and the
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role of its authority system can be understood through the degree
of dependency experienced by the workers. This was contingent
not only on the nature of the work-unit's organisation, but also,
for example, on the external environment.
'Organized dependency,' as Walder calls authority relations
inside the work unit system, is measured by two major parameters:
the ability of the organisation to cope with the workers' needs and
the availability of alternatives.
Organized dependency... refers to the institutional
positions of subordinates with regard to superiors in organ-
ization. The greater proportion of the subordinates' needs
that is satisfied by the organization, the greater is the
subordinate's dependence on the organization. The fewer
the alternative sources for satisfying these needs, the more
dependent are subordinates. To the extent that subordi-
nates are unable to organize themselves collectively to
resist the demands of superiors and to the extent that they
are unable to develop and protect a competent leadership
of their own, the more dependent they are on superiors.so
Walder uses 'organized dependency' to investigate the patterns of
'institutional culture of authority,' in Chinese industry, while the
issue of dependency and its twofold parameter is useful here in
understanding the administrative changes in the work-unit system
and the direction taken by the reform process. In the initial phase
of labour reform, in fact, it was the internal ability of the enter-
prise to satisfy the workers' needs (the so-called 'three irons
system')Sl that was challenged, while in the following phases (what
are called contractualisation and marketisation here), the choices
and the existence of alternatives (and of an external economic
reference, both for the enterprise as an administrative and eco-
nomic entity and for the individual), were the major focus. The
entire issue of dependency was then challenged by the growing
complexity of labour market relations and by the emergence of
what has recently been labelled the 'disorganized despotism's2 of
labour relations.
In the years immediately following the 1978 takeover by the
new reformist leadership, however, the administrative measures to
increase enterprise autonomy, diversify the economic structure,
and link rewards to objective economic performance made the
traditional paths of status attainment and upward social mobility
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slightly more difficult, while the role of the danwei was challenged
in these areas. In fact, the social status of the workers was strictly
related to the type of enterprise they worked in,s3 while upward
mobility patterns were a major consequence of the c1ientelist struc-
ture of authority systems inside the enterprise. Both these parame-
ters were stable when the enterprise could rely on secure resources,
the amount of which was almost independent of external vari-
ables, as well as of the quality of internal performance.
As a result of the initial reforms, the units progressively lost their
security vis-a-vis the outside world and this increased their need to
pay attention to previously neglected efficiency parameters.
Efficiency meant work-unit efficiency and work-unit efficiency
meant labour efficiency. In the framework of the reform policy, the
main path to achieving efficiency was decentralisation; decentrali-
sation had several important implications for enterprises, namely:
• participation of the enterprise in the direct management of
resources and production factors;
• participation of the enterprise in the redistribution of its
profits under different forms (profit retention, then taxation);
• emergence of budget constraints related to production effi-
ciency (still constraints set by the government and not by the
market);
• increase of managerial responsibility and pressure over the
economic results of the enterprise (both upward to the state
economic plan and downward to the workers' economic
expectations).
Among the major consequences of the cell-type organisation of
China's urban society was the extremely low level of labour mobil-
ity beginning in the years following the Great Leap Forward.
Geographic mobility from the countryside to urban areas was dis-
couraged and strongly opposed with the help of administrative
barriers, such as the hukou system. Access to employing units was
also restricted by the unified allocation system and by the virtual
absence of labour recruitment paths other than administrative
paths. At the same time, administrative limits to labour force
movements were also applied to inter-unit mobility, which
remained a centrally controlled adjustment (authorisation from the
labour bureau was necessary) in the labour allocation system.
The danwei became the watchdog of this status quo in the
aftermath of the food crisis of the Great Leap Forward when an
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uncontrolled flow of enthusiastic or desperate workers largely
increased the economic pressure on urban centres. As a con-
sequence, the 1958 hukou regulations were implemented much
more strictly after the Leap contributing to further protection of
the privileged working class from social and economic competition
from in-migrants.
At the beginning of the reform, the mobility rate of Chinese
workers was close to zero. As noted by Naughton, in 1978 'death
was four times as important a cause of job leaving as were resig-
nation and being fired.'54 In that year only 37,000 of the 63
million state workers quit their jobs or were dismissed. The
immobility of the Chinese workforce, so strictly intertwined with
the social role of the danwei, was a political as much as an eco-
nomic option, resulting from steps taken under the pressure of
major- social crises, later deepened and upheld under the policy
arms of radical politics.
As we saw earlier, although mobility soon became a subject of
discussion among economists, the initial steps of reform targeted
enterprise efficiency as well as wealth distribution as factors in the
people's well being.
To achieve the goal of efficiency, therefore, decentralisation and
managerial autonomy were needed. Reform of the danwei system
began by tackling the problems related to the state-enterprise
relationship, which mainly concerned financial issues and respon-
sibility for the management of resources.
The very first decision in this direction was the re-creation of
enterprise funds for the payment of bonuses and rewards. The
State Council re-established this practice in November 1978, when
enterprises were again allowed to keep part of their profits, pro-
vided that they exceeded the established yearly quota. The decision
allowed for the retention of a maximum of 5 percent of the total
payroll. At the same time, in this initial formulation, the new
policy gave the industrial branch departments the right to retain
between 5 and 15 percent of the above-quota profits55 and to redis-
tribute them as bonus funds to profitable enterprises, thereby
turning the profit retention policy into a tool of 'autonomy vis-a-
vis the central controllers not only at the national level but also at
the locallevel.'56 Later on, following opposition by the enterprises
and policy adjustments, the above-quota profits were retained
directly by the enterprises.
The 'profit retention' policy (lirun liucheng) was fully imple-
mented in March 1979 with the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of
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Finance Circular on Systematically Experimenting the Profit
Retention System.57 This regulation nevertheless contained a major
redefining of the previous 'enterprise funds,' and the new fund -
managed directly by the enterprise - was not intended for bonuses
and rewards or for worker welfare, but exclusively for expenses
for equipment and 'simple construction works,' for technical
improvements and for a 'management fund' (jingli jijin).
The 'profit retention' policy was soon accompanied by a deep-
ening of the administrative reform, with the extension of the
economic responsibility system - already in effect in the agricul-
tural sector - to industrial units. Rather than simply assigning the
responsibility for management of the enterprise to the factory
director, this system sought to clarify the division of tasks among
state, branch departments and units, in a process of redistributing
financial resources and production factors, and establishing a
formal link between funds allocated by the state and work-unit
performance. Thus, DATL's double track (that is the evaluation of
both individual and enterprise performance) was recognized in
policy implementation as a necessary path leading to greater
autonomy and efficiency.
The economic responsibility system was first mentioned and dis-
cussed in a long document published after the Conference on the
Reform of the Industrial Management System held in March
1981,58 and it was later implemented with some substantial
corrections in November of the same year.59
As with most of the policies of those years, the major problem
acknowledged by the circulars was the overheating from the effects
of the experimental regulations. The autonomy enjoyed and
requested by the enterprises was, in fact, so high as to endanger the
fulfilment of overall production objectives. Many units engaged in
unsound practices, such as the distribution of bonuses without ref-
erence to standards of efficiency or productivity, or they turned to
more profitable production than that required by the state plan.
The practice of Ii da da gan, Ii xiao bu gan60 (engaging in prof-
itable, and abandoning less profitable, activities) must have been
extremely common, as the November circular explicitly stated that
it was to be rejected by managers and local authorities.
The implementation of bonuses and piece-rate wages as well as
other material incentives, was also a way of undermining the inter-
nal clientelistic structure of the work-unit, as it fostered conflicts
not only between cadres and workers for the distribution of bonus
quotas, but also among the workers themselves. For example, the
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latter concerned the criteria for assignment of individual bonuses
or material rewards of model workers, who became the targets of
unofficial criticism, as their outstanding performance contributed
to raising production norms and productivity standards. 61
Although the danwei system was still far from dismantled, the
emergence of uneven distribution practices, coupled with the limi-
tations imposed on internal recruitment, caused a steady decline -
with respect to the expectations created by reform during these
years - in the levels of satisfaction of workers' growing needs
inside the enterprise and the importance of the unit in the process
of attainment of individual status.
Although the structure of the unit was about to change, the
major direct effect on workers and the organisation of labour was
still exerted by the wage system, which was continuously adjusted
and reformed in the years up to 1985.
In particular, praise for the experimental application of 'floating
wages' (fudong gongzi) since late 1982 led to large-scale imple-
mentation of this system in 1983. The expression 'floating wages'
identified a system linking the distribution of individual wages
more directly and systematically to the performance and produc-
tivity of individuals and their units. The concept of floating wages
was flexible as it could be applied by the enterprise to the total
amount of the salary, or to the part exceeding the standard wage;
it could be related to individual, group, or collective performances
or to general indices, such as profit-making, productivity, or sales.
Floating wages were a direct consequence of the new policy of
'tax for profit' which, as of 1982, favoured the transformation of
enterprises into independent economic units (not yet independent
accounting units, though), that is, enterprises whose agent-principal
relationship with the state was expressed, albeit partially, in tax
remittances and no longer in contracted profit quotas.
Tax for profit strengthened the independence of work-units
from their owner, and radically separated the internal management
of production factors and of labour.
The factory director responsibility system adopted in 1984 was
the last step in the formalisation of this independence. The direc-
tor was given the power to manage personnel according to
productivity factors and to act as a de facto capitalist, able to take
part in economic benefits and to act on behalf of the government
but within limits increasingly set by his own interest or by that of
his enterprise. The responsibility system, that assigned to the
factory director much greater decision-making power and (at least
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on paper) the discretion to decide on all labour-related issues,
became, with the deepening of the reform, a powerful tool for pro-
duction despotism. This later became evident when the market was
intended to act as the principal regulator of labour relations.
The economic independence of the unit was thus a necessary
precondition for a market-driven and contract-regulated recruit-
ment process, that is, for enterprises to become employing units
(yongren danwei) and for what we have called the practice of
contractualisation of labour relations.
For the moment, however, all decisions remained strictly con-
tained inside the logic of policy accommodation; they were all 'old
tricks' of a more pragmatic approach to labour and workers; and
they were all aimed at 'damage containment.' This approach
proved insufficient once the opening up of the Chinese economy
progressed and both enterprises and workers discovered to their
own expense that the rigidity of central allocations no longer fitted
into the picture.
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Towards the Marketisation of
Labour Relations (1984-1991)
4.1 From Distribution to Employment:
Labour Relations and Social Constraints
The second turning point in the reform period was another 'Third
Plenum,' this time the October 1984 Third Plenum of the Twelfth
CCP Congress. The comprehensive decision on the structure of
Chinese economic reform adopted at this plenum changed the def-
inition of the national economy from a 'planned economy' (jihua
jingji) to a 'planned commodity economy' (you jihua de shangpin
jingji).
As already argued, this change corresponded with some major
shifts in policy orientation, theoretical understanding, and just-
ification, as well as changes in the process of restructuring
production and social relations.
Although the period beginning with the 1984 decision and
lasting until the beginning of the 1990s cannot be considered
homogeneous or without contradictions from the point of view of
policy implementation and political struggle, a visible trend in the
development of social and economic relationships convinces me
that this period can be identified by the process of contractualisa-
tion of the labour economy.
The process that I label contractualisation can be summarized by
the following points:
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(a) The diversification of the economic structure and the
emergence of greater geographic mobility despite still limited
official labour mobility (both horizontal and vertical) con-
tributed to a much more hostile labour environment, whose
social demands for labour opportunities were progressively
addressed less to the state and more and more directly to the
newly formed economic players (economic units, enterprise
management, labour service companies, labour agencies),
which were inclined to behave in consideration of economic
profitability;
(b) At the same time the state's role in the labour economy
increasingly became one of supervision, not only over redis-
tribution, as had been the case until then, but also over
allocation, mobility control, and social welfare functions;
(c) Formal recognition of a decentralised structure of the
economy, extended application of a responsibility system
(comprising the industrial as well as the agricultural sector),
and initial changes in the property rights structure and in the
economic relationship between state and localities and
betwee~ government and enterprises helped to formalise the
labour contract as a major control device of labour relations,
thus expanding the 'contract' system from the level of
state/enterprise relations to that of enterprise/worker relations;
(d) Diversification and the growth of external opportunities made
it essential for traditional productive units to deal with
insider/outsider relations, integrating paternalism as a typical
feature of the internally productive and protective danwei, as
well as clientelism towards the state and its bureaucracy. The
smashing of the 'iron rice bowl' (dapo tiefanwan) conse-
quently brought about the crisis of the danwei as a model unit
of productive organisation, while more complex labour rela-
tions and conflicts emerged in the new situation.
(e) While China was heading towards a commodity economy
with a diminished role for planning, the declining role of cen-
tral planners made it possible for theoretical efforts and
related policy processes to enter more thoroughly the discus-
sions of whether or not 'labour is a commodity,' that is, of the
contradictory nature of labour relations under a socialist sys-
tem. It was not a coincidence that these discussions began and
steadily developed from 1984 to 1987 when labour contracts
were first advocated and later implemented as a guiding hiring
principle.
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Although a main feature in the field of labour policy of this period
was the implementation of contract labour regulations for state-
owned enterprises, the term contractualisation must be understood
in a wider sense, that is in the broader context of the economic,
ideological, and political transformations that were modifying eco-
nomic relations inside the Chinese productive system and that
involved not only state enterprises but also many other fields of the
economic and labour society.
Although Chinese analysts prefer to see contract regulations as
a consciously implemented component of a longer process of
building a labour market in socialist China, and while there can be
no doubt that labour reform was moving in the direction of a
marketisation of labour relations, deregulation was not yet
complete and many of the theoretical and economic conditions for
the development of a labour market were still absent during this
phase.
First of all, the role played by the state sector was still over-
whelming and the restructuring of industrial state-owned
enterprises still had a long way to go. The attitudes of workers,
enterprises, and the state towards the labour issue were still very
much influenced by social stability, worries about social conflicts
and, lastly, the economic interests of social groups and economic
elites. While opposition to the reform by different players has
sometimes been overestimated, resistance and intra-unit conflicts
were the major reasons why the system was only partially imple-
mented in the initial years and did not obtain the expected results
in terms of an increase in labour mobility.
Second, when the regulations were introduced, China had a
large number, but not a large variety, of workers willing to partic-
ipate in the labour 'market.' The most skilled among them were
still generally attracted to secure positions inside state enterprises,
while the available workforce was mainly made up of low-
level, non-specialized workers of rural origins, who entered the
urban labour arena as migrants and were difficult to employ in
industrial state enterprises because of administrative and residence
barriers that were still in force in the field of geographic and
labour mobility.
Third, while structures such as the labour service companies
(laodong fuwu gongsi) and talent exchange centres (rencai jiaoliu
zhongxin) were already active in contributing to a 'rational flow'
of the labour force, the supply and demand relationship remained
as unbalanced as it had been under the classic socialist system: an
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excess of supply of unskilled labour still corresponded to a short-
age in other segments of demand (trained, specialized, and skilled
labour).
The introduction of the contract system, therefore, was likely to
be a further important move along a path leading to the greater
independence of the enterprise, rather than towards a conscious
decision to implement a labour market.
I will try to justify this assumption both in this chapter, by dis-
cussing the labour debate, and in the next chapter, by taking into
account labour contract policies.
4.2 A Changing Policy Strategy:
Labour Relations Discussed
At the time of the fifth conference on distribution according to
labour (1983) the discussion on labour had already changed direc-
tions to a thorough economic analysis of the labour factor in the
rapidly changing social environment, with the principle of DATL
definitively accepted after the long ideological discussions of the
previous years. Actually, the need even to hold such a discussion in
1983 can be traced back to the emergence in those months of some
residual 'leftist' positions 'arguing the dangerous emergence of
individualism, while in reality a high degree of egalitarianism stilI
existed.'!
The conference eventually paved the way for an expression of
the correctness of the DATL principle, which, from that time on,
became an accessory tool of the theoretical interpretation of
labour, as much greater attention was placed on the interaction of
economic and productive factors.
The communique on 'Actively Implementing a Labour Contract
System,'2 published by the Ministry of Labour and Personnel
(MoLP) in February 1983, together with the new instructions on
worker selection,3 were yet another recovery of earlier policy steps
in China's socialist labour history: in the 1950s, before the egali-
tarian attitude of the Cultural Revolution changed both practice
and rules, contract labour, as well as temporary labour (mainly
from the countryside), were widely employed in the urban indus-
trial sector, and were never really eradicated despite the high tide
of radicalism. Furthermore, at the time of the publication of the
communique, experiments on contract labour had already been
carried out, mainly in Shenzhen where a 'special economic zone'
(SEZ, jingji tequ) was established in 1979.4 As a provisional
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regulation, the communique represented no more than an endorse-
ment of the political correctness of an experimental practice that
had already been going on for some time in many enterprises, and
it was not yet a sign of its adoption as a guiding policy principle.
The low mobility of the Chinese workforce was one of the prin-
cipal results of the traditional Chinese egalitarian policy, and it
soon became clear that immobility was the main target of the cam-
paign in favour of a contract system. Initially, the attack on low
mobility was aimed at opening the 'closed (internal) system' of
recruitment in the Chinese danwei, in order to allow for a rational
(he/i) exchange of labour inside and outside of the factory, testify-
ing to the emergence of an 'outer' dimension (in theory as well as
in practice) of the labour force, as necessary prerequisite for the
emergence of a labour market.
One .example of this strategy was the attitude towards 'internal
recruitment' (neizhao). While the 1979 regulations on worker
selectionS implicitly accepted that the characteristics of virtue (de),
knowledge (zhi) and health (ti) had to be respected for all workers
hired by 'state and collective enterprises at district and county
level, including the sons and daughters of the staff and workers
already working in the unit,'6 the 1983 regulations explicitly stated
that 'unless otherwise decided by the central authority, enterprises
are not allowed to hire from inside'.
The practices of neizhao and dingti (substitution) were definitely
not among the most important economic factors affecting labour
mobility, but the specificity of the integrated social-productive
system built around the Chinese danwei contributed to making
'internal recruitment' an accepted worker benefit, while the
popularity of this custom created major implementation problems
when direct relations (not mediated by state intervention) between
enterprise (demand) and worker (supply) became a theoretical
imperative, under the label of 'bi-directional choice' (shuangxiang
xuanze).
The traditional employment system7 in socialist China was based
on the principle of central and unified allocation of the labour force
and was justified by the rationale of state control of economic poli-
cies. The decentralisation of responsibility and the emergence of the
principle of independence in enterprise management resulted in the
units deciding on the allocation of a progressively larger part of
their profits, as well as their being in a position (at least on paper)
to hire labour according to effective productive needs rather than
according to general policies or balances of power.
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Experiments with this new system of recruitment of the labour
force were the result partly of the new economic ideology and
partly of a widespread dissatisfaction among workers, mainly
skilled workers, whose position and compensation had largely
been eroded during the egalitarian years.
The contract system was also a cautious 'second step' (after that
of wage reform and diversification through DATL) towards the
independence of the labour policy of enterprises. Once enterprises
were able to allocate economic resources in a slightly more
autonomous way, they had to be given the opportunity to act to
alleviate the heaviest of their economic burdens, that is, redundant
(fuyu) labour.
Caused by the 'hoarding' of the labour force - a practice con-
nected to the accumulation of resources permitted by the central
allocation system during the hiring of new personnel - the excess
mainly involved non-trained personnel while the shortage of
skilled labour remained unchanged or was even aggravated by
technological upgrades and by the changing demand structure of
'modernised' enterprises. This testifies to the legacy of irrational
labour policies at the unit level which, although constituting
a financial advantage during the years of central allocation,
often became an unbearable burden after decentralisation was
under way.
Criticism of the immobility of the labour force in state enter-
prises appeared after 1984 as a result of the acknowledgement in
1983 of contract labour experiments in nine provinces. As with
many other policy measures in those years, contract labour had
been intensively experimented with before any official announce-
ment on the issue. The policy option described by analysts
consisted of a three-stage process, that is, 'an intense propaganda
and overall discussion of the issue of contract labour, an experi-
mental phase in which the new system is introduced together with
the old system, and final implementation in all enterprises.'8 This
is what was to occur between 1983 and 1986, that is, during the
period when new regulations were approved that required all
enterprises to hire exclusively under the contract labour system
regulations.
Meanwhile, at the theoretical level, two different discussions
were taking place: one concerning the economic and social signif-
icance of the transformation of labour allocation systems, and the
issue of labour mobility in particular, and the other regarding,
more specifically, the theoretical implications of the 'contracting'
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of the labour force, that is, the question of the commoditisation of
the labour force.
Discussing Labour as an Economic Factor
As of 1984, the issue of DATL was suddenly no longer problem-
atic. Significantly, the major journal for economic research in
China (Jingji Yanjiu - Economic Research) published only four
articles on the general issue of labour (lao) and wages (gongzi)
during the whole of 1984, only one of which concerned DATL.
The starting point of the renewed debate on labour was the
acknowledgement of the immobility of labour in the Chinese
industrial system. The 'iron rice bowl' system had turned out to be
a constraint on economic development in the initial years of
reforIl}, both at the enterprise level, where the attention on 'inter-
nal' pressure was often greater than on economic rationality, and
at the macroeconomic level, where China was now facing the con-
tradiction of joint pressure from industrial growth and increased
rural-urban mobility on the one hand, and administrative inade-
quacy and mammoth-like systems for the central allocation of
economic factors, on the other.
Thus, reform in this field called for workers to be considered
'production factors' (shengchanli yinsu), that is, not persons
'born in worker families,' but individuals who, potentially or con-
cretely, contribute their working capability to the productive
process. The boundary of the category of worker (gongren) is his
possession of a labour force in relation to the social reproduction
process.'9
The immobility of the labour force was largely discussed with
reference to the theory of production factors. A need was felt for a
functional link between the general debate on labour, the issue of
mobility, and reform of the employment system in the direction of
contractualisation. 'Labour mobility,' it was argued in an essay of
1984, 'is not a component of the direct production process, but an
important precondition for it.'IO The theory of production factors
and the mobility of labour were both constituents of the new inter-
pretation of industrial production. This was now considered a
result of the 'rational behaviour' of economic players (enterprises
and the state) and of the influence of economic levers on social
development and individual as well as social aspirations, to the
point that mobility 'reflects the objective economic needs' of the
reforming Chinese system.
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Mobility was not only seen as necessary for industrial develop-
ment but also as a consequence of the unequal distribution of
economic factors, such as a different natural population growth in
different regions, uneven levels of technical development, an
unequal geographic distribution of productive forces, and, finally,
a different quality of labour. 12
There were three major positions regarding reform of the perma-
nent employment system. As with many other issues in the dialectic
of reform, various contending positions were raised against the 'con-
servative' idea viewing the system based on life tenure as the only
way to safeguard the 'right to work' of socialist labourers and to
protect workers from instability, risks of unemployment, and privi-
leges. 13 Counterarguments generally supported the temporary imple-
mentation of a double-track employment system, maintaining both
permanent workers and contract and temporary workers on the one
hand, while gradually abolishing the permanent employment that
had become 'an unconditioned life-long system' on the other. 14
Both arguments supported the setting up of a more flexible and
diversified system, the superiority of which was described by Liu
Qintang as follows:
1. It is advantageous for the development of the virtue,
knowledge and health of workers and to increase the
quality of labour. Due to the implementation of a con-
tract system of employment, a hiring method based on
selection, as well as a policy of 'training before employ-
ment' (xian peixun, hou jiuye) , the basic malfunction-
ing of the employment system will end, and the quality
of the hiring mechanism will be greatly improved.
2. The possibility of a rational flow of employees from
and to the enterprise establishes conditions for devel-
opment of scientific labour management. The duration
of the contract as well as the number of hired workers
can be decided by the enterprises according to their
production needs, contributing to the solution of the
concrete problem of 'hoarding' of labour....
3. It has a positive influence on the strengthening of
socialist discipline and on decreasing absenteeism....
4. By increasing the enthusiasm of both workers and
employing units, it greatly contributes to increasing
productivity. The implementation of contract labour
allows enterprises to expand their hiring independence,
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as well as their choice of the labour force needed for
production, while individual workers will be able to
choose their enterprise and position according to their
skills, qualifications, capabilities, and interests.1S
This short description (one of many which could be quoted here)
gives an idea of how the parameters of the labour arena were out-
lined. First of all, the actors were now the worker and the enter-
prise, while decreasing importance was assigned to the role of the
state. Second, labour society was described by relations based on
'choices' in an open economic situation involving the 'outside
world' and 'individuals.' Third, the final aim was now the effi-
ciency of management, and the modernisation of bureaucratic!
economic mechanisms.
In tht; initial months of contract experimentation, a major sup-
porting argument was that the system maintained its feature of
'security' while granting greater 'flexibility' to the labour factor. As
mentioned, the security factor was still a highly regarded concern for
individual behaviour, while a flexible method for hiring and firing
was an economic necessity for the rapidly growing industrial units.
Tools of labour flexibility were still of a bureaucratic nature at
this stage, while flexibility itself was related to 'rationality' in
labour mobility. This means that the flow of labour, which was the
final aim of the entire reform process, was at this point still con-
sidered a top-down decision and that the field of intervention of .
the bureaucracy in labour allocation had been shifted from the
school/unit relationship of the unified allocation system to the
larger field of labour society. Public employment agencies such as
'labour service companies' or 'talent exchange centres' (TECs)
were still visible signs of state intervention created to deal with
phenomena that were growing (unemployment) or had simply not
been acknowledged previously (shortages of skilled labour); in the
initial years, these institutions dealt mainly with the transfer of the
labour force from unit to unit, rather than with the accession of
new workers to the economic system.
The following is an example of how the intermediary role of
LSCs was described:
Labour service companies became a form of organisation
of social labour and have the function of a 'reservoir' of
the labour force redistributed by the enterprises. LSCs can
organise the social labour force and, through planning,
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proceed to dispatch and redistribute labour, thereby
contributing to a rational use and to the saving of the
labour force. They can also become 'transfer stations'
(zhongzhuan zhan) for excess workers in those enterprises
undergoing restructuring, who can be organised by LSCs
to be trained, re-introduced into other units, and
employed to open up further opportunities.16
Although we shall see the greater, autonomous economic relevance
of LSCs become an important component of the contradictions
between the state and nonstate sectors in a later phase, at this
point these intermediate bureaucratic bodies still represented the
will of the state to control the 'rational flow' of the labour force
within the framework of a planned economic environment.
This attitude was also clear around 1986 when the phrase
'labour force market' first appeared, accompanied by a deepening
of the labour reform. There were two types of labour force
markets: the 'divided and unorganised labour force market,' that
is, a market made up of self-organised (mainly rural) labour
suppliers seeking jobs in the cities (an often-quoted example is the
'nannies market'17); and the 'concentrated and organised labour
market':
As information about supply and demand of labour does
not flow easily between workers and enterprises, units
often have difficulty in finding workers that fit their needs,
while workers have no way of finding a job in the desired
position. To solve this situation we need to create a con-
centrated and organised labour market that fosters the
exchange of relevant information about labour supply and
demand, and that can become a place for them to meet. ls
In the beginning, these places were such formal organisations as
LSCs and TECs in the form set up by the local (generally munici-
pal) labour bureaus. 19
The Chinese expression for 'labour market' still evoked a phys-
ical place in which two sides meet under the precondition of a
planned, rational distribution of the labour force. The socialist
labour market, at this point, was not only still a market of non-
commodities, but also a 'planned market.'20
The labour market was therefore intended to serve as the mar-
ketplace for something which flows but cannot be purchased (as it
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is not a commodity), nor sold (as it is not individual property). In
this way, it remained no more than a tool of the rationalisation of
the productive process.
At a seminar convened by the Beijing Municipal Labour
Academic Association, and held at the end of 1985, this organisa-
tional and institutional role of the 'labour market' was outlined.
Three main opinions emerged. The first argued that the labour
market is 'a mechanism and a means for the social distribution and
regulation of labour power.' This was the so-called 'labour market
under leadership' and stressed the existence of a joint organisation
of job seekers (be they self-organised, individuals, or LSCs). The
second opinion also intended the labour market to serve as a mech-
anism, but aimed at objectively regulating the labour flow. This
meant that attention had to be focused on both sides of the hypo-
theticallabour market (supply and demand) and that 'both recruit-
ing units and labourers have the freedom to choose,' while labour
mobility is a 'non-commodity exchange.'
The third opinion which emerged at the conference claimed that
the term 'labour market' did not fit the reality of the mechanism
required for restructuring the labour system and that instead such
terms as 'appropriate labour allocation' or 'rational labour flow'
should be used. 21
As we can see, all three opinions stressed the role of the labour
market as a mechanism (a tool to be used by the state according to
general needs), the main purpose of which was the resolution of
irrational behaviour on the part of labour supply and demand in
the new economic situation. However, it was still an idea related
to the inter-unit exchange of labour, whereas the term mobility
'refers to the transfer of the labourer between work-units.' While
the use of the term 'labour market' had great ideological appeal in
a period in which the 'market' was the main objective of economic
reform, no market-related economic principle lay behind the con-
cept, as price, opportunity, or supply and demand were not
allowed to act freely in a commoditised environment and mobility
was still the result of rational (that is, policy-driven) choices and
not of the interaction of economic forces.
This discussion, which corresponded to some relevant steps for-
ward in the process of ideological reform, was accompanied by an
enlargement and further opening of the debate about labour and
reforming socialist economies. After 1986, the structural difficul-
ties of a 'classic' socialist economy were openly discussed, and
works by foreign economists introducing the implications of
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reforming socialist systems were studied and sometimes translated
into Chinese.
This shift in theoretical strategy appeared clearly in a number of
academic publications in which the influence, in particular, of
Janos Kornai's22 view of the reform of socialist systems was directly
reported.
As an example, let us look at an influential article by Luo
Shouchu on Labour mobility and reform of the labour system,
published in spring 1986.23 Luo's analysis begins with the question
of labour immobility in the traditional system and the conclusions
she draws are strikingly similar to those of Kornai in describing the
'classical socialist economy':
Under the traditional system, enterprise input and output
are decided by the state, cost and profit are exogenous
quantities, gains and losses are taken over by the state,
capital is utilised free of charge, personal incomes, unre-
lated to enterprises gains or losses, are determined by
uniform state standards.... [In some cases] the enterprises
are forced to adopt the easiest fulfilment of plan indicators
as the goal of their behaviour and they subsequently
develop a 'capital hunger' (touzi jike) and a 'means of
production hunger' (shengchan ziliao jike) at the same
time as they become 'labour hungry' (laodongli jike) ....
The 'big pot' causes labour to lack initiative and enthu-
siasm. All this makes it difficult for labour productivity to
rise. Those enterprises that do not obtain requested equip-
ment increments must request an increase in labour to
fulfil quotas. When requested labour increments are
obtained, they become an excuse for raising the enter-
prise's grade and requesting new equipment and other
advantages.24
This analysis, assigning structural economic significance to the
phenomenon of 'labour hoarding,' earlier identified as an irra-
tional trend of enterprise management, draws heavily from
Kornai's 'soft-budget constraint' in traditional socialist economies
affecting the rationale of labour management.25
Luo takes a halfway position: the softness of the budget con-
straint, on one hand, and the restriction of planning to industrial
labour allocation, on the other, both contribute (from diametri-
cally opposed perspectives) to the 'lack of a selection mechanism
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which should function to promote excellence and eliminate the
inferior.'
In China, constraints on the increase in labour in large
industry come from economic (funds and planning) fac-
tors, rather than from natural ones. The after-effects of
'labour starvation,' rather than being reflected in labour
shortage show up in other forms, such as labour immobil-
ity, more employees in enterprises than there are jobs,
under-utilization or nonutilisation of skills, and indiffer-
ence everywhere.26
While the existence of such structural problems in labour alloca-
tion and utilization had already been pointed out in an earlier
phase .of the debate,27 the systemic interpretation that emerges
from Luo's article was rather new and reflected the growing
importance assigned to economic constraints in the analysis of
labour allocation and organisation.
Evaluation of the poorly performing allocation system led to the
conclusion that 'the traditional labour management structure can-
not achieve optimal results in labour allocation' and that an
'organic combination of plan and market is necessary.'
The novelty of this point in the debate and in this emerging inter-
pretation was less the recognition that market relations must also be
admitted in the realm of labour allocation than the understanding of
structural problems such as unemployment (people waiting for
employment) as a result of both labour overflow (due to units seek-
ing efficiency in their production process) and friction or disequi-
libria when supply and demand are met ('outside of production').
From this point on, the debate entered a phase in which the
word rationality was applied to the sustainability of economic
factors rather than to adherence to rational Marxist principles.
Is Labour a Commodity?28
Although a more pragmatic attitude towards labour emerged at
this stage, the greater part of the theoretical debate was still
devoted to an issue of pure socialist theory, that is, the question of
the commoditisation of labour in the changing economy of
Chinese socialism.
The particular intensity with which this topic was debated dur-
ing the years of labour reform and contractualisation is logically
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related to the issue of marketisation of labour relations being dis-
cussed here. While the rationality of market mechanisms was
advocated, it was impossible to find justification for the applica-
tion of market relations in the traditional understanding of labour
as a noncommodity economic factor.
In accordance with the tradition of Chinese theoretical debates
under socialism, the two categorical answers to the question put at
the beginning of this paragraph were not related to different pol-
icy options and both supported the current policy of labour
reform. There is probably one major reason for this: the question
of commoditisation of labour was not related to the specific policy
of mere labour reform (although this was the most visible among
the recent changes in the Chinese social and economic system) but
more broadly related to the economic reform path as a whole. For
all commentators, reform of the traditional allocation system, as
well as an extension of the contract system, were essential for
China's modernisation. But the creation of a labour market (for
which the main precondition is a recognition of the commodity
nature of labour - laodong Ii shangpin xingzhi) would lead to the
question of what kind of economy China was to have - whether a
'planned commodity economy' or a 'socialist market economy' -
and what the relationship between labour and other production
factors (such as the means of production and a growing variety of
capital) would be.
Seen from the perspective of this final goal, this otherwise unin-
teresting, redundant, highly ideologised discussion can probably be
better understood as a part of the process leading to the following
stage of the reform, that is, the 'socialist market economy' of the
1990s.
The discussion gave rise to some arguments in favour of a posi-
tive answer to the question. These points are what we will associ-
ate with support for a 'market socialism' solution of the reform:
first, while labour and the means of production are (by definition)
jointly owned by labourers in the general economic system, during
the production process the quantitative and qualitative combina-
tion of labour and the means of production turns labour into
'something with measurable value circulating on the market.'29
Second, the existence of a labour market is conditioned by a
recognition of the commodity nature of labour. In order for a mar-
ket to exist, there must be a commodity to be marketed.
Third, as the mobility of labour increases, the intersection of
supply and demand creates a difference between the value and
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use-value of the labour force, which is a main characteristic of
a commodity.
While advocates of 'labour as a commodity' generally found it
very easy to support their stance once the precondition of a labour
market had been accepted, it was more difficult to justify such a
position in the context of a socialist economy, in which workers
are both suppliers and owners of the means of production.
On the other hand, those who supported the principle that
labour can never be considered a commodity under socialism had
to find a different definition for a labour market, which they
accepted as a mechanism but not as a principle.
Tortuous and partial reformulations of the unacceptable princi-
ple of wage-labour markets were therefore a clear sign of how hard
it was to overcome these difficulties and how intense the need was
to be consistent with the leading ideology: such concepts as 'labour
service market,' 'live labour market,' 'manpower resource market,'
and 'job market,' (strangely enough, the controversy was not
about the term 'market') were all used to describe the actual rela-
tionships (between enterprise and workers, inside the production
process, between the two roles of the worker as supplier of labour
and owner of the enterprise, etc.) in terms of a rationalisation of
the allocation process.30
As an arena for the debate in those years, the journal Zhongguo
shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China) was particularly active in
hosting open discussions in which the different positions chal-
lenged each other directly. Both positions expressed supportive
views for the new policy of contractualisation, but were sharply
opposed in terms of their definition of labour.
I will report some parts of this debate in the following pages, not
because I consider them essential to the evolution of the labour
debate but simply to show how instrumental these positions were
to the struggle over the future of the Chinese economy, and how
quickly 'conservative' positions were abandoned once the political
struggle had been resolved in favour of a further deepening of
reform.
Socialist market economists (SMEs) often based their analysis
on a pragmatic re-consideration of labour mobility and of the role
of workers as owners of the means of production.
One collective expression of the worker's position as
owner [of the means of production] is that he can move
freely, and autonomously decide his productive and
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administrative unit, while realising the unity of labour and
means of production in the social environment. Without a
labour market, without the chance for the worker to move
his labour freely as if it were a commodity, the position of
a worker would be that of a passive allocated and adjusted
factor, therefore becoming dependent on only one part of
the means of productionY
For those opposed to this position (to simplify, we shall call them
Planned commodity economists, PCEs), the problem lay elsewhere.
In an article in response to the above, which appeared in the same
journal, Ma Conglin does not accept that 'the free movement of
labour .force implies that labour is exchanged on a trading
(maimai) basis,' and he argues that mobility and commoditisation
do not necessarily go together. 32
Similarly, in the same issue of the journal, Wei Xinghua quotes
the contrasting examples of life tenure in Japanese (capitalist)
enterprises and of the high mobility rates in the Soviet (socialist)
labour system to demonstrate that the nature of labour in fact has
nothing to do with the issue of mobility.33
The basic difference therefore is in the final aim of mobility.
While SMEs consider 'free mobility' (ziyou liudong) as the general
rule, PCEs advocate mainly a 'rational flow' (heli liudong) of the
labour force.
While the former concept implies that the rationality of the sys-
tem lies in individual behaviour (and regulation is a result of mar-
ket forces), the latter assigns superiority to the (public) mechanism.
This is clearly a difference that is not limited solely to the labour
allocation system but extends to all fields of the economy.
Firstly, the labour flow we discuss here and the free flow
of commodities in all markets are not the same thing. Still
people are not encouraged to seek jobs as they please, in
disregard of the requirements of the state plan and overall
arrangements, and exclusively out of personal considera-
tions. While a rational flow of labour is encouraged,
labour should be relatively stable.... Secondly, by labour
flow we mean chiefly the flow of qualified personnel
rather than the sale of labour as a commodity on the mar-
ket. We should not regard the flow of qualified personnel
exclusively as a relationship of exchange between labour
as a commodity and money.34
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A similar dispute, in fact, emerged in connection with the principle
of DATL. Can the principle of DATL (that is, remuneration based
on equal quantity and quality of labour) be used when labour is a
commodity or does the principle of labour pricing (implying dif-
ferent remunerations for equivalent labour because of different
economic conditions) 'naturally' emerge?
PCEs stressed the contradiction between the two principles,
while SMEs attempted to keep the contradictions within the
framework of socialist theory.
The commodity nature of social labour under socialism is
the starting point for individual commodity distribution,
and the recognition that the labour force is a commodity
helps the implementation of DATL. As labour exchange is
ba~ed on equal value, to accept the principle of labour-
commodity can guarantee that an equal quantity of labour
receives equal remuneration; if the labour cost is not based
on an equal-value exchange, it will be very difficult to
implement DATL.
Owing to limited competition among labour suppliers
and too little possibility for choice on the demand side,
demand-supply joint regulation of the market does not
emerge.35
Compared with the debates in the initial years of the reform, this
was a very different interpretation of DATL, mainly based on the
superiority of the regulatory power of market relations over the
redistributive principle for which the problem lay in the measure-
ment of labour quantity and quality.
This contradictory position, which tried to combine the equity
of central distribution with the advantage of market relations, was
stigmatised by the opposing view that 'if labour is a commodity,
DATL cannot succeed.'
... if distribution is carried out according to the value of
labour, the income of labourers will have nothing to do
with surplus products and their value. The latter is owned
by others. However, distribution according to labour
means distribution of products owned collectively by
labourers as well as of the national wealth. Apart from the
portion of the products distributed among labourers as
consumer goods according to work done, the remaining
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products and their value will go directly or indirectly to
labourers in the form of social deductions. The higher the
development level of socialist production, the more social
wealth and the greater the disparity between the income
earned in accordance with the principle of distribution
according to labour and the 'value of labour.' This is
because distribution according to work is not restricted by
the 'value of labour.'36
As we can see, the contenders in this ongoing debate expressed two
well-defined positions that were probably more important for the
consequences they had on the general discussion of socialism than
in the field of labour policymaking where, instead, a pragmatic
attitude dominated.3? The extension of the mechanism of labour
contracting was surely one of the reasons for the explosion of this
debate from 1985 to 1987, but this policy and the process of its
evaluation also brought some new issues to the main table of the
labour debate.
4.3 Labour Contracts and the Nature of Labour Relations
On 1 October 1986 the newly promulgated 'Regulations for the
Recruitment of Workers in State-Owned Enterprises' and
'Regulations on Dismissal of State-Owned Enterprise Workers'
became effective. SOEs were thereafter required by law to 'practice
the labour contract system' while 'openly recruiting workers from
society.'
The introduction of a contract system for labour partially elim-
inated the long-established and dominant practice of bureaucratic
allocation. This was a much longer process than that first
sanctioned by the 1986 regulations and it did not end such pater-
nalistic and clientelistic practices as 'internal' recruitment, or the
important role of administrative allocation.
Contracts changed, if not in theory at least in the individuals'
perception of their labour, the role of workers inside the pro-
duction unit, and consequently fostered the transformation of the
work-unit from the all-encompassing organiser of life and produc-
tion to the employer.
The new system also acknowledged a division of workers into
different types, namely permanent, contract, and temporary
workers. While the three categories were not new to Chinese
labour organisation, a recognition of different statuses became a
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foundation for an economic division between workers who were
occasionally assigned similar tasks with different monetary
incomes and non-monetary benefits.
The reform also introduced elements of a legalisation of labour
relations; the existence of an agreement underwritten by both
parties allowed (mainly in theory) workers to act against the enter-
prise and, consequently, to turn to the state to safeguard their legal
'labour rights.'
Finally, the emergence of the new system diminished the inci-
dence of social benefits and social security, which were the major
features of the traditional social contract between workers and the
state. This was soon targeted as the principal reason for the dete-
rioration of labour conditions. The emphasis on this feature is also
very important in our discussion of the labour issue in Chinese
debates.during the 1980s as it contributed to turning attention
from distribution and allocation to the labour process and indi-
vidual attitudes and behaviour.
This further step is also partly a legacy of the re-emergence of the
social sciences (other than economics) as an element in Chinese the-
oretical debate. With the relative 'relaxation' of central control over
discussion of theoretical issues, which lasted until 1988-89 and was
partly due to the transitional nature of reform theory (that is, to the
generally shared impression that the reforms need experimentation
and options from which to choose), some considerations arising
from sociological experiences and field research were introduced.
Therefore, labour became an issue that involved not only the eco-
nomic performance of the system but also individual satisfaction,
social development, and security.
This new way of presenting labour is well described in an article
published shortly after the 1986 contract regulations went into
effect; in addition to the 'many merits' (mainly those linked to the
efficiency of production and of economic mechanisms) of the new
system, the essay also found several difficulties in implementation,
mainly related to contradictions at the level of production and
individual attitudes. 38
Of particular interest is the section of the article devoted to
workers' 'concerns' in the two factories surveyed:
For the time being, since society and family cannot under-
stand the labour contract system, they thus view contract
workers in an unfavourable light. Some people say:
'Contract work is temporary work for which there is no
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guarantee at all. Those who take on such work have to
suffer throughout their lives.'
Contract workers also consider themselves 'inferior' to
others and some of them say: 'We are second-class citizens
in that people prefer not to choose us for husbands or
wives and in that we have to worry about questions like
health and livelihood after retirement.' As reflected in
actual situations, they are not entrusted with important
tasks and very often are dismissed from their jobs if a mis-
take is made.39
While this early investigation anticipates one of the problems in
the implementation of labour contracts, what is more interesting is
that a new sociology of labour (the scientific method of which is
still very questionable) was emerging as an important tool of inter-
pretation and a consistent part of the labour debate.
As seen, the arguments in the debate on the nature of labour
have to be understood within the general context of economic
changes; however, statements of the official line on the labour
system took over and summarized some of the arguments (mainly
the ones used by those whom we called SMEs) to justify the
marketisation of labour relations.
In a June 1986 speech, for example, Hu Qili assured that the
reform of the labour system and the introduction and wide imple-
mentation of labour contracting was aimed at 'improving the
quality of workers and staff,' responding to the needs of 'stability
as well as mobility and conforming to the demands of modernized
planned production and development of a commodity economy.'40
Labour contracts according to this official statement do not harm
the position of workers as owners of the enterprise and the nature
of the socialist contract remains opposed to that of wage-labour
under capitalist conditions.
But behind the emergence of the contract labour system, which
the Chinese leadership dealt with as another political campaign to
be 'enthusiastically supported,' some related macroeconomic
problems were appearing and were already being pointed out by
analysts.
One problem was the increase in hiring costs and the relative
contraction of employment. This was understood to be a result of
one of the principal goals of socialist enterprises, that is, the
growth of per capita income rather than overall profits.
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The current reform generally induces enterprise goals to
turn toward the increase of per capita income. Thus their
hiring standards differ from those of enterprises pursuing
overall profits. As a result, while there is a slackening of
enterprise hunger for labour and a hoarding tendency,
there are also trends towards an increase in the cost of
using workers and a relative decline in the number of
placements....
Despite the fact that the cose l to the enterprise of the
use of workers on the accounting books is wages, the goal
of the enterprise and the rigidity of income compels it to
view the proportion of profits set aside for bonuses and
the welfare fund as personal income, as an actual cost
which has to be guaranteed.42
This situation opened up contradictions within enterprises, that
required greater autonomy to become effective economically, but
whose 'rational economic behaviour' meant the risk of increasing
unemployment. This situation was further exacerbated by the
unbalanced nature of China's labour supply: abundant in unskilled
labourers, the pressure of which reduces wages, but comparatively
poor in highly sought skilled workers, whom the enterprises are
generally ready to compensate in a more attractive way.
But the Chinese danwei, it was recognized, was still a 'com-
munity' and its egalitarian mechanism tended to respond to the
expectations of unskilled workers for higher income, thereby
entering into a spiral of increasing labour costs. Only the deepen-
ing of reform and growing of economic constraints would later
overcome this limitation.
Another macroeconomic problem to which attention was turned
was rising unemployment in the industrial sector (coupled with
growing concern for the increasing number of displaced agri-
cultural workers). The consequence of contract labour and
independence in hiring and firing was an increase in the dismissal
of redundant workers, as they became a burden for the enterprises
rather than being the financial advantage they had been under the
traditional system.
The problem of large-scale unemployment (a central concern in
the late 1990s) was already clear in the eyes of observers at that
time, not only as a result of changes in enterprise behaviour, but
also as a macro social factor, the consequence of the growth of the
working population, of the decrease in the percentage of the
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population employed in agriculture, and of a general disequilib-
rium in both the sectoral and geographic distribution of labour
supply and demand.43
What may be concluded about the debate on contractualisation
is that it evolved radically from 1983 to 1988 in at least three
major respects: it became more pragmatic, wide and rich in eco-
nomic considerations, in particular after the labour reform went
into effect. The question of the commodity nature of labour came
to be understood as a component of the larger debate on economic
development, but insofar as the specific issue of labour is con-
cerned, the traditional unanimity of consent accompanied the birth
of the new system. As of 1987, finally, some critical and worried
analyses of the future labour society appeared, probably corre-
sponding to the re-emergence of a scientific attitude towards field
research which exposed the crisis of China's work-unit identity
and the growth of a desire for mobility which (coupled with the
administrative crisis) was the problem at the centre of the debate
on labour markets in the following years.
The end of the monolithic danwei system, ushered in by the
emergence of diversified workers' identities, accompanied the end
of a privileged society built inside the closed gates of industrial
enterprises. The traditional (ruraVurban, industriaVagricultural)
divide, the origin of this privilege, was further complicated by
labour policy reform, and by the progressive decline of adminis-
trative control over society and mobility.
The process of policy formulation, in the years leading to the
implementation of the contract system, more than at other times,
enjoyed the possibility to investigate and evaluate experiments of a
different nature, and was not forced to apply only rigid ideologi-
cal schemes, thus resulting in a more complex set of policies that
set the tone for the reforms to come. Contracts penetration of
Chinese enterprises was slow, difficult, and driven by economic
and political considerations, as well as by market opportunities.
Nonetheless it was a massive and dramatic change in the manage-
ment culture and in social organisation. Despite social and political
resistance, contracts did change the labour arena for good,
although this was still questionable in the years when the policies
were first formulated.
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5.1 A 'Structural' Economic Reform
Towards the end of 1984, the set of experimental policies of eco-
nomic reform implemented during the initial years of readjustment
resulted in major official recognition of the new nature of the
Chinese economic system. The 'Decision on Economic Structural
Reform' adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the twelfth
Central Committee in October 'summed up,' in the official words
of Hu Sheng,
the experience of economic structural reform since the
third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee, put
forward and elaborated more systematically a series of
important questions, both theoretical and practical,
concerning this issue. It is a programmatic document for
carrying out overall economic structural reform.!
This document marked the end of the experimental phase of eco-
nomic reform, and 'shattered the traditional concept of setting
planned economy against commodity economy' [sic].2
The planned commodity economy (PCE) was the name given
to the new framework for the Chinese economy which opened
the path for a more structured reform of labour relations. In the
'Decision on Economic Structural Reform', the PCE was seen
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as involving: further development of the nonstate sector,
while maintaining the leading role of the state sector; further
devolution of autonomy to enterprises through expansion of the
tax-for-profit system; reduction in the control function of state
organs and transition from state control to state supervision of the
economic system.
All measures proposed in the document signalled an intention to
proceed along the path to decentralisation of state prerogatives in
the economic system. The effectiveness of the principal means of
state control of the industrial sector (mandatory production plans,
distribution of materials and production factors, and distribution
of funds) steadily and consciously decreased in the years following
1984.
In 1987, for example, the number of industrial products con-
trolled by mandatory plans of the State Planning Commission
decreased from 120 to 60 (17 percent of total industrial output),
while only 26 production materials were still distributed by the
state (as compared to 259 before the reforms). In addition, state
funds had largely been replaced by bank loans (76.6 percent and
23.4 percent in 1978, respectively and 31.2 percent and 68.8 per-
cent in 1987, respectively).
The decreasing role of state planning had major consequences
for the enterprises as they acquired an increasingly greater degree
of autonomy through an enlargement of the scope of the respon-
sibility system and implementation of the factory manager
responsibility system in 1985. This new autonomy, as well as the
dismantling of the previous system for state financial and produc-
tive supply, forced enterprises and their managers to adopt an
active and aggressive attitude towards production factor markets,
including the labour market.
At the same time, the new 'economicism' in enterprise behaviour
caused disorientation among workers, who faced new complex
and alternative choices as full-scale contract employment was
introduced into the state sector (1986). Although the number of
workers under contract was still very low with respect to perma-
nent workers until the late 1980s (about 10 percent in 1988),
almost all working families were confronted with choices, at least
for the new members of the family who were entering the labour
arena. As of 1986, life tenure in SOEs, with all its advantages and
high levels of individual and family dependence, was de facto abol-
ished for all new recruits. Worker families, the backbone of the
danwei system, took on a new attitude which has been called 'one
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family, two systems' (yijia /iangzhi),3 that is, maintaining the
family position in the state unit, while dispatching sons to run indi-
vidual enterprises or to find employment in the more profitable
though more insecure private sector.
This chapter will focus on three aspects of the implementation
of contracts in the Chinese labour system: the institutional
arrangements and policy derived from the new basis for economic
policy set by the 1984 decision on economic reform; workers'
reactions and adaptation to the new regulations; the impact on
enterprise management and on the nature of work-units.
5.2 The Labour Contract
Labour contracts were first mentioned in 1980 in the regulations
on labour management in Sino-foreign joint ventures.4 In this
case, contracts were the only way to regulate employment rela-
tions in enterprises. Contracts were signed by management and
trade union representatives and confirmed (pizhun) by local
labour departments. Revival of and experiments with contract
la~our were th~s f~stered and .accelerated by the emerg~nce .of
pnvate and foreign Investment, In areas such as Shenzhe~peC1al
economic zone. •
Only later did the idea of contracts in labour and employment
relations become associated with the reform of SOEs. The first
experimental regulations involving recognition of a direct and con-
tractable relationship between worker and enterprise were more
concerned with the quality of recruitment and the selection of
recruits than with the conditions and competitive advantages
offered to the economic unit by the abolition of life tenure and
related commitments.
In February 1983 the Ministry of Labour and Personnel issued
a circular calling for a large-scale experiment with labour contracts
in SOEs as a means of eliminating 'iron rice bowl' and of defini-
tively applying the principle of 'from each according to his ability,
to each according to his labour' (gejin suoneng, an/ao fenpei).5 The
circular targeted both state and collective units and called upon
'provinces that have not yet tried out this system to choose one or
two cities or counties to implement this experimental reform
before the end of the present year.'6 The contract described in this
circular could be long-term (without specified duration) or short-
term (three to five years), with wages calculated 'according to
labour,' including (at least for workers holding urban hukou) all
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major social security items (such as old age pensions); no mention
was made of the welfare items generally issued to life-tenure
workers (such as housing, schooling, etc.).
Shortly after this circular was issued, provisional regulations for
the 'recruiting, testing, and selection of workers' were issued and
made public/ This second circular talked explicitly of open recruit-
ment, officially putting an end to the practice of neizhao (internal
recruitment) of 'children of the unit's workers,' one of the most
obvious clientelist forms of family protection in industrial units. 8
Both documents intended therefore to introduce rational prac-
tices into hiring procedures, keeping the labour contract and
labour management (laodong guanli) separate from recruitment
and from the broader issue of employment (jiuye). Judging from
the time it took for the system to go into effect and become com-
pulsory for all state and collective enterprises (1986), and then to
be popularised, the experiments must have met with numerous
difficulties. In 1987, the number of contract workers reached six
million, slightly more than 5 percent of the total industrial work-
force (including the private and foreign investment sector), of
which 61.5 percent were new recruits. A significant trend towards
sUbstittfion of fixed workers with contract workers did not take
place until the beginning of the 1990s: it is only since 1992 that the
number of contracts stipulated yearly has begun to exceed the
number of new recruits in the state sector, meaning that some of
the fixed workers were slowly turning to contract labour.9
There were 13.7 million contract workers in SOEs in 1990 (13.3
percent of total SOEs staff and workers), but their numerical
growth was much more evident in the following years, reaching
26.2 percent of the state industrial workforce in 1994 and 52
percent in 1997. This contributed to the optimism of the Chinese
government regarding conversion of the entire industrial labour
force into contract workers by the year 2000.
While it should be noted that implementation of the labour
contract system progressed at a slower pace than expected, it is
reasonable to assume that this change was probably the most sig-
nificant of all changes imposed by the reform and the one with the
deepest impact on Chinese labour society. Rapid, straightforward,
and painless development could not be expected.
As mentioned above, employment and labour management
(wages and organisation) had been kept separate in labour policy-
making during the early reform period. The extension in the use of
contracts became the first tool to integrate the two issues within a
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framework that would eventually lead to the emergence of a
labour market. Enterprises were encouraged to be actively
involved in the demand side of selection. However, they lacked not
only administrative support from public structures (labour service
markets and talent exchange centres run by local labour bureaus
developed rapidly only after the beginning of the 1990s), but
sometimes it was difficult for them to be selective as their hunger
for labour and for new recruits was very limited.
The previous practice of hoarding the labour force and the struc-
tural difficulties in laying off workers, for both internal and
macroeconomic reasons, put the force already on the books to a
more rational use, instead of hiring new workers. As the new
system was compulsory only for new recruits in the initial years of
contract work, workforce growth inside the state sector remained
limited to this category, while the largest proportion of new entries
in the arena of labour relations was in the private or collective sec-
tor and in the state-led (or collective) 'out of plan' production units
of various types, such as labour service companies or township and
village enterprises. The ability and willingness of SOEs to absorb
new workers decreased continuously after 1986. In that year,
before the full-scale implementation of the labour contract regula-
tions, new urban employment entering the state sector was still
67.6 percent of the total (5.36 million); in 1991 it reached a nega-
tive peak of 47.4 percent (3.63 million), with a significant increase
in collective (35.6 percent), individual (7.9 percent), and other
kinds of enterprises (private and foreign, 9.1 percent).lO
The set of labour reforms issued in 1986 included four major
documents: one concerning the institution of labour contracts, one
on hiring procedures for SOEs, one on the dismissal of workers
violating labour discipline, and finally one on the institution of an
unemployment fund. Once again, these four issues (labour rights,
recruitment, industrial relations, and welfare), structurally a part
of the same chapter of labour reform, were kept separate, as was
the case in 1983.
The 'Provisional Regulations on the Establishment of the
Labour Contract System in State-Run Enterprises' were published
in July 1986.11 According to this document, 'full year workers'
(changnianxing gongren) have to be hired on a contractual basis.
The document also establishes a difference between contract work-
ers and seasonal (jijie) and temporary (/ingshi) workers, that is,
those hired (also on a contract basis) for periods shorter than one
year.
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Contracts could be short-term (duanqi - one to five years) or
long-term (changqi - more than five years), and could be extended
after expiry 'according to production needs' and with the agree-
ment of the worker. 12 Recruitment was described as an open
process directed by the enterprises under the leadership of local
labour departments, on the basis of voluntary application by indi-
vidual workers undergoing selection based on 'virtue (de), knowl-
edge (zhi), and physical conditions (ti).' The workers, at the end
of this process, were hired on a trial basis for a period of between
three and six months.
The contract signed by the two parties included some regular
items, such as quality and quantity standards (zhiliang he shuliang
zhibiao) to be achieved by the worker; his/her duties; duration of
the contract and of the trial period; production and working con-
ditions; salary, social insurance and benefits; regulations concern-
ing labour discipline; penalties for violating the labour contract;
and all other items agreed upon by both worker and enterprise.13
The rights of the workers to terminate the contract and the
duties of the enterprise not to dismiss the worker were also clearly
stipulated, whereas the norms under which the enterprise could
fire the worker were specified in another document regarding both
contract and fixed workers.14
There were also provisions concerning the regulation of labour
relations and the treatment of contract workers vis-a-vis perma-
nent workers. There was the possibility for contract workers to
receive fewer material benefits (fuli), with their lower income
being compensated for by 'wage-type' monetary benefits that in
any case could not amount to more than 15 percent of the
standard wages. Material incentives (bonuses, rewards) and basic
contributions for health, food, work security, and tools were to be
calculated on the basis of the standard for fixed workers with the
same productive duties.
On many other issues the position of contract workers was
equal to that of fixed workers. For holiday and wedding leave, sick
or maternity treatment, work-related accidents or illness, the con-
ditions were the same as for other workers, although a limit was
set, for example, on the maximum duration of leave for non work-
related illnesses or accidents (three months to one year according
to the overall duration of the contract, extendable for those
already working in the unit for more than two years). When leav-
ing a unit, contract workers were entitled to a severance allowance
(the so-called 'life allowance' shenghuo buzhu fei), calculated as
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one monthly standard wage for each year of work completed in the
unit (but not more than twelve). There was no payment if the
worker had chosen to resign (zixing cizhi) voluntarily, nor after
the expiry of the term or dismissal by the enterprise.
Finally, the document established a security system for retired
workers: enterprises were to create retirement funds by allocating
15 percent of the yearly total contract wage bill, whereas workers
were to pay 3 percent of their standard wage for the same purpose.
An earlier document had created the first public unemployment
fund. 15 This fund - intended to protect workers dismissed by bank-
rupt or near-bankrupt enterprises, workers whose contract terms
had expired, or workers who had simply been 'laid off' by enter-
prises - was put under the control and management of local
government. Enterprises made contributions (1 percent of the total
payroll before taxation) and local treasuries subsidized it and
intervened when resources ran low. The fund was to be used not
only to pay subsidies to dismissed workers but also, for example,
to organise training activities, to cover early retirements (in the
case of enterprises undergoing restructuring), medical expenses,
and 'expenses that help unemployed workers provide for
themselves by engaging in production.'16 The latter could refer to
the creation of labour service companies managed by local
governments.
Workers with a standing of more than five years received pay-
ments from the unemployment fund for two years; others were
paid for twelve months. During the first year, the unemployed were
provided with 60-75 percent of their standard wage (as we saw, a
small part of the total wage, at least for permanent workers), and
with 50 percent during the second year.
Contracts and temporary labour were largely used in the late
1950s and early 1960s. Contract workers, mainly recruited from
the countryside to increase productivity of low-tech productions,
constituted an extra army of industrial workers who could be used
in addition to permanent labour and who could be dismissed
almost at will (sometimes in a rather harsh and uncontrolled man-
ner by the urban bureaucracies), to be sent back to their original
rural brigades, as was the case once the policies on labour mobility
changed at the beginning of the 60s. The use of contracts, however,
was never extensively used to undermine the prerogative of the
urban worker elite.
Unlike the 1950s and 1960s, it was already clear in 1983 that
the new contract system (hetongzhi) was expected to become the
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substitute for the 'iron rice bowl,' and involve also all those work-
ers who had until then enjoyed the advantages of higher status and
higher levels of security embedded in the life-tenure system of
urban SOEs.
Labour contract workers are considered 'regular enterprise
workers' and their wages fall within the national labour wage
plan. They are formally entitled to the same economic and civil
rights as permanent workers (work, study, participation, political
rights,t7 and material incentives). In the optimistic official view,
they differ from permanent workers only with regard to their
insurance and welfare benefits which are charged partly to the
enterprise and partly to the worker: 'the advantages of the perma-
nent labour system have been retained while the iron rice bowl has
been eliminated.'18
The use of contracts was made compulsory not by these regula-
tions (which were concerned with establishing contract workers'
rights, duties, and position inside enterprises) but by another
document issued on the same date concerning recruitment of
workers. 19 The two documents were kept separate in order to link
contracts to the recruitment process rather than to SOEs' manage-
ment. The second document also affirmed the need for open
recruitment to 'respect the national employment plans.' Enterprises
were, in fact, enjoying much greater freedom in resource manage-
ment and managerial decisions, even though the constraints on
their budgets were not hard. Acting 'outside of the plan' (jihua wail
was becoming a major source of revenue for SOEs.
Despite the breakthrough, contracts appeared to 'remain within
the cultural tradition of reciprocity, with rights balanced by oblig-
ations,'20 while they became a tool to establish new labour rela-
tions in both SOEs and foreign-invested and private enterprises as
well as a way for enterprises to practice 'open recruitment'
(gongkai zhaogong). However, the new tool was expected to lessen
central level control of employment dynamics.
5.3 Contracts and Labour Mobility: Moving the Dual
Market to the Cities
The provisional regulations also contained one strange article
specifying the possibility of terminating a contract and signing a
new one with a different unit in case of 'production necessities or
of national regulations requiring cross-county (kuo diqu) move-
ment of the labour force.' This was the first recognition of the
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potential for labour mobility under the contract system, although
the regulation clarifies that the movement of contract workers is
conditioned by 'the approval of labour offices and the fulfilment of
hukou and pension fund formalities.'21
The 'mobility' incorporated in the contract system was probably
intended to contribute to solving the economic and geographic
contradictions between the developed urban labour demand and
mainly rural labour supply; a solution to this dilemma had been
obstructed largely by administrative measures such as the family
registration system.
The work-units that had been involved in the decentralisation
and independence schemes of the early reform years were chang-
ing their administrative and economic agency relationship to the
state, but their internal structures had not yet been questioned.
Clientelism and paternalism remained dominant in the unit-
worker relationship, while the new responsibility system made it
more evident that managers were directly responsible for choices
and policies related to workers' well being. The contract system
challenged existing interpersonal networks and increased compet-
itiveness as well as intra-unit conflicts: labour contracts are gener-
ally individual agreements (not household-based as they are in the
countryside) and are linked to individual and collective product-
ivity, as well as being deprived of most of the acquired welfare
benefits previously attached to labour. This new relationship largely
reduces the political and social role implicit in the work-unit system
and exposes the worker to different varieties of management des-
potism, rather than being dependent on the enterprise.
Newcomers were often convinced that a contract was the first
step towards life tenure in an enterprise, while permanent workers
were frequently reluctant to abandon their privileges as 'masters of
the enterprise' to undertake a new and uncertain status. Not sur-
prisingly, the labour contract contradicted the unit system and this
factor affected the rapidity of its implementation. Only later, when
the advantages (and sometimes the necessity) of xiahai22 became
more evident, mainly in the urban developing economy which
could grant a higher - albeit risky - income, did the voluntary
mobility of workers become more marked.
The demand for workers in the booming urban enterprises in
those years and the difficulties of recruiting among urban hukou
holders forced the authorities to shift from control to encourage-
ment of labour movements from the localities towards the cities,
and to facilitate the so-called hukou migration, that is, the formal
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and bureaucratically driven transfer of workers, associated with
the transformation of their hukou from rural to urban status. This
policy lasted only until the end of the 1980s when the new eco-
nomic crisis and the relatively lower demand for labour forced the
authorities to bring hukou migration under control again.23
It is no coincidence that the major experiments with reforming
the contradictory nature of the hukou system were carried out dur-
ing this period of significant administrative reorganisation of the
allocation system. In 1985, new regulations were issued concern-
ing temporary residence for non-hukou holders, extending the
possibility of registering for temporary residence in small towns.24
The reasons for and structure of rural-urban migration in the
second half of the 1980s strongly indicate that the distinction
between hukou and non-hukou migration is still very effective in
shaping migration patterns. Non-hukou mobility, an expression
referring to self-initiated rural-urban migration, is predominantly
work-related: 49.3 percent of these migrants leave the countryside
for jobs in industry or the self-employed sector. But due to the high
incidence among non-hukou (informal) migrants of self-employ-
ment and family businesses in the residual niches of the developing
urban economy, a further 33 percent of them who may actually
consider migration for 'family reasons' (migration with the family,
marriage, or to rejoin family and friends) should probably be
included in the total number of work migrants.
The employment structure of migrants revealed by the 1990 cen-
sus shows that the non-hukou migrants were principally employed
in the industrial workforce, and that a significant percentage (73.6
percent) were employed in privately-owned enterprises or in the
self-employed sector.26
By contrast, hukou migrants are almost entirely the result of
state-led job transfers, assignments, marriage migration, or other
reasons (such as study or training) and only an insignificant per-
centage (1.8 percent) entered the labour market without being
assigned by the relevant administrative units.
The demand for temporary labour has been very high since the
beginning of the 1980s. The special economic zones that have
enjoyed a special status in employment practices since 1980 have
been the leading areas in the recruitment of temporary workers.
According to official data, permanent labour only accounted for
44 percent of the total workforce in the Shenzhen SEZ in 1987,
while contract workers amounted to 14.1 percent and temporary
workers 41.9 percent.27 Also, in the case of temporary workers,
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massive transfers of the labour force under the auspices of local
authorities lasted into the 1990s, as demonstrated by the existence
of special model collective contracts signed between mine plants or
other labour intensive state-owned plants and local governments
for the hiring of 'rural rotation workers' (nongmin lunhuan
gongren ).28
Employment 'out of the plan' (jihua wai) in SOEs also grew
steadily in the reform years, principally in the fast growing coastal
provinces, whose economy required a large pool of cheap labour.
However, state-owned enterprises also preferred to hire temporary
workers when needed because: they cost less than contract or
permanent workers29 as there was no need for the enterprises to
grant welfare or to pay insurance costs; wage labourers from the
countryside (nongmin gong) were considered simple-minded per-
sons {laoshi) and therefore easier to manage; they were 'easy to
hire and fire' (zhao zhi ji lai huizhi jiqu). Furthermore, workers
coming to the city from the countryside to seek labour were ready
to take on positions and to do the dirty work that the urban
population now refused to engage in.30 It was not the exception
that temporary workers were hired outside of the official recruit-
ment channels without being given formal contracts. This was
especially true for the bearers of rural hukou, whose chances to
find jobs in the cities remained limited to those in construction or
in the lowest echelons of industrial production.
In 1988, the number of 'out of plan' workers in SOEs had
already reached 10.49 million. About 21 percent of the excess total
rural workforce that left the countryside between 1977 and 1988
(134 million officially) was hired by SOEs, although 90 percent of
them had the status of temporary or seasonal workers. Later, in
1995, a survey revealed that around one-third of Shanghai's
workers in foreign funded enterprises had either never signed a
contract or were illegally employed. 31
As on other occasions, the regulations on contracts contributed
to the recognition of a situation that was already widespread in
state industrial enterprises and the emergence of some major and
latent contradictions.
The need to implement a labour market faced the existence and
social importance of administrative barriers still largely active,
though subjectively ignored by labour suppliers, moving towards
areas with greater and more flexible demand for labour. At the
same time, the ability of enterprises to maintain their role as the
urban organisers of life and production faced structural problems,
118
FROM WORK-UNIT TO EMPLOYER
and while the interest of managerial activity turned towards
economic goals, the policy towards workers led to the use of tem-
porary rather than long or medium-term contracts.
The channels for recruitment were still largely conditioned by
the lack of administrative and official recognition of the market
mechanisms in allocation of the labour force. State enterprises
were forced to use the labour force market inside the framework
of the state plan; yet, due to their increased economic autonomy,
they no longer had the advantages they had enjoyed earlier when
they hoarded the 'in the plan' labour force to increase their total
wage bill.
Finally, the contract remained an administrative means to con-
trol recruitment while allowing for greater mobility. The state
attempted to regulate the situation by trying to reduce its direct
intervention, and depicting itself in the role of 'arbitrator as well
as a regulator, as is often the case in many countries in East and
South East Asia.'32
5.4 From Work-Unit to Employer
It is a widespread impression among commentators on labour
reform that - with respect to the original objectives - the process
remained largely incomplete and labour relations were far more
extensively influenced by changes in external conditions and the
deregulation of the market than by new regulatory efforts.
However, looking at the entire process of implementation from
an historical perspective, and considering both continuity and
change in the system, contract regulations - as a major element in
the labour reform - seem to have been quite helpful in transform-
ing the macro and micro structure of Chinese labour society into
its present configuration.
Contracts, based on mobility, were not simply intended to over-
come laziness and low efficiency in production but also to ration-
alise the relationship between state and unit worker. They were
issued outside of direct state control and contributed to making
state employment less attractive and raising the competitiveness of
nonstate and small business employment inside the labour market.
Contracts contributed to the segmentation33 of the working class
as recruitment replaced assignment. Skilled workers, scarce and in
high demand, and young urban dwellers were able to obtain much
better conditions and jobs in the market than were unskilled tem-
porary workers, not so much in terms of wages as in other perks
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and benefits. Despite widespread opposition from the media and
'public opinion' to the increase in floating workers in the cities,
because it was claimed they stole job opportunities from local
youth, these two segments of the labour market apparently never
really competed for the same jobs, as only migrant or rural workers
would accept second-rate, dirty or unprotected jobs in the mar-
ginal manufacturing factories, since they were excluded from
access to the privileged segments of the market.34
Korzec describes 'resistance' from workers and managers to full-
fledged implementation of the major features of labour contracts,
such as limited duration and the de-linking of wages and perks,
and points out the difficulties of dismissals and the reproduction of
'iron security' among contract workers in SOEs.35 While dismissals
are not happily accepted by workers in any economic system, they
were a completely new individual and collective experience for
workers who had been accustomed to high levels of dependency
and who were not willing or not prepared to face the market.
Although still entitled to basic services unavailable to non-urban
workers, the bulk of industrial workers began - with the gradual
contractualisation of their prerogatives - to feel the anxieties of
market insecurity. Resistance to the dismantling of the iron rice
bowl became more and more prevalent as the reform progressed;
strategies by workers' family, while 'avoiding open confrontation
and open bargaining with the authorities,' - as another author puts
it - 'may at least bring a modicum of mundane benefits and respite
from abuse.'36
Together with the problem of dismissing excess workers, the new
units had to deal with the increased mobility of skilled workers, as
the privileged segment of the working class enjoyed more employ-
ment opportunities. Before the implementation of contracts, the
mobility of technical and skilled personnel was very low.
According to one report issued in Shanghai in 1986, at least 60
percent of the professional and technical personnel working in the
city's enterprises had never been transferred after they started
work, and about one-fifth of the 553,000 trained personnel were
not working 'with what they learned and in what they are good
at.'37 In 1987 articles noted the 'scarce success' of the system estab-
lished to exchange talent based on talent exchange centres (TEe).
Only 14 percent of the over one million applicants for job
exchange with professional or technical knowledge were trans-
ferred after 1983. In one TEe in Beijing, applicants willing to
change jobs were said to have to wait at least three months,
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although it usually took more time - even a year - and then only
10 percent were said to have succeeded in obtaining a different
position.38
Nonetheless, the natural force of attraction of state units began
to decrease after the contracts were implemented, and the 'iron rice
bowl' was challenged by the steady reduction in the dependency
rate and the increase in alternatives. The contracts, the result of a
bi-directional choice and not an administrative act/9 theoretically
could be easily terminated by the workers if they found better
opportunities. The relatively high number of applications for the
urban job exchange was a sign of a supply on the move, facing
rigid demand from industrial enterprises that resorted heavily to
administrative means to retain skilled workers.
The short duration and easy cancellation of contracts were an
advantage for the enterprise only with respect to unskilled labourers,
a workforce that (due to the greater pressures they generally face
in the market) is more willing and ready to accept the despotism of
hard labour and the instability of short-term employment, for
example, in the construction industry, or to some extent the textile
industry. In most other cases, and mainly for those positions where
training is a necessary prerequisite and skilled labour is scarce, the
situation differs and the managerial principle of workforce stability
can be applied to reformed Chinese SOEs as it can to Western
capitalist enterprises.
Yet the privileged use of long-term contracts has sometimes been
seen as a failure of the labour contract system to eliminate the 'iron
rice bowl,' and observers of the labour arena in the late 1980s
were sometimes induced to conclude that 'labour contracts are
actually not terminable' and that 'the specific relationship of the
state, the management, and the workforce, institutionalised in the
'iron rice bowl', still exists in the newly created work relation-
ship.'40
This view was partly contradicted not only by later develop-
ments towards a full contractualisation of labour relations, but
also by the relatively broad use of temporary workers in urban
enterprises. Resistance to an extension of marketised labour rela-
tions was unavoidable in such an all-encompassing structure as the
Chinese danwei.
The conflicts originating in the contract system (as well as in
such other sensitive issues as disparities in distribution according
to labour) and the demise of the 'iron rice bowl' safety net were
mainly intra-unit, as the workers initially widely perceived them as
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an attempt to reform, rather than to dismantle, the danwei system
at their expense. The dismantlement clearly became the objective
only as the contracts failed to offer a valid alternative to the old
system, and when the workers' position inside the unit continued
to decline in favour of the growing importance of managers and of
their economic rationale. Opposition by workers to the widening
gap between employees with different tasks, and even more to the
growing income of the managerial elite went along with the clear
perception of a decreasing level of security enjoyed inside the unit,
that was not at all compensated for by the wider employment
opportunities offered by the market at large only to the skilled, the
young, and the educated. Cases of a de facto egalitarian distri-
bution of bonuses or rewards under 'social' pressure from the
workers, of resistance to the execution of central regulations, and
of more active family strategies to preserve the accumulated
advantages of the worker elite are widely reported in the litera-
ture.41 In many ways, following the contract system, resistance
inside the enterprises began to take the shape of disorganised
collective action, or of 'ruses insinuated in the interstices of every-
day life.'42
Contract regulations, together with a slowdown in the expected
growth of workers' salaries and real wages (the latter decreased
0.8 percent and 4.2 percent in 1988 and 1989 respectively,43 also
because of the increasing inflation in those years), contributed to
the mounting discontent that probably was one of the reasons for
the participation of workers in the 1989 student protests in Beijing
and other cities.44
The main change introduced by contracts was a direct and hier-
archical relationship (despite an official denial) between employee
and employer (rapidly identified with the increasingly despotic
manager), in which neither could rely any longer on the uncondi-
tioned umbrella of state intervention. The unit became an enter-
prise, with all the constraints imposed on it by the new economic
environment, but in the initial period it was probably easier for
management to cope with external and macroeconomic limits than
to cope with the social constraints imposed by a socialist ideology
and a socialist community within the enterprise, from which work-
ers still had great expectations.
Analysis of the early repercussions of the contract system within
the enterprise in the late 1980s inevitably leads to the conclusion
that contracts did not achieve their intended regulatory goal dur-
ing this phase. But a more detailed look at the changing economic
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and social environment of the reformed labour society in the early
1990s leads necessarily to an acknowledgement of the far-reaching
effects of marketisation and contractualisation of labour relations
on Chinese society. Contractualisation was the first step in defin-
ing a market framework for labour relations. Regardless of the
resistance by units or workers, a re-definition of this environment
(which involved more working opportunities and the availability
of different sources of income in the urban market) was about to
change both the enterprise's role as a social organiser and the
worker's strategy towards employment.
Scepticism about the effectiveness of this set of reforms centred
around contract regulations also emerged among Chinese com-
mentators. The major reasons for opposition were rooted in the
nature of the work-unit system:
... the labour contract system is not the best among the
labour and employment systems that man has devised. Its
positive advantages are often offset by its disadvantages.
For enterprises in the East, in particular, it is certainly not
the best option. Like a streak of bright colour on a quietly
elegant painting, it jars with the harmony unique to the
enterprise management system [based] so strong on per-
sonal feelings that has developed in the East (China is no
exception). To make the labour contract system the pre-
dominant labour and employment system in Chinese
enterprises will spell no end of trouble for the future. 45
This uncommonly outspoken article goes on to list the major dis-
advantages for the unit of using the labour contract system on a
large scale: pressure to cope with the short-term interests of the
workers, thereby neglecting the long-term interests of the unit; the
development of a psychology of 'what is outside the labour contract
is none of my business' and the weakening of workers' feelings for
the company; an increase in worker-management disputes; uncer-
tainty about the duration of work relations; economicism in labour
relations, etc. All of these disadvantages involve differences in the
'Eastern'46 conception of the work-unit and labour relations as
compared to the marketised relationship of Western enterprises. As
largely demonstrated by more recent literature on working condi-
tions inside 'Eastern' enterprises within China,47 the so-called
'Eastern' management of labour relations has proven even more
exploitative than others and it certainly is not more effective in
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complying with demands for a greater say by the workers in the
production process.
According to this view, however, the central issue is the reform
of enterprises rather than reform of the labour system. 'Given gen-
uine enterprises,' that is, enterprises with entrepreneurs, 'workers
will show new initiative even without any change in the existing
labour and employment system.'48
Despite changes in the labour system, during this phase the unit
still remained the central focus. Its autonomy from the state,
acquired through administrative reform as well as through reform
of property rights and distribution of the surplus, faced the chal-
lenges of becoming an independent economic unit, and it had to
cope with the conflicting interests deeply embedded in its structure
and a rapidly changing society.
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The Labour Market Debate
in the 1990s
6.1 Labour Market: An Open Issue
In the 1990s, moving beyond many of the remaining ideological
and theoretical barriers, the discussion of the labour issue became
more pragmatic, on the one hand (due to the increasing need to
integrate the discussion of unit-level labour organisation and
income distribution with that of macroeconomic and social insta-
bilities related to development, modernisation, and mobility), and
increasingly focused on the nature rather than the legitimacy of
marketised labour, on the other, as a result of the far-reaching
changes in the economic premises of socialism. The recognition of
the commodity nature of labour and the increasing role of
the market relationship both inside and outside the work-unit were
accompanied by the emergence of different and con-
flicting opinions on the role of labour markets: some, very radical,
opinions argued the superiority of markets and their ability to
regulate and determine the accommodation of macroeconomic
relations, and some opinions, more moderate, were more con-
cerned with the deregulation process in a search for an intermediate
solution in the process of abandoning public welfare and social
security.
Both inclinations were accompanied by a further deepening of
the social and cultural processes which originated in intellectual
circles during earlier stages of the reform period (the opening up of
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the scientific community to the outside world, the re-emergence of
the social sciences, the end of the rigid ideological legacies, etc.), as
well as by a consequent greater understanding, deepening, and
increasing visibility of factors of social and economic instability,
related to administrative and organisational reform of labour allo-
cation and wealth distribution.
In the field of policy debate, the focus on the labour market and
the enlargement of the concept of labour reform towards a com-
prehensive 'labour and personnel' reform, involving cadres and
white collar workers to demolish the 'iron' labour security,
contributed to the emergence of new actors in the labour debate,
such as professional associations and trade unions, the latter
largely interested in the protection or redefinition of their long-
held prerogatives within the new environment.
As .of the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, the expression
'socialist market economy' (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji) or simply
'market socialism' was officially accepted. In the same year, a new
trade union law (gonghui fa) was approved,t along with some
other regulations affecting the protection of employees' rights,
such as the 'Law on the Protection of Women's Rights.'2 These
legislative measures were a necessary prelude to the new labour
law discussed from the beginning of the labour reform process.3
Although it was not yet clear how this new theoretical shift
would influence the labour economy, one major change immedi-
ately became evident. If the planned commodity economy was
intended to favour the commoditisation of products but not of
production factors, 'socialist market economy' recognises the need
to put all production factors on the market, albeit a state-
supervised one. This basic assumption laid the groundwork for
resolving the dispute over whether or not labour is a commodity,
but it also completely changed the perspectives and viewpoints of
the labour debate.
It was argued that in order to evolve from a 'planned economy
containing market mechanisms' to a 'socialist market economy,'
production factors, such as land, financial resources, labour, infor-
mation, and technology had to be marketised.4 The market set up
during the initial phase of the transformation of the Chinese
planned economy was only a 'half-way market that cannot get
anywhere,' one which used market mechanisms only to adjust
demand but not to adjust supply, a sort of one-sided market.
This view, which in particular emerged among the economists of
the CASS Institute of Economics, shed a different light on the
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symbolically for employees' political consciousness, will be earned
in the marketplace in the form of money.'?
In the second half of the 1980s the extenuating labour/com-
modity issue had dominated the labour debate, favouring the
emergence of two positions: one arguing in favour of the existence
of labour markets under socialism, and the other against it.
The need to establish (and therefore accept) labour markets was
seen as a consequence of the existence of a (planned) commodity
economy, which required the emergence of production factor mar-
kets, including a labour market:
Socialized commodity production demands not only that
there be unified social measurement standards for the
flow of key elements of material production ... but also
that there be social criteria of measurement and exchange
p'rocesses for the flow of labour as a key element in
production. Opening a labour market is therefore an
essential condition for socialist commodity production
itself.8
This simple and in fact realistic position (acknowledging a situa-
tion which was already in place in the real economy), which was
to become dominant in the early 1990s, contrasted sharply with
the confusing and complicated justifications offered by its chal-
lengers, who played with words to deny the labour market while
admitting its existence under 'different forms.' The term laowu
shichang (labour service market) was preferred to laodongli
shichang (labour force market) when referring to labour exchange,
as it implied a difference and separation between labour and the
means of production.
Under conditions of market socialism, labour service con-
stitutes a special commodity; its value is invisible. The
socially needed amount of labour expended in the labour
process constitutes the value of labour service. Workers
cannot sell labour on the market, but can sell or provide
labour services.9
In a discussion of labour markets in China, Feng Lanrui attempted
to explain this subtle and sophisticated distinction to me by means
of one apparently simple example:
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Imagine you need to have a dress made and you bring
cloth and other materials to a seamstress. In that case you
are the owner of the production materials and the seam-
stress only contributes her labour as a service. This is an
example of labour service. In the labour service market,
you can only sell services, not labour.1O
Unfortunately, the difference is still not clear to me! In fact, it
seems that only self-employed workers can sell their own labour,
not employed workers whose labour (and the possibility of pro-
ducing) depends on production materials, such as those in indus-
trial enterprises.
Furthermore, labour power (laodongli) is distinguished from
labour (laodong) , a distinction which tends to keep industrial
labour separate from other 'services' but also establishes an arbi-
trary distinction between production factors and labour.
As already mentioned, the basic contradiction in the commodi-
tisation of labour was largely resolved at the end of the eighties,
clearing the path for the publication of important and influential
theoretical works discussing the previously forbidden term 'labour
force market' (laodongli shichang).
Nonetheless, usage of this new and powerful term could not
avoid the emergence of at least one clear distinction between the
two major approaches: on the one hand, the importance of market
forces in the regulation of labour relations was stressed, while the
demand for social equality was progressively neglected or post-
poned and the importance of policy (state) regulation downsized.
On the other, political and social scientists tended to focus on the
importance of constraints (xianzhi) and of natural or objective
limits to the full deployment of market laws in the field of labour
exchange.
More simply, the debate was between a free market and a regu-
lated market, between state intervention and 'freedom of choice'
(xuanze ziyou). At the beginning of the 1990s, the defenders of the
superiority of market forces could rely on a decade of experience
demonstrating the efficacy of market allocations of labour to
improve performance and productivity in industrial enterprises as
well as widespread optimism about the regulatory ability of mar-
kets in other economic fields. In contrast, the advocates of a
restriction of the boundaries of labour markets stressed the
increasing differential in income distribution, both geographically
and socially, as well as the risks of deregulation; they agreed to
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eliminate the hypocrisy of the earlier jargon - 'labour service'
markets and people 'waiting for employment' - and to adopt the
categories of the labour market and the commoditisation of labour
relations, but they could not accept the market as the only prin-
ciple for the regulation of labour flow and industrial relations.
Their image of a labour market was still more related to an
extension of the contract system, and was based on the right to a
'bi-directional choice' (shuangxiang xuanze).
In assessing the limits of the new dispute, I will use two defini-
tions that came to represent the two positions. They are taken
from the two major works on the issue of labour markets pub-
lished during the early 1990s in China. One is Dai Yuanchen's The
Formation of Labour Markets and Wage Reform in China, pub-
lished in 1994; the other, On China's Labour Market, edited by
Feng I.;anrui, with Gu Liuzhen, Zhang Weiyu and Hou Yufu, was
published in 1992. Dai is a senior researcher at the CASS Institute
of Economics, while Mme Feng is a former deputy director of the
Institute for Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, also
at CASSo Both scholars, during interviews, claimed paternity for
the term 'labour market' in China.
In her introduction, Feng writes:
We believe that labour markets are the result of a devel-
oped commodity economy, and their emergence and
growth require the existence of some necessary conditions.
As far as the workers are concerned, they must enjoy indi-
vidual freedom and legally protected independence; they
must become the owners of their own workforce and the
subject of individual interests....
Based on historical evolution, analysis of reality, and
theoretical research, we propose a model for the Chinese
labour market: a national, unitary, and controlled labour
market. This is only a roughly sketched project. The
market we have in mind is a real, not nominal, market; it
is a market subject to macro control and not totally free;
it is national and unitary, not regional and scattered. The
major difference between our national, unitary and con-
trolled market and a 'labour services market' is that ours is
the sum of 'trade' relations (maimai guanxi). It is subject
to the regulations of market mechanisms and the macro
control of the government. Public control is indirectly
realised through economic, legal, and administrative
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means. It is an arena for economic relations and not only
for the selling and purchasing of the labour force. l1
This definition is innovative from several points of view. Labour is
a commodity and workers are the owners of their workforce. The
'selling and purchasing' of labour are accepted as the foundation
of the labour market, while individual rights are safeguarded by
the individual possession of rights and 'individual freedom.'
Nevertheless, market forces must be moderated by state interven-
tion, employment policies, and 'administrative measures.'
What Feng, as a political scientist, is postulating here is probably
not only a project for the future development of labour markets,
but also the rectification of the widely accepted analytical cate-
gories; in a few sentences, she goes beyond some of the major the-
oretical debates of previous years (labour/commodity, individual
ownership of labour, legalisation and individualisation of labour
relations). However, now that the 'labour market' as a concept has
been introduced by means of this paradigmatic definition, the
debate is open as to what these new 'words' will mean in the dis-
course on labour economy.
Furthermore, a 'national and unitary' market is necessarily the
result of nonmarket forces, namely public intervention, which
must be able to cope with the increasing regionalisation of the
Chinese economy and the emergence of scattered markets. The
national market is one in which interregional and intersectoral
labour mobility and migration must be controlled by administra-
tive means and not merely by the pull and push of market factors.
Dai Yuanchen's interpretation of the labour market implies a
different view of China's development path:
After the emergence of the concept of a 'planned market
economy,' different opinions were raised, and among
them were some intent on limiting very strictly the role of
market laws. It was argued that only labour products
belong to the 'commodity' category and not production
factors, such as land, financial capital, and labour.
Therefore, if the market is limited to commodities, and
it is not extended to production factors, its boundaries
are those of a 'planned economy with some market
mechanisms.' ...
[This is] very similar to what the Polish economist
Oskar Langell called a 'simulated market' [mosi shichang]
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in the 1930s. But China has already passed the stage of a
simulated market; it has built a real market and demon-
strated the effectiveness of market functions. 13
In order to justify the demand for a 'real' market with the least
possible control by the state, Dai begins with a re-evaluation of the
'individual freedom' (geren ziyou) of workers. This, according to
his interpretation, is the very foundation of the theories of Marx
and Engels. 14 Allowing the state to control allocation would mean
treating the worker 'as if he were a screw that, once tightened to a
surface, will never be removed.'15
... the government should no longer intervene by means of
unified allocation (tongbao tongpei) and distribution
through administrative orders as it did under the tradi-
tio'nal system. Rather, enterprises and labourers, that is,
the demand and supply sides of the labour market, should
be allowed to exercise their free choice in accordance with
the principle of voluntary participation, so that the market
mechanism can play its role in the deployment of labour
resources. 16
The direct consequence of this definition of a labour market and
of state intervention is that 'according to correct [sic] economics,
salaries are the average price deriving from the encounter of
demand and supply of labour power.'17 The development of a
labour market in China and the deployment of this new role of
salaries as the price of labour's trading relations still suffer from
administrative constraints. Two of them are major concerns in the
study by Dai and his group:
[...] the first is the free mobility of labour, as the perma-
nence of a life-tenure system of 'one time allocation' is
non-market behaviour; the second is the reform of the
system for salary determination, as state intervention in
this field also is nonmarket behaviour.
As in many other fields of discussion during the recent years of
Chinese reform, the debate on labour centered on policy options in
which the major point was what role the state should play and the
amount of freedom it should allow for market 'mechanisms.' This
debate is much more familiar to Western observers than the earlier
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debate. Despite some attempt to keep track of Marxist ideologies
(sometimes in very strange forms, such as taking Marx and Engels
as defenders of the market and of the free deployment of market
forces), the major point is now the growth of the market and the
policy options it implies.
This cannot but influence the prospects for a social re-engineering
of Chinese society:
The monetarization of economic interests is a basic guar-
antee for the rationalization of behavior. More specifi-
cally, this means that we must establish a rational interest
structure whereby labourers can partake in market
exchange through their possession of labour, that is, par-
take in this interest structure so that the overall objectives
of the society at large can find full embodiment in the
behavior of individual staff and workers.18
The faith expressed here in the ability of individual economic inter-
ests to become determinants of 'rational' behaviour in the market
was not shared by all. Those who generally did not agree tended
to point out the many constraints to a harmonious relationship
between individual interests and the needs of the social and eco-
nomic system.
Commenting upon the above passage, Howard and Howard see
in the dialectic of Dai Yuanchen and Du Haiyan the influence and
'epistemological violence of reductionist economics.' The 'neo-
conservative' discourse arguing for the self-regulatory power of the
market in the field of labour and the importance of consumption
in tackling employment problems under market conditions are
seen by these commentators as a reverse plot to eliminate defini-
tively the remnants of the labour security system.
Thus the Howards state:
The discourse of Western neo-conservative economics is
being used here in such a way as to suggest that there is
only one way to conceptualize economic relations and
practices in a market economy. It is being used to delegit-
imate and drive to extinction alternative conceptual
frameworks. The technical discourse and the mechanistic
framework exclude the vocabulary of political economy.
Discussion of power, authority, rule, legitimacy, consent,
rights and responsibilities in the workplace is gradually
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being displaced by the scientific jargon of a managerialist
discourse. What this discourse reflects is the increasing
dominance of economic reason not only in Chinese social
sciences but in everyday life. It reflects the gradual dis-
placement of an ethical world view based on solidarity,
community, cooperation and a cooperative common-
wealth. 19
The Howards do not specify that what we are comparing here are
two alternative discourses rather than two real worlds - one based
on the community ethic, the other on aggressive economics. Their
considerations allow us nonetheless to understand to what extent
the labour debate in China has changed the theory of labour rela-
tions, and how far we now are from the ideological assumptions
of the late 1970s. The path followed by the labour debate began
with Marx and is finishing, more or less willingly, in the open arms
of Milton Friedman's neo-liberalism.
In fact, the influence of American neo-liberalism has become
more and more relevant as an increasing number of Chinese
researchers have obtained postgraduate degrees from U.S. aca-
demic institutions and scholarly exchanges between Chinese and
U.S. universities have intensified. In 1988, quite significantly,
Milton Friedman took part in a conference in Shanghai on China's
economic reform,2° together with other American scholars.
Despite the existence of direct influences21 - too clear and too
relevant to be ignored - they are probaly insufficient to conclude
that the American conservative market fetishism has become the
most important determinant of the Chinese economic debate and
the major inspiration for labour policies. In fact, in Chinese liber-
alist discourse, the emergence of the market as a key element and
faith in its ability to solve problems is sometimes also the result of
wholly internal and empirical considerations, such as disillusion-
ment with the effectiveness of full employment policies:
Labour is a micro-factor for production and management,
but is also a fundamental factor of macroeconomic devel-
opment; this factor has to be distributed among different
enterprises and different productions. The problem is:
what type of distribution grants the optimum allocation as
well as the most efficient use of this production factor?
[My research] demonstrated that the best method is the
market. '"
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The model for market organisation of the labour econ-
omy comprises: (1) individual ownership of labour by
workers, and the right of the employing units to hire and
fire workers.... (2) the price of the labour factor basically
determined by the market and jointly decided by the
worker and the enterprise.... (3) as for employment
opportunities and open job competition, employees
should be subject to examinations, comparisons, and trial
periods by the hiring unit which should be able to choose
a worker that is appropriate in terms of skills and knowl-
edge, for the kind of job and remuneration level openly
offered. In society there should always be an adequate
reserve labour force to exercise constant competitive pres-
sure on actually employed workers.22
This position reflects the dualistic approach towards labour as an
economic factor as well as the re-emergence of macroeconomic
considerations in the field of labour economics. Employment, as
we saw earlier, was a major concern for policymakers during all
stages of the labour reform, and positive considerations on the role
of unemployment had already emerged in the late 1980s.23 The
issue of a 'reserve army' (houbei jun) of workers is generally
understood as an inevitable consequence of labour reform, and
'zero-rate unemployment' (ling shiye lUi is no longer an issue in
setting the objectives of policy activity.
Full-employment policies definitely do not fit the objective
of zero-rate unemployment, and in reality zero-rate unem-
ployment does not exist and is not achievable. That is
because: (1) an adequate creeping unemployment rate can
create a reserve army of workers to help the structural reg-
ulation of the economy and the new relationship between
labour and capital; (2) in order to favour the inclination of
workers to change jobs frequently, in the labour market
there must also be some voluntary unemployment; (3) the
cycle of reproduction of fixed assets can make the overall
cycle of employment fluctuate. 24
Acceptance of the positive role of a limited rate of unemployment
is common to all analysts. What is not accepted by advocates of a
controlled labour market is that the existence of a reserve army
should be used positively as a tool to exercise pressure on workers'
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attitudes toward labour, as this is the mechanism through which
'on-the-job labour exploitation' (zai zhiye de boxue) takes place
under capitalism. Unemployment (shiye) is therefore accepted
exclusively as a temporary result of the natural development of
production, and the contradiction among population, productive
forces, and productive capital. The ultimate (and utterly utopian,
as rates of up to 20 percent of actual urban unemployment are
common in industrial cities) objective of labour policies remains
full employmentF5
The mechanical nature of 'closed' and limited labour market
relations is a major concern of supporters of extensive state inter-
vention in the macro labour economy:
There can be many characters, playing different economic
rol~s in the labour market. But the actors in a labour
market are in reality only two: the supplier of labour - the
worker":' and the demander of labour - the enterprise (or
any other hiring body). There cannot be a third party.
Intermediary or public officials are not actors in the
labour market. The government itself is not a direct actor
in the market. The role of government, representing the
public interest in the market, is that of control, guidance,
and adjustment of the market, and not that of a partici-
pant in the deployment of labour trading relationships.26
The role of the state as a super partes referee in the match between
seller and buyer should therefore be one affecting the macroecon-
omy, the overall adjustment of the labour factor in the economy.
The simplified labour market scheme emerging from this
description is based on simple, two-sided relationships, rather than
on the complex set of interrelations that generally characterises
market dynamics. In fact, it still requires that market activities be
limited to some of the complex economic links that constitute a
developing commodity economy.
In contrast to this simplification, a more 'liberal' view of the
labour market tends to consider such factors as diversification of
income sources and multiple jobs on the supply side, progressively
harder budget constraints, as well as technological, financial, and
productive boundaries on the demand side, making the state's abil-
ity to control the levels of the demand-supply balance and of
income distribution progressively less effective.
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This more economic-driven view tends to stress the importance
of the mutual influence of consumer prices and wages. It tends also
to suggest the elimination of what remains of the 'non-market
behaviours' of most state enterprises, where salary policy is still
not market-driven and remains strongly influenced by irrational
decisions at the enterprise level:
The widening of the income gap between workers is due
to the lack of development of market mechanisms. It is
influenced by non-market factors and it is neither reason-
able or just.27
Unlike this author, I conclude that full deployment of market
forces will lead to an increase rather than a decrease in income
differentials.
However, faith in market forces and in their self-regulatory
capability reveals an enlargement of the analytical field that is no
longer limited to worker-enterprise contracting. The 'double-track'
system (shuanggui zhi) of labour allocation involving the co-
existence of market and state allocation of the labour force and
income is giving way to a multiplication of income sources and
salary systems, slowly amplifying the importance of factors other
than the actors' behaviour.
This new attitude and the larger role enjoyed by neo-classical
economic theory have led to a re-shaping of the labour discourse
in the 1990s, in which it is now argued, with all foreseeable
consequences for policy and propaganda, that competition and
individual attitudes toward the market can lead to both general
development and the growth of individual well-being.
6.3 The Reshaping of Labour Relations
The acceptance of the labour market had wide-ranging implica-
tions for the acknowledgment of new labour relations and the
further enlargement of the debate. The resolution of the dispute on
the commoditisation of labour was to push the discussion towards
a more realistic and practical understanding of the labour econ-
omy. The progressive redefinition of the nature and roles of labour
market actors shifted the focus of the discussion from labour as a
comprehensive and abstract concept, to the behaviour of labourers
and the interests of work-units.
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Labour relations (laodong guanxi) have been radically trans-
formed by the reforms of the last two decades, not only because
central allocation and the labour distribution mechanism have
been extensively replaced by the action of market or market-like
forces - much earlier and for far more people than the actual the-
oretical debate openly recognizes - but also because they reflect the
evolution of relations between workers and enterprise manage-
ment which were once 'largely cooperative in nature' but are now
based 'primarily on an exchange of economic interests. '18 On the
other hand, a major change is still underway in the fields of admin-
istrative interpretation of labour relations and legal reform. These
two are strictly interrelated as they both involve the approval of a
new labour law (laodong fa - 1994), with the complex process of
its formulation and implementation, and the major re-organisation
of the .All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) resulting
from the new trade union law (gonghui fa - 1992).
As mentioned above, the most popular interpretations of the
labour market tend to simplify and purify it by reducing the
number of actors involved in the formation of labour demand and
supply and consequently also to exclude outside intervention by
non-market bodies, while sometimes admitting and allowing for
regulatory intervention by the state. This necessarily implies that
trade unions, up to this point a Leninist bridge between the party
and the masses, will have to decide on their field of action, their
objectives, nature, and structure according to the demands of
marketised labour relations if they want to have a future role in the
new labour economy. At the same time, the party is faced with the
controversial decision of how much longer it will unconditionally
support the working class that it created from scratch in the 1950s.
The new labour law (notwithstanding its importance as a
further step in the legalisation of labour relations) was partly an
attempt to rationalise the new dimension of industrial relations
and partly an effort to complete the redesign of the new role of
trade unions that faced a double crisis of identity: the first stem-
ming from their inability to represent working class interests in a
completely competitive environment and in a much more priva-
tised economic environment, and in the face of a new class of
managers rather than the state; the other resulting from the rela-
tively low status of workers' organisations inside the party hierar-
chy, due to their lack of an autonomous revolutionary background
and to the ten years that they were closed out from the political
arena during the Cultural Revolution. The emergence of a labour
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market and the changed nature of relations inside industrial enter-
prises have endangered the very existence of a mass organisation
that, despite corporatively representing the working masses, was
never really able to express and represent the conflicts embodied in
the old and new contradictions in the labour system.
The reform of the trade unions targeted 'effectiveness' in the
same pragmatic way as the economic reform in many other fields
in China. The question is: what is the substance of the issue of
effectiveness?
If we acknowledge that the new structure and organisation of
the Chinese economy is now more appropriately described by cat-
egories typical of a market economy, we see that the parameters of
the effectiveness of trade unions are objectively different today
from what they were in 1978 when the All-China Federation of
Trade Unions was re-established after the Cultural Revolution.29
Greater effectiveness was then indicated by the ability to mediate
between the pressures of management/state and those of the work-
ers in all major economic issues and to back the party as the organ-
iser of political activities inside the unit. In both cases the role of
trade union was mainly limited to the micro-society of work-units,
and was aimed at a prevention and reduction in conflicts.
What does effectiveness mean at this new stage and what does it
imply at a functional level? Probably exactly the opposite of what
it meant in the past: the ability to represent and support the
interests of just one party - the workers - to address criticism in
the name of and on behalf of the working class and individual
workers, to take care of the growing number and variety of
processes occurring outside the unit and intervening in the process
of the formation of a labour market, to limit the pervasiveness of
public intervention while maintaining the advantages of public
assistance as much as possible, to force and favour conflicts in
order to obtain advantages for the 'represented.'
This is at least the kind of effectiveness that seems to be expected
by the workers and which is also emerging in the new pragmatic
attitude of trade union leaders.
The twelfth Congress of the ACFTU held in 1993, for example,
expressed concern about these new forms of effectiveness by expos-
ing the new areas of workers' discontent and economic weakness,
largely identified in the mostly un-unionised and highly exploitative
labour management systems introduced by market behaviour and
many foreign enterprises and by the new sweatshops of the private
economy.3D Despite regulations, trade unions are not prepared to
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enter the arena of open conflicts such as those of private and for-
eign-funded enterprises, and they often try without success to
involve the private sector in the same institutional relationship that
they have with human resource management in SOEs.
The 1992 Trade Union Law still describes ACFTU as a mass
organisation, which, 'while defending the common interests of the
whole people, defends at the same time the legal rights of the
workers.'31 Its main political objective thus remains the public
interest, not that of a class or a social group; hence it is not allowed
to act as a mere syndicalist body. At the same time, while it is not
free from control by the state, it lacks even a minimum of support
from the workers, who do not see the ACFTU as representative of
their interests as a class, whether on the shop floor level or in the
general economy.
The law defines the right of trade unions to intervene, as sole
repres~ntatives of the workers, to adjust the relationship between
workers and work-units in the process of the legalisation of labour
relations, in the definition of individual and collective labour con-
tracts32 (art. 18), and in the resolution of labour disputes (laodong
zhengyi tiaojie - art. 20). The signing of a collective contract is to
be previously discussed (no mention of approval appears in the
text of the law) by the unit's workers' congresses (zhigong daibiao
dahui). Strengthening the impression that the legal reform of
labour was strictly tied to that of the trade unions, the unions were
also entitled to exclusive power to underwrite contracts by the
1994 labour law.33 The presence of a trade union representative on
the 'committee for adjustment of labour disputes' (laodong
zhengyi tiaojie weiyuanhui) inside the enterprise and on the 'arbi-
tration commission for labour disputes' at the municipal (shi) or
district (xian) level was granted by the 1993 Regulations on the
Resolution of Labour Disputes in Enterprises.'34
The role of trade unions is therefore affirmed inside the slightly
conflictual administrative framework of labour relations, but it is
still a sort of peace-keeper. The new laws simply redefined the role
and functions of the old organisation but did not radically change
the nature of trade unionism in China.
Those who drafted these regulations seemingly understood
effectiveness in the traditional way in their attempts to introduce
the presence and activity of trade unions into the multifaceted
economy, with no actual change in their nature. Significantly, as
just one example of the organisational reform of trade unions, the
new law lists among the possible sources of revenue an item
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mysteriously called 'other income' (qita shouru), totally unlimited
by any further definition, which de facto allows unions to enter the
market economy independently and behave like an enterprise both
within and outside the boundaries of its institutional activity.
Yet the 1992 law did not introduce any major changes in the
comprehensive structure of trade unions in China. It deals with the
role and function of only one well-identified trade union federa-
tion (the ACFTU) and it is not a law on trade unionism. The
regulations deal with functions, not rights; when rights (quanli)
are mentioned they are attached to the organisation and limited by
that framework. The law grants trade unions the possibility to act
and exercise rights on behalf and in representation of the workers.
Significantly, Section Three of the law, listing the functions of the
organisation, is entitled 'Rights and Duties of the Trade Union,'
thereby limiting by law the flexibility of its role.
No change in nature is conceded. Trade unions are still mass
organisations 'realizing the unity of class and mass nature,' subject
to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The representa-
tion of workers' interests is still achieved through administrative
channels and not by consensus. The contradiction between the
need for autonomy and the limits of the reform is well described
by the statement 'Trade unions are the mass organisation of the
working class in which staff and management willingly engage. '35
Nonetheless, the new trade union law, which replaced that of
1950 and injected new optimism into disheartened trade union
officials within and outside work-units, has improved the under-
standing of the crisis among the trade unions leaders. The limited
scope achieved by the law was probably also due to the slowdown
in the debate on labour reform following the 1989 student and
worker movements. The ACFTU Congress of October 1988
had indicated that reform of trade union practices was necessary
and that radical reform of the structure and functions of the feder-
ation could no longer be postponed.36 The congress elected Zhu
Houze as its first secretary-general since the Cultural Revolution
(up to that time it had had only a president, Ni Zhifu), but he only
held this position until August when, following the crackdown on
the student movement (June 1989), he was accused of approving an
official donation of 100,000 yuan to the Beijing Red Cross to be
used for support and assistance to the student movement.)7
Although much research has targeted episodes of the formation of
unofficial trade unions during the period of popular unrest,38 it is
not yet possible to ascertain to what extent these episodes
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influenced the debate inside the ACFTU on its forthcoming reform.
In any case, the crackdown brought to an end a process of reform
that seemed to have gone well beyond the level later set by the 1992
trade union law.
The workers' movement of 1989 was probably the result of
'independent spontaneous protest from below' and 'ACFTU insti-
tutional agitation from above,'39 and demonstrated, on the one
hand, the interest of the ACFTU in lobbying for a redefinition or
a rewriting of its corporate prerogatives in the new framework of
a reformed China; on the other, the distance between workers'
interests and their capacity for representation in the trade unions.
Interviews with trade union leaders demonstrate that the existence
and uncontrollability of independent trade unions were not only a
challenge to the party-state but also were generally perceived as a
danger to the corporatist primacy of ACFTU worker representa-
tion, mainly in nontraditional fields of intervention of official
organizations (private enterprises, for example, where trade unions
are almost nonexistent).
Some fundamental points of the reform policy were addressed
particularly by the debate in and on trade unions. The first was the
change in industrial labour relations and their transformation from
bipartite (state-worker) to tripartite (state-management-worker) in
the state-owned enterprises forming the core of China's industrial
production. The implications were that the unions would have to
become representatives of economic interests in face of the other
two parts and obtain legitimation from workers and acknowledge-
ment from management and the state. In fact, the passage from
representing shared, collective, and top-down defined political
interests to defending structured, divided, and bottom-up indi-
vidual and group interests meant a radical transformation in the
role of trade unions and a further crisis of legitimacy.
A second point was the emergence of new fields of intervention
for trade unions, such as privately-owned enterprises, Sino-foreign
joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises, that had
sprung up without the burden of bipartite labour relations and
with the advantage of a low-cost workforce and were therefore not
ready to forego their competitive advantages. Unions were thus
unable to exercise any kind of restraint on the exploitation of the
workforce, as they lacked both shop floor organisation and polit-
ical support from either the workers or the state.
A third issue was the legal reform of labour relations, which was
a necessary prerequisite for unions to 'shake off their image of hide-
142
THE RESHAPING OF LABOUR RELATIONS
bound agencies which have faithfully done the government's bidding
ever since 1949.'40 This process began in 1990 with the ratification
by the National People's Congress of the International Labour
Organisation Convention on Tripartite Consultation41 and was
'completed' by the 1992 trade union law and the 1994 labour law.
An enlightening text on the situation of grassroots labour rela-
tions and the role of unions was published in 1993,42 and was
mainly concerned with the meaning and implications for the work
and evolution of trade unions of the redefinition of the behavioural
patterns and composition of the Chinese working class after the
reform and in the context of the 'bitter taste of early capitalism.'
The picture emerging from this research is one of a double strategy
on the part of unions, searching at the institutional level for recog-
nition from the party-state to participate in the allocation of new
corporatist privileges in the representation of workers' interests,
while facing at the practical level the need to understand what con-
sequences the workers were facing once their labour force was
thrown into the market:
Chinese workers are beginning to savour an economic sys-
tem strikingly similar to that of early capitalism in the
West. To Chinese workers who grew up with the concept
and experience of security and social equity, it tastes bitter
right down to the core....
Market forces have educated Chinese workers to
become shrewd and calculating.43
Therefore, the corporate practice of trade unions addresses both
theoretical and practical efforts to mitigate the effects of such
changes, to sweeten this taste. In the field of policy recommenda-
tion, trade unions have become the strongest institutional advocate
of a controlled labour market as well as of a slowdown in the
process of abandoning the public system of social security.
During this period in which the labour market became the
pivotal point in the labour debate, macro control by the state and
'guided employment' (zhidao zhiye) were advocated in trade union
journals as a means of keeping the effects of labour market dereg-
ulation under control and to increase the quality of the use of the
labour factor, reduce workers' unused time, and minimize the
effects on employment of the growth of the population.44
The content of the entire debate can be summarised under the
label of 'labour relations' as comprising three major issues: actors,
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reform of property rights, and legal development. Labour rela-
tions, as a new concept in Chinese labour theory begin, in fact, to
be described as 'relations between the owner of the labour force
and its user.'45 These are mediated by the market and consist of
both social and economic relationships. In particular, the defini-
tion of individual labour rights and strategies for their protection
are a major concern of the unions. In the official view of the party,
China is steadily advancing towards a rule-based society, in which
the civil and social rights of individuals are progressively recog-
nized by law.
The role of trade unions is a sum of rights and functions: 'rep-
resentation, protection, participation, and control' are generally
listed as their major functions under the new system.
The right of representation means that the trade unions
have the power to represent the workers' interests; pro-
tection includes helping and guiding the workers when
signing an individual or collective labour contract (jiti
hetong), contributing ideas for the handling of workers by
the enterprise, participating in the resolution of labour dis-
putes, as well as granting legal support and services to the
workers, participating in the resolution of strikes and
slowdowns; participation means taking part in the demo-
cratic management of enterprises and the management of
general affairs in the enterprise; control means verifying
the application of contracts and the democratic manage-
ment in order to safeguard workers' rights. 46
Although this functional description depicts the activity and role of
trade unions as more conflictual vis-a-vis the enterprise, there is
still no clear distinction between the two parties, due mainly to the
fact that trade unions are not yet allowed to acknowledge the exis-
tence of a structural contradiction between the class of wage
workers and that of the new bosses in the management. This also
derives from the incomplete reform of property rights, as well as
from the corporatist behaviour of unions which continue to claim
the right to take part in enterprise management and the decision-
making process, despite the marketisation of labour relations.
To safeguard the corporatist power of the unions, the new laws
have introduced a new version of the labour contract, that is, the
collective contract (gongbao hetong or jiti hetong), which has been
correctly interpreted by the unions as a way to obtain collective
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representation (and consequently power) in front of management
as the sole administrative body allowed to act on behalf of the
workers and their interests. The collective contract in its original
form was to be signed by the workers' congresses and enterprise
management,47 but in fact the law only names the unions as the
representative,48 requiring them to present the draft of the contract
to the workers' congress for discussion.49
What is most striking in the definition given by the trade unions
of the collective contract is its description as a comprehensive tool
with which to organise labour relations inside the factory. Its
nature as a contract, that is, as a deal stipulated between the par-
ties under the pressure of market forces, is just a secondary factor,
and gongbao hetong is seen as a tool for bargaining industrial rela-
tions within the archetypical SOEs:
There are four major elements to the collective contract:
the first consists of the objectives, including productivity,
efficiency, technological improvement, cultural construc-
tion, labour administration, and improvement of workers'
lives; the second regards the responsibilities: those of the
manager, the party organisation, the trade union, and the
workers; the third concerns distribution: wages, bonuses,
welfare, etc.; the fourth is contract management and
includes control, settlement of disputes, general appraise-
ment, etc.so
The collective contract is depicted as a sort of 'social deal' (or a
'framework agreement'sl) between the parties inside the factory. It
is not an instrument with which the work-unit establishes a rela-
tionship with the market. It regulates the working conditions and
roles of each party inside the unit, and seemingly constitutes a
basis for the hiring of new workers. What is strange is that gener-
ally no attention is paid to the action of market forces (prices,
salaries, the reserve army of workers outside the enterprises, or
labour costs in the market). The unit is still understood as an inde-
pendent and self-reliant economic entity.
6.4 Conclusion
This account of how China approached the issue of the labour
market reveals that the theoretical conflict between two develop-
mental strategies reached its climax under the compelling need to
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find practical solutions to new and impelling social and economic
problems. After the elimination of the heavy burden of ideological
legacies, labour reached the central stage of discussion as a social
question and an economic factor. The contention did not focus on
the meaning, nature and relationship of labour anymore, rather
the debate concentrated more clearly on the changing characteris-
tics of the labour society. The complexity of labour relations
emerged from observation of the changes taking place both inside
and outside industrial enterprises. While in the late 1970s and
early 1980s the labour discourse was still centred on the political
nature of policy decisions, the superiority of their aims with
respect to other societies, and the socialist nature of the labour
relationship, in the 1990s the demise of a socialist discourse on
labour became clear. 'The theoretical conviction that in socialism
there js no unemployment,' a Chinese author noted recently, 'was
a theoretical obstacle to the acceptance of unemployment.
Unemployment is spreading to the entire world, and, accept it or
not, it is coming to you and to me as well!'52
This pragmatic disillusion, as we saw, was reinforced not only
by a dramatic turnaround in the sources of inspiration of economic
literature, but also by the conviction of the inevitability of the
trend towards globalisation among policymakers and in the leader-
ship. The deepening of the process of restructuring of the industrial
system required that the issue of labour be dealt with in a more
radical way, with carrot and stick, to contrast, at least on paper,
the progressive deterioration of labour relations that had become
inevitable. The deregulation accepted by policies and the emer-
gence of a 'weak' labour discourse were challenged only margin-
ally, in a prevailing atmosphere that accepted the new situation
with no major contention, while institutional actors such as the
trade unions were unable to think, express and represent an alter-
native way of development, and remained at the margins of the
debate, willing to find a role for themselves in the puzzle of
reforming bureaucratic relationships, rather than in expressing the
interests of their members.
The 'demise' of socialist labour discourse, however, not only
meant the abandonment of a labour theory and the embracement
of liberalism, but was also accompanied by (and largely the result
of) an increase in the organisational complexity of China's labour
society, as I shall try to address in the epilogue of this history.
146
7EPILOGUE: LABOUR
MARKET AND THE STATE
Informalisation or Institutionalisation?
Who is driving the process? I have spent many pages qescribing the
conflicting relationship between theory and policy;--Ju'ring a period
when the myth of socialist labour gradually faded away, but now
we are faced with the question of what is determining the shape of
today's marketised labour relations. Is it the market that, with its
deregulatory power despite the efforts of central and local bureau-
crats, is dominant, or is the state, with its agencies and its indirect
intervention, still in control? The reader may not be satisfied with
a Solomonic answer, but I do believe the two elements conspired
together to create the institutionalised labour market that China
experienced in the 1990s. This epilogue is my only way to conclude
my assessment of the demise of socialist labour in the last globally
significant socialist country surviving at the end of twentieth cen-
tury. By the time this book goes to press, China will already be
much farther on its path although the final direction is still uncer-
tain.
7.1 Informalisation and the Labour Market
The major question in this epilogue concerns the emergence of a
multifaceted labour market strategy in the development of the
labour economy in China in the 1990s, while, concurrently, dereg-
ulation and informalisation increased social complexity and made
institutions less relevant components of the social engineering
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process. Although major theoretical recognition has recently legit-
imised the concept and mechanisms of the labour market as well
as granting them a pivotal role in the reform of the economic
system, it is hardly conceivable that the long history of public inter-
vention in the field of labour management reached its end in the
1990s. Nonetheless, many policy options taken, as well as some
consequent and uncontrolled outcomes of the economic strategy
pursued in recent years, have radically modified the environment
for labour competition. The search for competitivity in enterprises
gradually made the burden of overstaffing in industrial SOEs
unsustainable, and gradually turned the economic inefficiency of
enterprises into a social problem, due to the growing incidence of
lay-off policies; the growth of the individual and private sectors
contributed to enlarging the choices in the labour market, and to
accelerating the crisis of the 'life-tenure dream'; the chaotic growth
of urban economies, the potential for higher revenue and the con-
solidation of familial strategies increased the readiness of labour
suppliers to undertake labour mobility; informalisation grew in
tandem with the process of reproletarianisation as a consequence of
a still high rate of bureaucratic intervention in the economic system
and the growth of a hidden (or second) economy.
Different from other experiences in emerging economies, and
from what theory tells us,! in China's dual-labour market there is
no clear-cut distinction between its formal and informal sides.
Elements generally associated with informalisation (deteriorating
working conditions, instability, high turnover, insecurity in the
work place, and interest networking) were also visible in the first
market, while, at the same time, informality was in some cases
associated with opportunities for greater income generation in
those activities not controlled by the state (services, craftsmanship,
and petty commerce, in particular).
The role of the informal sector, in particular in the Chinese
urban economy, has become increasingly important since the mid-
1980s, although it grew considerably in the 1990s due to the
reduced ability of administrative means to control some of the
processes traditionally relegated to centrally-planned human
economic management, such as labour allocation, population
redistribution, intersectoral equilibrium setting, urban economic
planning and bureaucratic re-distribution of wealth.
The decline in the institutions overseeing this process did not,
however, signify a collapse; the informalisation in the labour arena
had to cope with the evolution of an incomplete and still highly
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institutionalised transitional bureaucracy that was able to deal
with the 'regulatory mobility' of the markets. The actions of both
the market and institutions (or institutional market players) pre-
vented the deployment of all the positive regulatory effects of the
labour market, while, at the same time, reducing the margin of pro-
tection generally granted by socialist institutions to the working
class. The effects were evident both in the formal and informal
sectors of the labour market, for both traditional actors in the urban
economy (the established worker elite) and the newcomers/
outsiders who flooded the urban markets in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. State policies to control mobility gradually lost steam
and had less of an influence on the strategic individual decisions of
potential migrants. Zhao Shukai, for example, reveals that in 1994
over 79 percent of migrant workers already at destination were
unaware of the documents necessary for their out-migration and
employment.2
According to one research study conducted by the Ministry of
Labour and the Institute of Economics of CASS/ despite the
changes in the hiring mechanisms, the ways to enter registered
enterprises (SOEs, COEs and POEs) were little changed through-
out the 1980s and the early 1990s. Almost 70 percent of new
recruits (between 1980 and 1989) entered units after 'graduate
assignment' (hiye (enpei), 'examination' (zhaogong kaoshi), or
'transfer from another unit' (wai danwei tiaoru). The increase in the
latter category from 12.5 percent in the 1960s to 27.5 percent in the
1980s (together with a decrease in dingti - substitution - practices
from 12.9 percent to 4.7 percent)4 indicate greater mobility of the
official workforce, but on the whole the data reveal a certain
stability in workforce composition that has not yet been radically
changed by the contract system. A few considerations are neces-
sary, however, in order to understand how deeply the allocation
process and the participation of workers in the new competition
have been influenced by the recent political and economic reforms.
First, the number of contract workers in enterprises (an indicator
of declining immobility, if not of increasing mobility) was still low
at the time this CASS research was completed in 1992; a relevant
increase was recorded since 1995 when the total reached 39 percent
of the state industrial workforce (almost double the percentage in
the previous year).5 The survey also shows that the percentage
of those hired by examination (that is, through a selection process
at the enterprise level and not by assignment) reached 48.4 percent
if only contract workers are considered.6 We can therefore predict
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that the proportion of formal workers facing market mechanisms
will grow steadily, in tandem with the growth in the number of
workers hired under the contract system, although preferential
channels will still be used for cadres and highly skilled personnel
in the formal sector.
Second, we have to consider the rapid increase in non-danwei
employment, namely the individual and informal sectors, which
are involving more and more people who have little or no access
to the state sector or to official paths of employment.
In 1994, there were about 12.25 million urban employees in the
registered individual sector (25.5 million - more than double as
many - in the flourishing rural individual enterprises), as com-
pared to over 112 million employed in the state-owned sector.7 But
the size and dynamism of non-danwei employment is much greater
than the statistics show.
Therefore, although the channels for recruitment remained
largely unmodified as far as urban industrial units were concerned,
the number of urban people legally or illegally employed outside
the danwei system became increasingly significant in the analysis
of real labour markets flows.
This out-of-system labour market sector is made up of those
employed through informal channels in tertiary and small handi-
craft industries, as well as those illegally employed without welfare
and insurance protection in enterprises (mainly in the construction
industry) that subcontract major works from state-owned or large
collective units. Their exact number is difficult to compute,
nonetheless the observation of widespread labour practices sug-
gests a dramatic increase in informal labour in recent years.
The informality of labour practices emerges, for example, in the
registered individual enterprises (getihu). In spite of their name,
they frequently enlarge their scope and dimensions by employing
other members of the household. According to one survey in
Shanghai, the average number of workers per getihu is over five,
but only the individual entrepreneur is on the books in the fiscal
departments.8 This practice is a part of the intense accumulation
strategy of the Chinese family economy, which is essential for
establishing and developing productive and commercial activity.
The extraordinary propensity for savings in the Chinese household
is emblematic of one of the most powerful engines for the take-off
of the Chinese economy.9
Family members generally contribute unskilled labour, while the
getihus can always fish in the large labour pond for skilled or
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technical SOE employees interested in extra salaries. Many workers
in SOEs (and especially those labelled as 'redundant' and not
engaged in production) are ready to start their own business or to
sell their labour to existing private enterprises, thereby helping to
solve the basic deficit in know-how generally found in small
businesses.
Some large SOEs hire a large number of temporary workers
while a corresponding number of their employees are made redun-
dant and taken out of production; the rationale for this is found in
the lower costs of temporary labourers and in the larger avail-
ability of labour supply for second jobs.
The so-called 'second job' (dier zhiye) seekers are stimulated to
enter the informal labour market by a greater availability of spare-
time as a result of their hidden unemployment, by the diminishing
purchasing power of monetary wages as well as by the possibility
of higher remuneration in the private sector, without losing the
welfare, services, and status they enjoy in the state unit.10
Research conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1991 in eigh-
teen localities found that around 10 percent of the labour force is
engaged in second jobs, with relevant differences from place to
place. Much higher figures were found for example in Guangzhou
and Wenzhou, where the presence of private business was more
significant, but other metropolitan areas such as Beijing (10 per-
cent), Shanghai (15 percent) and Tianjin (8-10 percent) were also
experiencing the same phenomenon. II In Guangzhou a later survey
revealed that workers with second job increased from 15 percent
in 1984 to as much as 50 percent in 1995.12
Second jobs, especially for technicians, have been recognized by
law since 1986,13 as a means of solving the chronic labour supply
shortage in this specific area of the labour market, and probably as
a way of rewarding those with better skills. Skilled workers
enjoyed greater chances to enter the second job market during the
entire period of labour reform: by 1987, about 13 percent of the
technical and skilled personnel in SOEs nationwide had reportedly
taken second jobs.14
An official 1988 document pointed out that some problems had
emerged with the 'extra-time collaborators' (yeyu jianzhi), and
mandated that workers engaging in a second activity outside the
unit could only use 'non-working time' (and not working hours as
was apparently the case), provided that they successfully accom-
plished the duties of their main job inside their own unit.1S Second
jobs remain an accepted feature of the labour market system and
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of the relationship between the formal and informal, as well as
between the state and private, sectors.
Second jobs usually generated higher incomes than the main
urban jobs, while the latter gave the worker access to danwei
welfare, housing, and labour protection for himself and his family.
Personal income varied considerably from industry to industry,
with petty commerce topping the ranks with revenue ranging from
one tenth to several tenths higher than salary. A late eighties esti-
mate puts the total annual revenue from second jobs between 6
and 12 billion RMB (the higher estimate being about 6.2 percent
of the national annual monetary wage bill in 1989).16
The emergence of such an informal labour market is a side-effect
of the growth of the individual urban economy, and generally is
based on family or friendship, as the advantages of accumulation
tend Fo be maintained within the framework of the household.
Family businesses and related informal practices are a good way to
resist administrative and bureaucratic pressures, to limit the costs
of enlargement and of increasing competition in an overheated and
competitive commercial market.
These practices, however, can not be labelled as an informal
labour market in a traditional way, as they largely rely on the
existence of formal structures that greatly influence their existence
and determine their development. This kind of informality would
not, in fact, be possible without the indirect support offered to
workers by the safety net of the formal employment sector. On the
other side, formal enterprises and danwei suffer from the resource-
draining effects of on-the-job unemployment, second jobs and
brain drain.
On a different level there is, however, a much more traditional
form of informality that largely relies on the availability of
unskilled and unprotected labour flowing into the cities from the
countryside with no support other than their own working ability
and personal connections in the cities.
7.2 The Labour Market and the Floating Population
Another part of the informal or parallel urban market is the
migrant economy that generates informal/illegal labour recruit-
ment practices. The size of the so-called 'floating population'
(liudong renkou) is a major topic of discussion among Western
and Chinese specialists. Estimates range from 80 to 100 million
people (figures that might tend to be exaggerated), taking into
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account all persons temporarily or permanently living in a place
other than that indicated in their hukou documents. Some popula-
tion surveys,17 for example, exclude from this category persons
only temporarily residing in a different place (less than one year),
thereby correctly excluding all business travellers or visitors tradi-
tionally considered floaters, but also most seasonal workers
coming to the cities from the countryside during certain periods of
the year. 18
Furthermore, as one writer states, 'the floating population, as
the term suggests, is elusive and seasonal. Within any year, its size
tends to be larger in the winter season when demand for work on
the farms is low, and usually reaches its peak in February or
March, immediately after the Spring Festival. Also typical at this
early stage of mobility transition is a significant amount of
seasonal and circular migration.'19
In general - and officially - the difference between floaters
(liudong renkou) and migrants (qianyi) is that only the latter (a
small number) have obtained a change of hukou status. Only with
an urban hukou do rural floaters become migrants. Floaters are
largely the result of rural to urban migration flows and are living
evidence of the increasing complexity in both urban and rural soci-
eties and of the progressive demise of the hukou system's ability to
determine rural-urban boundaries.
The presence of a floating population in large Chinese cities has
increased in the 1990s. In May 1995, there were 3.29 million
floaters in Beijing (of which 2.88 million were not visitors or trav-
ellers), while the entire registered (huji) population of the capital
was 6.2 million.20 That means that one out of three persons in
Beijing was not entitled to a permanent residence certificate in the
city and therefore had major difficulties in accessing the formal
and state-led labour markets, as well as the welfare facilities still
reserved for urban dwellers. Of these about 75 percent had become
workers or were engaged in petty commercial activities.21
In 1990 the estimated percentage of floaters in rural areas
ranged from a minimum of 11.1 percent to a maximum of 27.5
percent.22 In Guangzhou about one-third of all urban workers were
waidi {outsiders)23 and urban authorities admitted that they were
an important source of cheap labour for the local economy where
the local workforce was insufficient.24
A large number of these migrants without status, however, end
up doing marginal and dirty jobs as a result of the large demand
for temporary employment in industrial enterprises and the service
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sector. The needs of the construction industry, for example,
employing about one fourth of all rural workers in big cities,
match the requirements of most rural labourers for low-skill, tem-
porary activities in the cities.
The recruitment and organisational mechanisms of the con-
struction industry is relevant here to understand the extent to
which industrial and economic conditions determine the attitude
maintained by local authorities in a highly competitive and dereg-
ulated labour market. While almost losing entire control of the
process, they progressively rely on informal organisations (often
extensions of native place networks) that provide a tool to main-
tain social stability, and to employ cheap labour for economic
construction. At the same time, local authorities in the places of
origin, willing to export their surplus labour, have established
bureaucratic links with their counterparts in the cities (both
govenlment agencies and mass organisations) in order to facilitate
the export of labour.2s
As noted by Solinger, the traditional models for interpreting
migration flows collapse in China 'under the weight of the state -
a state much more involved in regulating its populace's mobility
than most other states,' that 'created and exacerbated push factors
that drove poorer people out of the less promising rural areas,'26
while turning a largely deregulated market (for work and capital)
into a powerful pull factor.
At the same time, the retreat of the state from its role as organ-
iser of social networks left space for the re-emergence of tradi-
tional and despotic patterns in the labour market, mainly along the
lines of interpersonal or 'ethnic' networks. The institutional con-
trol still at work on the mobility of these newcomers in the cities
facilitated the duties of the new bosses, marking a path towards
draconian management on one side and ethnic organisation and
familial self-exploitation on the other. The first is well exemplified
by the extent to which teams or 'gangs' have been able to organise
and exploit rural labourers, mainly in the construction industry of
large and medium cities; the second is exemplified by the size of
the safety nets that 'native place networks' have been able to
organise within large cities.
The myth of 'blind flowing' (mangliu - a clue to the justification
for restrictive policies towards migrants) is dispelled, as Ma and
Xiang show/7 by the different strategies and decisions adopted by
migrants in their native places. Connections, skills, and the avail-
ability of capital are important variables in the decision to initiate
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a migration project, in the choice of a destination, in the forms of
organisation, as well as in the possibility for success.
According to Zhao Shukai, migrant farmers initiate a labour
market of their own, a sort of 'protomarket' (chuji xingtai
shichang), which is extended, multifaceted, flexible and vital. It is,
however, also scattered, has a low degree of organisation and suf-
fers from 'small peasant attitudes', from limited circulation of
information and, in general, from a lack of regulation.28
In ]iangxi province, in 1992, about 85 percent of outmigrants
had chosen self-initiated ways or peasant informal organisations to
outmigrate.29 The levels of informality of this segment of the
market remain very high and the attempts by the government to
'regulate' (guifan) the relationships established in this parallel mar-
ket appear largely ineffective. The advantages of a flexible market
for the employer derive from its very lack of regulation and from
the lack of control over the implementation of labour regulations,
assignment, registration, protection etc.
For this reason, some policy analysts are now suggesting that
'blind movement' is to a certain extent a risk that cannot be
avoided, and they greatly emphasise the need for a regulatory
action that focuses on the spreading of information in the market
and among market players, rather than a fully-fledged regulation
of the flow. Ineffective attempts to fully regulate the blind flow
would only be 'the refraction of a traditional mentality of eco-
nomic planning on today's employment question.'30
7.3 Working for a Boss: The Case of the Construction
Industry
The construction teams (baogong dui) working as contractors or
subcontractors in the booming construction industry of the large
cities employ mainly rural workers (nongmin gong) who have tem-
porarily or permanently left their rural jobs. There were about
550,000 construction workers in Beijing in 1994, 93 percent of
whom were 'rural workers' (nongmin gong), constituting about 21
percent of all immigrants in the city.3!
Many of the construction teams are based or originate in the
countryside. At the beginning of the 1980s, local 'construction
stations' (jianzhu zhan) were directly dependent on the rural
governments and were contracted for public or 'popular' (minban)
construction projects. At that time, they were not different from
a public agency that could recruit temporary workers. In the
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following years, when the modernisation of China's economy
demanded increasing numbers of construction workers and the
need for agricultural labour fell drastically, the 'stations' under-
went a massive process of privatisation. In order to maximize
profits and work opportunities, they split into several 'teams,'
working in a larger number of smaller projects. Many of the more
experienced workers set up their own construction teams, under
the name of their original construction stations, and they compen-
sated the original stations with an annual 'management fee'
(guanli fei).
In the mid-1980s, with the booming demand for construction
work in the cities, growing competition among urban construction
enterprises, and difficulties in recruiting labourers from among the
urban elite, a number of rural teams were authorized (jinshi xuke)
to work in the cities.32 Later, the urban authorities in Beijing estab-
lished' a system of authorisation for construction teams from
outside, issued in connection with the local authorities in their
places of origin. This gave the team leaders the official recognition
they needed to enter the protected urban market and to act as an
employer both in the localities and in the urban markets. They
often operate in the same market as the illegal teams with which
they compete, thus making work conditions even more difficult.33
The construction fever in Chinese cities did not abate in the
1990s, and baogong dui were a major outlet for workforce sup-
pliers from the countryside. The high competition among the
workforce, the large amount of full or partial subcontracting, and
the lack of protection for these workers have contributed to mak-
ing construction work very difficult, unprotected, and poorly
remunerated. For a total daily wage of 7 to 10 yuan34 (about 80
percent of the floating population earns less than 300 yuan a
month35 ), the rural workers spend 14 to 16 hours at the construc-
tion site, and are therefore largely dependent on the team boss for
such facilities as accommodations, transportation, and food. 36
Almost militarily organised, with poor living and working con-
ditions, in which roles are hierarchically defined and team bosses
(baogong tou) exert almost tyrannical power over the workers, the
construction teams, and especially those who work without autho-
risation, are the least integrated migrants groups in the urban
society and economy. Often collectively recruited from the same
village, they generally do not speak nor do they learn either the
national language or the Beijing dialect. Unlike the lao shifu (old
masters), who tend to remain for longer periods and enjoy higher
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way in which the issue of labour was to be addressed. Since
labour is only one of a number of production factors and since the
market is, at the same time, a set of unifying mechanisms for the
allocation of production factors, the next logical step was de-
regulation, debureaucratisation, and the abolition of central or
planned allocation, as well as of the 'three-in-one' policy allowing
for the integration of collective, self-employment, and central
planning.
In addition to economic research, however, the investigations of
the social scientists into the effects of labour reform (and its related
phenomena) had a different focus outlining many of the issues
which might be a source of instability in China's development.
Studies of social stratification, income differentials, labour
migration, and social crises relevant to economic stability, etc., con-
tributed to mitigating scientific optimism over China's economic
future within the framework of a deregulated market environment.5
Micro-level sociologists studied such phenomena as poverty in
marginal communities and migration, exposing the re-emergence of
some socio-economic characteristics typical of Chinese develop-
ment, thereby making the idea of a pure (and blind) market more
problematic: for example, the emergence of an efficient family
economy despite the context of 'rationalisation' and modernisation,
and the downsizing of industrial activities due to the emergence of
'rural industries' (xiangzhen qiye). These contradictions were
accentuated by the size of the problems facing China, by the lack of
infrastructure, and by the crisis in rural production, which were
understood as major risks, not only in themselves but also in their
possible consequences for the stability of the economy.
6.2 The Mechanism of Labour Allocation
The magic word needed to move out of the theoretical impasse
created by the emphasis on markets was 'mechanism' (jizhi). In
most academic presentations of the market economy, the rationale
and scientific foundation for socialist planning was replaced by
equally scientific market mechanisms - the role of which was in
part to resolve the remaining irrational economic behaviour under
market socialism - in a 'logic and vocabulary informed by neo-
classical economic theory. '6
In the official language, political awareness and good behaviour
were replaced by the promotion of individualism and indepen-
dence, in an environment where 'merit, which was once bestowed
127
!I!il!
il'll
THE CASE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
rankings in the hierarchy, the unskilled workers have a very high
rate of turnover.3?
Urban authorities also tend to consider construction teams as a
way to maintain control over migrants,38 while workers, by means
of a 'privileged' relationship between their bosses and the police
authorities, often manage to escape the required registration.
Recruitment generally takes place in the countryside, where the
team boss has better control over the workers and can rely on the
binding role of family and kinship.39 Most of the construction
workers recruited in the countryside to work in the city, generally
youth (aged 18 to 30), do not intend to permanently migrate or to
remain in the city and therefore they do not easily integrate into
urban society. Only occasionally and under pressure do the bosses
hire workers directly in the cities.
The team bosses are also referred to as 'white-collar rural
workers' (bailing nongmin gong). They are a sort of intermediate
entrepreneur, spending considerable amounts of money (mainly in
bribes and gifts) to secure subcontracts from enterprises and, with
some capital at their disposal, to cover the costs of recruitment and
to set up a building site. They generally have good connections with
urban key bureaucrats while maintaining strong influence also in
their places of origin, from where they recruit labourers.4o Since
payment is usually due only upon the completion of work, it is
very important for bosses to have a reliable team of loyal workers,
who are able to work hard, and who are flexible in terms of wages:41
49.3 percent of the floating population works for 30 days a month,
while 56.4 percent works longer than the maximum 8 hours daily
stated in the labour law.42 This of course has consequences both for
the quality of construction work and for safety conditions. A qual-
ity check of 341 projects in Wuhan revealed that less than 23
percent of those carried out by rural teams met specifications.43
Official statistics report that 1601 people died from over 6500 offi-
cially registered serious work-related injuries in the construction
sector in China only during 1994. Considered the high rate of infor-
mality in the sector, the real number must be much higher.
Informality and labour injuries seem to be directly proportional
also in other industries. A general survey in Zhangjiakou (Hebei)
revealed that, between 1988 and 1993, 74.1 percent of the labour
injuries involved rural workers.44 Mining, another sector with
high incidence of floating rural workers, tops this macabre rank-
ing with 11.529 deaths in 1994 (4590 of which in rural collective
enterprises).45
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The baogong dui rarely has full control over a project since it is
mainly a subcontractor. For example, of the 65,000 construction
workers from Jiangsu working in Beijing, only about 5,000 are
engaged in 'whole contracted projects,' while all others are work-
ing on subcontracted sites.46
The practice of subcontracting (zhuanbao or fenbao) is a com-
mon feature in the urban construction industry and both state-
owned and collective construction companies have different
options for engaging in subcontracting: (a) to hand over the work
to a rural enterprise after deducting a fixed amount called a 'man-
agement fee' (guanli fei), generally around 20 percent of the total
amount; (b) to assign the work to a member of their own unit who
recruits workers from the market; (c) to sell the contract to one or
more individual baogong tou to execute the work with their own
teams.~7
Subcontracting and dividing work among different executors
also increases the number of people intending to profit from a
certain job, thus reducing the profit margins as well as the salaries
of the workers. The contractor (chengbao) often becomes a
contractee (fabao) and the revenue of the final contractor is
inversely proportional to the number of subcontractors involved in
the process.
In June 1994 the Beijing government amended the 1988
'Provisional Regulation on the Administration of Construction
Enterprises from Outside Working in Beijing.' The new regulation
forced non-Beijing based enterprises to register with the municipal
Construction Office in order to be entitled to 'legal rights,' and it
prohibited local Beijing enterprises 'from employing workers from
other localities.' If an enterprise is found to be sub-contracting to
an unregistered team, it can be fined up to 10,000 yuan.48 This reg-
ulation will probably increase the number of registered enterprises
as well as the tax revenues, but it is not likely to improve the qual-
ity of life and labour relations in the construction teams.
The construction industry is only the most obvious example of
how a parallel labour market partially out of the control of the
urban authorities was developing as an integrated part of urban
development. The influx into Beijing of almost three million
people from other provinces, for example, responded to the needs
of an increasingly rich urban residential and commercial economy.
If we exclude those who went to Beijing as members of construc-
tion teams (about one-half million) and the small percentage
(12-13 percent) who regularly reported to the municipal authority
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to apply for jobs, the rest found jobs either through personal ties
or in the informal market.
In Beijing, several places have become famous as living 'labour
markets:' the walkway in front of Dongdan Hospital, for example,
is one of the most crowded. In this 'baomu (nannies) market,' men
and women, mainly from the rural province of Anhui, offer tempo-
rary or long-term services to Beijing residents, especially after the
emergence of families where both wife and husband are employed
and the breakdown of unit-level service networks and childcare
during the reform period have increased demand for such services.
But many other marginal jobs, such as bike repairs or carpentry,
as well as all kinds of heavy labour, are also offered on the street,
mainly by immigrants who have neither the skills nor the connec-
tions to obtain better jobs in the city.
7.4 Ethnic Economies: The Case of Ethnic Villages
in Beijing
Another example of the way in which informality in economic
activities is shaping the labour market independently from official
labour institutions is the ethnic enclaves. Unlike the individual
strategies of rural construction workers, ethnic economies gener-
ally reflect the emergence of longer-term organisational strategies.
Ethnic enclaves are the result of long-term and far-reaching
chains of migration that produce a concentration of economic
activities in a geographically identifiable and socially organised
area, making defence from urban pressures and the organisation of
informal production generally easier.
In this case, the effects of administrative pressures are balanced
by the entrepreneurial activity and the relatively high level of
organisation of the communities. The level of participation in the
municipal commercial and economic network is much higher than
that of other migrants, although life inside these ethnically orga-
nized communities is extremely inward-looking.
The major and most famous example is 'Zhejiang Village'
(Zhejiang cun), that has recently attracted research interest both in
China and abroad.<9
'Zhejiang Village' is the name given to a large community of
migrants from the Wenzhou area (mainly Yongjia and Yueqing
counties) who settled in Fengtai district, the southeastern suburbs
of Beijing, east of Dahongmen Road. In 1994 Yueqing accounted
for over 75 percent of the 50,000 Zhejiang migrants engaged in
159
EPILOGUE: LABOUR MARKET AND THE STATE
clothing production who were living in this area, testifying to the
solidity of native place ties. Unlike other areas where migrants
mixed with local dwellers, in Dahongmen the Wenzhouese rapidly
outnumbered locals, who often found it more convenient to rent
out their houses and move to other areas.50
Although the initial settlement began in the early 1980s, the
conditions for the formation of a large-scale, concentrated, inte-
grated (production and trade), and specialised 'ethnic' economy
developed when administrative controls on migration were relaxed
in 1985-86. At that time, a large flow of migrants reached the
capital, while the reform of the city's commercial system offered
the Wenzhou community more space for both them and their
products.5l
The arrival of the first Wenzhou tailors in the early 1980s was
viewed. favourably by the Beijing authorities, in particular because
of the chronic shortage of consumer goods in the city at that time.
The growth of the community, its concentration in some areas, and
the subsequent extension of its commercial activity to markets in
south Beijing favoured the development of a network of producers,
which has rapidly become an important economic factor in the
city. The hundreds of workshops in the previously quasi-agricul-
tural district of Fengtai were mainly involved in leather and clothes
production. Their products (and principally the leading article,
leather jackets - pi jiake) were sold in the stalls of most large
clothing markets in the Chinese capital, especially in the area south
of Qianmen, but Wenzhou hua (the local dialect) could be heard
spoken in other markets as well, a sign of a rooted and growing
presence of the economic interests of Zhejiang Village inside the
city.52 Although reliable data53 in this field are not available, it is
widely recognised that the Zhejiang people have gained control of
a large part of the distribution (and production) of shoes, leather
products, and clothes, mainly in the lowest quality niche of
the market.
As sometimes argued,s4 the concept of 'ethnicity' in the migrant
communities is related more to their place of origin, language and
kinship ties, than to other ethnic differences, such as religious and
cultural practices, customs, or facial characteristics (over 95 per-
cent of the migrants are Han). The ethnic link, coupled with a
family interest in the enterprise, allows for the actors in the econ-
omy (both shop owners and workers) to accept longer working
hours, poorer living conditions, and lower remuneration. It also
leads to accumulation and solidarity among the workers/family
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members. Ethnic links also have an effect on the dynamics of the
labour market: recruitment for Zhejiang Village's Beijing work-
shops is often carried out in the more distant but more reliable
Wenzhou market.55
The workshops were originally set up on a family basis and only
occasionally involved outsiders who were recruited through friend-
ship or kinship networks. Yet the recent growth and stability of
Zhejiang Village is becoming a source of employment for other
migrants. Of the over 90,000 people living in the Dahongmen area
in 1994, at least 40 percent were immigrants from other provinces
working in Wenzhou-invested workshops. 56
The capital needed to set up a new business in Beijing is gener-
ally raised in Wenzhou prior to migration. This is typical of the
Wenzhou people's business-oriented migration. Money can be bor-
rowed from usurers (gaolidai), from the so-called taihui, a sort of
mutual help organisation, or directly from family members.
Investment in technology, which has become increasingly neces-
sary, due to growing competition, can increase the dependency of
the workshops and the families on capital providers, with labour
often the only guarantee that debts will be repaid. The multiple
sewing machines typically in the middle of the living and working
space in the villagers' houses, although second-hand, can cost up
to 130,000 yuan.57 'Deviant practices' in the capital market in
Wenzhou have contributed to making 'underground' private finan-
cial institutions the most important sources of capital for the boom
of the individual economy in Wenzhou in the 1980s (almost 95
percent of the total capital needed by the private sector).58
Remittances from migrants, at least in the case of this enclave,
also seem to demonstrate that migration strategies have much to
do with the growth of the economy of native places. Yongjia
county, for example, in the first years of reform (1978-85)
exported only 15 percent of its labour force. But in 1985 48.9 per-
cent of the total rural income came from remittances.
The area where the Zhejiang migrants settled had the advantage
of both low-cost housing and low administrative pressures, and at
the time of the greatest influx was still in the belt between city and
countryside, that is, where most residents were not required to
have 'fully' urban registration. On the other hand, the area was
poorly equipped and lacked infrastructure, especially in view of
the high concentration of productive population that was to arrive
later with its burden of waste materials. Growing demographic
pressure boosted speculation and soon created a disproportion
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between low salaries (200-300 yuan per month) and the cost of
housing (up to 1000 yuan per room/month); thus, living space was
generally shared by up to eight to ten persons and was used for
both living and production.
Kinship-based recruitment does not shield workers from dra-
conian exploitation. Typically, new recruits work for no compen-
sation other than room and board. The major advantage is the
protection they enjoy in the administratively and culturally hostile
urban environment.
This kind of community which profits from marginal sectors
and particular features of urban organisation, such as low admin-
istrative and housing pressures, has recently been called, quite
appealingly, 'interstice community' (jiafeng juju )59 in Chinese spe-
cialised literature.
Their status as migrants has greatly limited their access to
urban 'services (medical care, schooling, housing). As already
mentioned, this situation is the result of the contradictory effects
and incomplete reform of the household registration system,
which keeps the social status of migrants separate from that of
urban residents, and stimulates the emergence of substitutive
social tools, mainly based on the self-organisation of a mutual
help network. Inside the village, clinics supplying simple medical
care have been set up as have private kindergartens.60 Once chil-
dren reach school age, families are faced with the choice of either
paying several thousand yuan per year to send them to public
schools or sending them back to Wenzhou until their primary edu-
cation is completed.61
The village also seems to be an almost independent unit inside
Beijing municipality. Conversations with officials show that the
Beijing municipal government regards Zhejiang Village as a 'dis-
trict' (shiqu), and is not about to intervene in its affairs as long as
its economic relevance does not endanger public security. There are
periodical clean-up campaigns, but the workshops that are closed
down generally re-open a few weeks or months later.62
The growth of the village also marked a change in the dimension
of its trade and in its ability to improve the visibility of its 'trade-
mark.' While Dahongmen earlier had been known as a market for
cheap garments and clothes, the opening - between 1992 and 1998
- of several buildings (funded by both local authorities and private
Wenzhouese63 ) turned it into a flourishing commercial area in the
south of the capital and into a symbol of the very success of the
community in its efforts to attain status.
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Some recent agreements and regulations between Beijing and the
Wenzhou municipal government64 regarding the size and protec-
tion of productive and commercial activities of Zhejiang Village,
suggest that a new policy is emerging with respect to this district
of the city. They also demonstrate that the community has enough
political power to negotiate rights and duties with the authorities.
What does the experience of Zhejiang Village tell us about
labour markets in urban China? The development of the village's
external politics is an example of how shadow economies live an
independent economic life only as long as they need to remain pro-
tected against an external environment that exercises a pressure on
them. As soon as the economic and political environment becomes
more acceptable, a cooperation between the two sectors appears as
a viable way to keep social evolution under control. As was the
case for the construction industry, municipal authorities have no
better way to keep the situation under control other than relying
on informal organisations. In this particular labour market the
'free' interaction between labour demand and supply is moderated
by the action of closed native place networks, who are given
almost unlimited freedom as long as their businesses do not ignite
social instability or unrest. As for migrant workers, they accept
harsher working conditions as a way to participate in a process of
potential status enhancement that would not be guaranteed by the
administrative labour market.
There are at least three other major communities of migrants in
Beijing, namely Henan, Xinjiang, and Anhui villages.65 The one
that is most strikingly different from Zhejiang Village is Henan
Village, in the Liulitun area east of the Sanlitun diplomatic com-
pounds. Henan people concentrated in this area (about 30,000 in
1995, but my impression during my most recent field visits in the
summers of 1996 and 1997 suggest dramatic growth) are mainly
employed in the construction industry, but many of them live as
scavengers along the roadsides. Their village, unlike the productive
and relatively well-organised and orderly Zhejiang Village,
appears as a huge garbage dump dominated by a 'gang' economy,
increasingly resembling that of Latin American urban slums.66
Henan village in Liulitun developed - along a typical interstitial
path - in an area that had been prepared for the construction of
the eastern part of the fourth ring road in Beijing. The post-
ponement of the project left free space to be used for collecting
waste materials, until the 1999 fiftieth anniversary of the PRC
when the urban authorities completed the construction work and
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eliminated, as much as possible, the migrants settlements; the
migrants then moved to nearby places, or to other areas in the city,
thus partly diluting their geographic concentration.67
A similar occurrence took place in the so-called Anhui Village
(Anhui cun) in the northwestern area known as Wudaokou. This
was a much smaller community of about 2,000 people, two-thirds
of whom worked as scavengers, such that the village was nicknamed
the 'garbage village' (peilan cun) by the migrants themselves.68
The comparison with slums is intended to bring to mind a vital
form of migrant organisation rather than a frightful, totally
negative or degenerated model. The gangs in Anhui Village, for
example, are complementarily organised by job into groups: fami-
lies may be separated, while male and female workers generally
share living quarters with other people of the same sex and the
same working times. There is no hierarchical organisation outside
of that of the families, and individual workers claim to be 'on their
own' (ziji ren). Apart from scavenging, some villagers engage in
petty commercial activities, mainly selling fruit, vegetables, or
seafood in the local markets or on the roadsides. Indeed, garbage
collection is generally reserved for middle-aged or elderly people
(40 to 70 years of age), while youths prefer to look for less dirty
and relatively more remunerative jobs, for example in construc-
tion. Scavenging is done both during the day and at night (to take
advantage of the reduced control), and the collected materials are
sold individually or piled on collective grounds.69 Certain groups of
migrants have the power to set the price and to purchase the
materials from the scavengers, and they generally resell them to
enterprises that recycle them for production. Such materials as
paper or metal are extremely scarce in China and thus can earn
profits. The middlepersons in this trade generally benefit the most
from these activities. We can infer that these migrants lack the
connections or opportunities to secure better jobs and are thus
relegated to such marginal sectors.
In general, one major difference is immediately evident when
comparing Wenzhou migrants (and economic migrants in general)
with other migrants: the Zhejiang settlement seems to be a com-
plete economic system in which production, distribution, and
services interact, something resembling an ethnic enclave. That is
why it produces opportunities for upward social mobility almost
independently of the surrounding economic system (though grow-
ing commercial links are gradually increasing its dependency on
external economic factors).
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Other migrant groups lack both entrepreneurial spirit (and
opportunity) and economic autonomy, and generally present them-
selves in the local labour markets as individual labourers, mainly
in construction teams. When a community does exist, it generally
plays the role of mediating between individual migrants and local
labour demand; should it succeed in organising autonomous
sources of revenue, this is usually in the marginal and residual
sectors of the local economy, such as scavenging.
Informal labour markets therefore open a totally new vista for
analysis of labour policies during the reform period. For the first
time, market forces reveal their disruptive though powerful side.
While control of the labour allocation system is still constrained by
state intervention, an increasing number of workers are finding
other ways to enter the secondary labour markets, where supply
and demand meet, apparently, more freely, and where there are
few or no policy restrictions or control.
7.5 The 'Mechanism' of Formal Labour Markets
As we saw in the previous chapter, 'market' is the keyword for
both policy reform and socioeconomic changes in the field of
labour. In the 1990s, mechanisms of a labour market were offi-
cially implemented among the enterprises in the formal sectors,
and labour was recognised as one component in the larger
category of production factors.
As the experience of the informal sector shows, official recogni-
tion is no longer a conditio sine qua non for the emergence of
market behaviour; nonetheless, another labour market, subject to
a regulatory bureaucracy, has developed under the influence of
administrative channels parallel to a highly deregulated market.
But the ability of the system to control allocation has been greatly
reduced in the market environment, especially in the cities.
The number of new workers and staff hired in urban centres
through the official allocation system decreased steadily from 5.02
million in 1985 to 2.84 million in 1994/° although both the
population and labour opportunities have continued to grow in
the urban centres. Only the number of zhuanda hiye (graduates
from high schools and universities) entering urban units recorded
consistent growth, almost reaching the 2 million figure in 1994
(0.885 million in 1985), testifying to the importance of allocation
for cadres and highly skilled labour personnel.
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In the 1990s there was an increase in the importance of official
employment agencies as go-betweens in the supply-demand game.
The role of talent exchange centres, for example, as regulators of
the mobility of highly skilled personnel in the labour market took
off when they were no longer simply involved in inter-unit 'trans-
fer' of personnel and became instead real intermediaries, offering
services to workers and enterprises. Their importance grew
together with their number: there were more than 8,000 such cen-
tres and employment agencies in the entire country by 1991, eight
years after the first talent exchange centre was established in
Shenyang. A general exchange centre under the Ministry of
Personnel was created in 1984. For quite some years, and in some
cases until today, these centres were accessible only to local hukou
holders, and were entitled to hold the workers' 'personal files'
(dang'an) during the time of transition from one unit to the other.?!
A ne~ role was stressed in the management instructions to local
talent exchange centres published by different local governments in
about 1992. According to the 'Provisional Method for Tianjin
Municipality's Talent Markets,'72 as well as the numerous similar
local regulations that followed in other places,73 the institutional
duties of these public agencies include consultancy, registration, and
intermediation, both for enterprises and for individual labourers.
As the leaflet advertising one such talent exchange centre in
Beijing states, its main professional tasks include:
(1) To start a Beijing talent market, to establish a talent informa-
tion system, to gather supply and demand information on
talent, to direct all kinds of talent to obtain employment, to
recommend talent for jobs, to provide services covering the
entire process, and to advertise for talent;
(2) '" To collect, run, and distribute insurance funds on behalf of
the Beijing municipal government;
(3) To manage the personal files of floating personnel, to expedite
the procedures of going abroad for private reasons, to provide
managerial services for personnel matters for all kinds of non-
profit institutions and enterprises;
(4) To coordinate and arbitrate the dispute of talents concerning
the floating of talents ... ;
(5) To develop international talent exchanges, cooperation, and
academic communications ... ;
(6) To carry out training work, including professional skill train-
ing or re-skilling before employment;
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(7) To test the quality of work and the ability of talent employed
by domestic or foreign customers;
(8) To set up scientific and technical entities ... to increase labour
opportunities for youths waiting for employment/4
Those interested in such services included retired or laid-off tech-
nical, skilled personnel and managers; self-funded (zifei) students
who have graduated from universities, high schools, or vocational
schools and are not included in the allocation system; registered
managers and technical workers from outside the city; and already
employed workers (zaizhi gongren) with university degrees or high
school diplomas.
Talent exchange centres (rencai jiaoliu zhongxin, or otherwise
called rencai tiaojie zhongxin) provide advice and consultancy to
enterprises in the process of contacting, selecting, and stipulating
contracts with workers by collecting information both on enter-
prises and on suppliers of labour.
The deputy director of one such station in Beijing (inside the
People's Cultural Park, Renmin wenhua gong) once showed me a
set of computers containing labour market information at the dis-
posal of both enterprises and applicants/5 At this talent exchange
centre - the largest of the seventeen in the municipality (at both the
district and county level) - a special 'talent fair' (rencai jishi) was
held every Wednesday. The number of people in search of new jobs
taking part in the weekly event averaged 1,500 to 2,000. About 90
percent of them had high school certificates or university degrees,
while 80 percent were under the age of 30; the majority were male.
All applicants paid a small fee to enter the fair. 76 Although the rate
of immediate success of the interviews was relatively low (about 8
percent), the fair provided a good opportunity for introductions to
the enterprises. Periodically (once in the spring and once in the
autumn), the centre also organised larger fairs, in parks or at the
International Exhibition Centre. Such initiatives are also under-
taken by other organisations, such as the trade unions or the
women's federation, in an attempt to diversify their services to
members and to control the drop in membership in recent years.
Also symbolically, these large skilled labour 'markets' are the
best expression of a willingness to have labour supply and demand
meet directly, albeit under the administrative control of the state.
Only about 30 percent of the enterprises taking part in these
initiatives in Beijing are SOEs; the rest are collective, rural, or pri-
vate enterprises. SOEs probably still use the official channels for
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recruitment more than these quasi market agencies; then again,
they are no longer the most important employers nor the most
attractive: looking only at the figures for annual new urban
recruitment, in fact, SOE employment decreased from 67.6 percent
in 1986 to 41.1 percent in 1994.77
Enterprises generally refer to these agencies when they need
skilled labour, but unskilled labour can also be recruited through
public agencies under the Ministry of Labour, which constitute a
part of the so-called 'labour system' (laodong xitong).
About 13,000 such offices operated in China in 1994, constitut-
ing about 86 percent of the zhiye jieshao jigou (employment
bureaus). The rest (about 2,100 stations) are organised by trade
unions, the women's federation and other mass organizations,
associations, street committees, or individuals. Of the workers
employ~d through the public system, almost all are rural workers
(67 percent) or youth in search of first employment (27 percent),
and most obtain jobs as common workers/9 In Tianjin, 31.2
percent of the 684,300 people who entered the formal labour
market in 1994 found a job. This percentage was almost
unchanged from the previous year, but the total number of people
involved with employment agencies was more than double (it was
296,000 in 1993).80
In official evaluations,8! the labour system has become more
flexible and suited to diverse situations and different labour
markets, allowing for the coexistence of private (or popular, min-
ban) and public agencies. Five major models, taking the names of
different urban centres, have been singled out in the official
analysis:
(a) the Changchun (or 'comprehensive' - yitiao long) model, a
system in which employment agencies (zhiye jieshao suo)
cover all phases of intermediation, evaluation, training, and
other administrative practices necessary to both the worker
and the enterprise; this method has become a model in more
recent policy documents;82
(b) the Yichang model, in which high levels of informatisation
help the standardisation of procedures and criteria, and
increase the productivity of coordination;83 this model also
allows for cross-district recruitment;
(c) the Nanchang model, a 'pure' (tun) model, in which agencies
act only as go-betweens, avoiding all administrative interven-
tion in any phase of the recruitment process;
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(d) the Wenzhou model, which arose in an area where the large
development of private and individual business boosted the
creation of private employment agencies under different
forms; in order to standardize and monitor the work of such
agencies, the labour bureau made available a building, from
which these private agencies now act under public supervision;
therefore the role of the public system is apparently only one
of coordination and supervision while practices are deregu-
lated and in the hands of private agencies. In Wenzhou (where
there were almost 40,000 private wage-labourers already in
1985) the tolerance towards privately hired workers was much
greater than that in the rest of China since the beginning of the
reform period, and the role of public agencies grew in tandem
with that of a spontaneous labour power market and private
'labour introduction centres' (laodong jieshao SUO).84
(e) the traditional model, characteristic of the less developed and
border areas, privileges administrative means and excludes all
other organisations.
Access to urban labour markets appears to be divided along
several lines: an administrative divide, as workers have different
access to allocation according to their administrative status; a
quality divide, as allocations of unskilled and skilled labour go
through different channels and involve different levels of bureau-
cratic pressure; a geographic divide, as the occupational situation
of different cities requires an adaptation of recruitment mecha-
nisms (both formal and informal); and a formal/informal divide, as
the two worlds have little or no contact in the field of labour
recruitment, although informal practices have emerged in the
recruitment of the formal labour force.
Official labour bureaucracy maintains a certain control in areas
where there is a more limited demand for labour and where infor-
mal practices are therefore less developed. Thus, more the private
sector is developed, the less effective seems the intervention of public
agencies in both recruitment and regulation of the labour market.
Although informalisation, once again, is not only a characteristic of
private and 'grey' enterprises, but of the state sector as well.
7.6 Mobility and Immobility in the Labour Market
By concentrating on the urban side of the issue, as I have done in
this book, I have tended to give only marginal consideration to
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more complex phenomena occurring elsewhere (namely in the
rural areas) while maintaining a theoretical division between city
and countryside which, despite continuing administrative con-
straints, no longer corresponds to the reality of a scattered and
complex situation. The bureaucratic boundaries, as pointed out
several times during this study, were progressively modified and
deregulated during the 1980s and early 1990s, with a totally
different level of effectiveness than at the beginning of the reform
era.
In this final section, I will draw on the results of a labour market
survey run by CASS in 1992 to assess the depth and thoroughness
of labour market transformations. 8s
The fascinating thing that strikes observers viewing the entire
labour reform process from an historical perspective is the extreme
flexibilfty in both policies and ideological background, which in
the long term (though in a step-by-step approach) have accompa-
nied the dramatic overall transformation of practices. The changes
have affected the role of state intervention and of economic factors
in the labour process, such that the present system is far more com-
plex than can be described by the artificial categories of 'formal'
and 'informal' used here.
. Thus, the ground has been laid for the coexistence of contend-
ing situations in China's labour economy in the 1990s:
(a) the 'dark side' of the labour market described earlier, which
more than official statements reveals the extent of the trans-
formation and the prospects for future labour relations in
post-socialist China; while
(b) public intervention is still highly effective in the field of
employment and in the definition of labour relations in the
formal sector, where the introduction of profit-driven manage-
ment mixes with administrative constraints.
Administrative actors and constraints, therefore, still playa con-
current regulatory role in marketised relationships in defining
labour mobility patterns as well as in shaping labour demand in
the formal sector. Public institutions, however, have long lost their
prerogatives as implementation agencies for central policies in a
scattered environment that has witnessed the rise of local players
(enterprise management, local governments, and lower echelons of
the bureaucratic system).
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Recruitment
The immobility of the Chinese traditional labour market has been
noted repeatedly in this study as one of the features preventing
China from having a real market-driven labour-force flow. In
recent years there has been a marked relative increase in mobility,
due partly to the informalisation processes described above, and
partly to the reform of the unit system. In particular, the simplifi-
cation of administrative practices for the recruitment of non-
hukou migrants under the contract labour and temporary systems
have greatly increased rates of turnover inside units, as well as the
ability of workers to move from one unit to another, from one
industry to another, or from one 'ownership level' to another.
In the 'Labour Market Survey,' of the 3322 interviewees who
had a migration experience (about one-third of the entire sample),
more than half (56.9 percent) had moved after the beginning of the
reform period (1980-1991).86
The kind of mobility in the formal sector emerging from this sur-
vey is less the result of upward social mobility trends than of hor-
izontal mobility. A look at the working situation of migrants at the
time of 'migration' for the same period shows that over 71 percent
already worked in state-owned enterprises. Tables 1 and 2 show
that the ability of SOEs to maintain workers is slowly being eroded
by the growth and increasing attraction of collective and private
enterprises, even though the state sector still remains the most
attractive. Also, the rush towards SOEs from collective and private
enterprises was, already in 1992, coming to an end. Indeed, the
trend is towards a progressive though not dramatic 'privatisation'
of the formal workforce, down on the scale of property (that is,
from the highest level of socialist state ownership towards collec-
tive or private ownership, generally considered to be the 'less
socialist' among ownership forms).
The kind of movement registered by this survey is still strongly
related to administrative actions. During the 1980s and early
1990s, 34.8 percent of these migrants moved for labour adjust-
ment reasons, 27.3 percent were 'assigned' (after graduation or
training) to units not in their place of origin, about 16 percent
migrated for family reasons (to accompany a spouse or to get
married in a different place), 8 percent were demobilized from pre-
vious (mainly military)87 assignments, and 5 percent moved as a
result of 'substitution' practices (which almost disappeared after
1990). This means that over 70 percent of the staff and workers
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interviewed entered the unit where they presently work as a con-
sequence of administrative measures, and due to market practices,
and that inter-unit mobility is still largely subject to administrative
decisions or controls.
Table 7.1: 'Inter-ownership' Mobility (1979-1984)
To State-Owned Collective 'Sanzi' Other
Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises Ownership
From
State Owned 57.3% 24.4% 13.5% 0.9%
Enterprises
Collective 25.9% 54.3% 18.5% 1.2%
Enterprises
'Sanzi' •
Enterprises
Other 56.5% 23.9% 19.6%
ownership
Source: CASS Labour Market Survey
Table 7.2: 'Inter-ownership' Mobility (1985-1991)
To State-Owned Collective 'Sanzi' Other
Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises Ownership
From
State Owned 42.8% 29.3% 26.3% 1.7%
Enterprises
Collective 20.8% 42.4% 36.0% 0.8%
Enterprises
'Sanzi' 6.7% 0 93.3% 0
Enterprises
Other 41.8% 24.6% 28..4% 5.2%
ownership
Source: CASS Labour Market Survey
The practice of assignment (fenpei) to a post remains extremely
important for staff and workers who have graduated from univer-
sities (61.3 percent) or technical high schools (30 percent).
Workers with less training generally have to take examinations to
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get jobs; indeed, almost half of the contract workers are hired by
examination (zhaogong kaoshi).
Technical personnel (Table 7.3) are assigned (48.7 percent) or trans-
ferred from other units (24.6 percent) confirming suspicions about a
more institutionalised path of recruitment for this group, while work-
ers who take a formal examination already constitute about one-third
(32.9 percent) of the total. Breaking down the data along the lines of
the relationship to the enterprise (Table 7.4) we note that less steady
relationships correspond to more informal recruitment.
As many as 45.4 percent of temporary workers, for example,
enter the enterprise through personal relationships, while state
cadres are almost entirely hired or transferred through formal
channels. As predicted, the overall number of contract workers is
increasing,88 and this will probably also further reduce the propor-
tion of contract workers formally assigned to enterprises.
Table 7.3: Hiring Methods by Working Position
Workers Technical Managers Auxiliary
personnel personnel
Assignment 15.9% 48.7% 22.8% 17.2%
after graduation
Demobilized 5.2% 2.6% 6.4% 15.4%
soldiers
Examination 32.9% 12.7% 22.9% 12.6%
and selection
Promotion 2.5% 3.3% 5.0% 5.7%
Substitution 9.0% 2.5% 5.0% 3.9%
(dingti fumu)
Personal 7.5% 1.3% 2.8% 5.4%
relationships
Recommendation 1.7% 1.0% 1.5% 1.1%
from an
employment agency
Transfers from 18.1% 24.6% 27.5% 26.3%
other units
Transfers from 1.3% 0.5% 1.0% 0.8%
subsidiary units
Other 6.0% 3.0% 5.0% 4.5%
Source: CASS Labour Market Survey
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Table 7.4: Hiring Methods by Working Status
State Permanent Contract Temporary Other
cadres workers workers workers
Assignment 44.6% 15.6% 15.7% 3.6% 12.5%
after graduation
Military 8.2% 7.7% 2.3% 1.3% 5.5%
demobilization
Examination 7.3% 25.2% 48.4% 29.5% 31.6%
and selection
Promotion 6.0% 3.7% 1.5% 1.0% 5.5%
Substitution 1.8% 9.8% 4.5% 5.8%
(dingti fumu)
Personal 1.0% 2.5% 7.4% 45.4% 4.6%
relationships
Recommen- 0.8% 1.1% 2.5% 4.3% 3.0%
dation from an
employment
agency
Transfers from 26.9% 27.7% 12.7% 2.3% 17.6%
other units
Transfers from 0.6% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 0.6%
subsidiary units
Other 2.9% 5.4% 4.1% 11.6% 13.4%
Source: CASS Labour Market Survey
From these initial data we can see that the influence of market
practices - though growing - was still unable, in the early 1990s,
to reshape hiring procedures in the formal labour market and to
reduce the influence of both guanxi and central planning, the two
contradictory forces coexisting under the traditional system and
hindering the process of market rationalisation of labour mobility
and labour flow, that were the main target of the labour reform in
the 1980s and 1990s. Contracts have played, and will continue to
play, an important role in marketising labour relations, but until
now they have been regarded mainly as a means of internal regu-
lation of labour relations rather than as a mutually satisfactory
agreement between demand and supply.
The growth of mobility in the 'formal' market has not followed
the same patterns as the more general social mobility. Mobility is
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only partially a result of the 'bi-directional choice' (see Chapter 4)
advocated by the Chinese theorists and is more clearly a result of
the greater flexibility of administrative practices and the greater
autonomy enjoyed by enterprise management. Also contributing to
the increased mobility have been relevant changes in workers' atti-
tudes towards their jobs and the emerging role of employment
agencies that act as almost fully marketised go-betweens. This
marketisation has resulted not only in intra-sector mobility and
competition and improved prospects for worker elites (both skilled
and trained staff) who can take advantage of growing demand for
technicians, but also in a restriction of opportunities for social
mobility among disadvantaged groups on the supply side.
As the two sectors of the market roughly corresponded to the
still active administrative divisions of city and countryside, and
despite the demise of the unit-based welfare, the urban groups
increased their advantage through better access to training and
education; education and training being the main divide between
those who can benefit from market rules and those who are forced
into even greater dependency on the enterprise or on the require-
ments of the labour market. Not surprisingly, the sample shows
that the highest level of education is not among cadres or managers
(for whom party membership remains an important prerequisite),
but among technical workers, about 60 percent of whom have
graduated from college or university, where only 7.8 percent of
nonskilled workers received college educations.89
Employment pressures and redundant workers
The existence of a labour market, with its increasingly demanding
competition and a 'reserve army' outside the enterprise, together
with the high discretionary power assigned to factory managers
after the implementation of the economic responsibility system, are
the major factors influencing the deterioration of labour relations
inside the enterprise. The 'ideology' of reform has invariably
argued that an increase in the income gap among different sectors
of society is justified, but this has proved to be a major turning
point for the work-unit system: as the Chinese industrial economy
is still very much labour-driven, workers face great pressures from
managers eager to accomplish ambitious production targets.
One study of state-owned textile factories (where, despite mech-
anisation, the labour factor remains extremely important and
pressure from outside - mainly from rural unemployed females - is
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particularly high), reveals that the new situation has radically
changed labour relations inside the plants along two lines: 9o (a)
managers have developed a cynical (though 'scientific') attitude
towards production organisation, aimed at obtaining higher rates
of productivity by increasing working hours, applying punitive
measures in the calculation of production bonuses, and using
Taylorist methods of rationalisation of working cycles, thereby
destroying the image of Chinese state factories where 'workers
work at a leisurely pace and enjoy all manner of perks;'91 (b) the
methods of 'socialist' production have been amply modified to fit
the new productivist ideology; for example, participation in 'labour
emulation,' that is, the periodic campaigns to increase individual
productivity on the shop floor, were declared to be 'voluntary' by
the 1995 Labour Law. Voluntary 'labour emulation,' however,
involves more workers today than it did earlier as individual pro-
ductivity and work attitudes and behaviour, although no longer
related to 'political performance' (zhengzhi biaoxian), are the
parameters for calculating the largest part of monetary wages (the
floating basic wage, bonuses, incentives, and subsidies).
In some of the mills investigated, the four-shift labour organisa-
tion that had been introduced in the mid-1980s has reverted back
to a three-shift system. Overtime labour and work during holi-
days92 are generally paid at normal rates, while sick leave is up to
the manager, and sometimes involves cuts in wages. To obtain
family leave (mainly requested by women), workers are sometimes
required to pay a temporary substitute from their own pockets in
order to avoid large salary cuts (the practice is called 'shift pur-
chasing' - maiban).93
The authors of this research contend that, contrary to what is
generally argued about the inability of the labour reform to radi-
cally modify labour relations in Chinese industry, the case of the
textile industry shows a radical change in labour practices, in par-
ticular as far as worker-management relationships and production
levels are concerned. I would argue that this is largely due to the
increasing pressure exerted by open market forces on the contrac-
tual position of workers vis-a-vis management as well as by the
remaining administrative constraints on the position of the enter-
prises in front of the state.
Paradoxically, the increase in workload has accompanied 'on-the-
job unemployment' (zaizhi shiye) and redundant workers in SOEs.
According to a survey by the Commission for the Reform of the
Economic System (Jingji tizhi gaige weiyuanhui, or Tigaiwei)
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carried out in Tianjin in 1995, the number of redundant workers
in the 3,362 SOEs in Tianjin in 1994 reached 124,651 (with an
average of more than 37 per enterprise).94
According to general policy, redundant workers should be
shifted to other units or to ad hoc affiliate enterprises under the
control of the mother firm, but this is possible for only some. In
the Tianjin chemical sector, only 36.2 percent (9,687 workers) of
the personnel classified as 'redundant' (fuyu) were relocated dur-
ing 1994. The rest mainly were kept in the factory on 'production
vacation' (shengchan xing fangjia - 51 percent), long-term sick
leave (changqi bingxiu - 24.2 percent) or 'internal unemployment'
(changnei daiye - 11.8 percent).95 Apparently these workers are
almost completely outside of the production process and it is diffi-
cult to relocate them (due to age or low skills). They remain under
the protection of the enterprise, whose burden of social costs has
become increasingly heavy after the independence of enterprise
accounting was introduced and the costs of welfare shifted from
state books to the enterprise. The same research in Tianjin
revealed, for example, that in one large glass factory 9,100
workers were actively producing, while 5,300 were receiving
pensions from the enterprise, amounting to one pensioner for every
1.7 active workers. Nationwide, the retired to active workers ratio
dropped from 1:30 in 1978 to 1:5 in 1994.96
Urban unemployment also greatly increased as a consequence of
the greater enterprise autonomy and the further drive towards
privatisation and efficiency. In most cases, the bureaucratic re-
employment system failed to offer a real solution to the problem.
Nationwide, only 26 percent of xiagang workers had been re-
employed by 1996, while an even smaller 13 percent had been able
to receive a training from the system.97 Higher unemployment rates
(estimates foresee 13 to 16 percent in the cities by the year 2000)
also created tensions especially among the generation that had
experienced the forced movements of 'down to the countryside up
to the mountains' (xiaxiang shangshan) before and during the
Cultural Revolution, who felt that they were once again been
betrayed by the government, and they were bearing 'the burden of
both revolution and reform.'98 Over 50 percent of the xiagang
workers in 1996 was under the age of 45, roughly the same
generation that made over 70 percent of the unemployed in
1980-81, during the previous - post-Cultural Revolution - unem-
ployment tide.99
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Wages and benefits
As the nominal wage (or 'position' wage) is only half or less of the
entire salary, a worker's monthly revenue generally depends on the
bonuses he/she receives as floating integration from the enterprise.
Bonuses are calculated by points (on a one hundred or one thou-
sand point scale), in a way that does not differ too greatly from the
previous workpoint system. Thus, workers are dependent on a
wide variety of parameters, some productive and some behav-
ioural (but no longer 'political').lOo The Taylorist attitude of the
new scientific management of SOEs is leading to exaggerated con-
trol over all moves made by workers who are subject to an endless
row of checks. More than as an incentive to increase production,
this attitude by the management is generally perceived as a contin-
uous threat to the workers' wage-level protection. The monthly
wage therefore remains largely undefined and the real wage more
often is lower rather than higher than expected: a sort of 'reverse'
use of the floating wages (punishing instead of compensating) as
bonuses are a major component of the salary that can be cut at will
or as punishment for deviant behaviour.
The CASS 'Labour Market Survey' attempts to compute the
incidence of the floating part of the salary on the workers' mone-
tary income. Although this calculation does not take into account
the nonmonetary components of the salary, the composition of the
monetary part quite clearly shows how wages can be used as a
means to control productivity as well as a tool of social control
inside the enterprise.
Monetary wages in the investigated industrial enterprises were
below 1,500 RMB per year for about 32 percent of staff and work-
ers, while the average value was 1,946.5 RMB per year. 1,500
RMB a year was not reached by the 25 percent of state cadres,
30.7 percent of permanent workers, 44.5 percent of contract
workers, and 57.6 percent of temporary workers. 101 There is an
important average difference between party members (2,818 RMB
and only 7.6 percent under 1,500 RMB) and nonparty members
(2,197 RMB and 24 percent under 1,500 RMB), but this is mainly
due to the concentration of party members in the highest ranks of
the enterprise system and to their low number in absolute terms
(8.1 percent of the entire sample).
Temporary workers constitute the sector of the internal labour
market subject to the highest wage pressures. The uncertainty of
income is confirmed by an extremely low position wage (44
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percent of the total wage) and a relatively high percentage of such
components as piece-rate work (8.9 percent). Contrary to what
was expected at the beginning of the reform period, the wages of
both permanent and contract workers have an almost negligible
piece-rate component. Piece-rate wages have proven to be more
efficient for extremely low-tech sectors, that is, those that employ
temporary workers, as piece-rates are unlikely to match the needs
of management to control and increase the productivity of work-
ers in longer term and more specialised production processes.
The situation was exacerbated by the financial difficulties of
enterprises: in 1997 more than 10 million employees saw their
salaries either reduced or they did not receive any salary at all
(jianfa, dingfa), constituting a total debt towards workers of 19.7
billion yuan (US$ 2.4 billion). In the provinces of Heilongjiang and
Sichuan - where there is a high concentration of SOEs - 1.58
million and 1.18 million industrial workers respectively received
no salary at all. 102
Table 7.5: Composition of Wages by Position
Average Basic Floating Piece Bonuses Labour Price In
Wage Wage Wage rate % Insurance-Sub- Kind
% % wage Subsidies sidies %
% % %
State Cadres 2577.9 57.2 7.0 1.2 15.9 3.3 14.0 1.5
Permanent 2307.2 54.8 7.1 2.3 ' 14.1 3.3 17.0 1.5
Workers
Contract 2052.5 49.1 7.1 3.1 16.6 4.6 17.1 2.4
Workers
Temporary 1899.8 44.1 9.5 8.9 14.3 5.6 11.8 5.9
Workers
Other 2180.1 57.0 5.9 2.0 13.9 2.9 17.0 1.3
Source: CASS Labour Market Survey
The relatively high level of price subsidies and of subsidies in kind
(the latter are especially high for temporary workers) reveal that
enterprises have hardly relinquished their role of 'distributor' of
goods and services to workers, even after the decline of the 'com-
prehensive' role of the danwei. Even more interesting is that there
is no significant difference in this category between SOEs (where
15.9 percent of the salary is distributed as price subsidies), COEs
(17.6 percent) and sanzi enterprises (14.1 percent). Although SOE
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data may be influenced by the larger presence of cadres, the over-
all numbers show a tendency on the part of all enterprise to inte-
grate salary with supplements in kind and services.
In SOEs - at least until the recent reform in 1998 - the one
major traditional allowance was housing. The average urban
household103 spent 28.79 yuan (per capita) for housing rent in
1994, that is, about 0.8 percent of per capita income, slightly more
than 1 percent of total annual living expenditures, and one-four-
teenth of the annual expenditures on clothing. l04 Considering that
in developed market economies the ratio between income and
housing costs ranges from 2:1 to 6:1, we can easily infer that hous-
ing remained, in the early 1990s, the major welfare item distrib-
uted by Chinese enterprises and the state, and thus not surprisingly
an area that has been the target for major reform initiatives.
The guality, or even the availability, of housing, as well as other
nonmonetary factors constituting the worker's income and affect-
ing the household's well-being, were long a result of state planning
decisions. Significant portions of the state budget were expressly
allocated for social welfare and housing construction, while the
'ranking' (based on ownership, size, and industrial sector) of the
enterprise was a determining factor in deciding the allocation of
public housing space. This gave a major advantage to SOEs and,
among them, to large and strategic enterprises. Collectives were
assigned almost no housing funds. l05
We would therefore expect that, after the start of the reform, not
every enterprise was able to guarantee housing to their staff and
workers; indeed, housing has remained a major demand from
workers, in particular from short-term workers who do not bene-
fit from urban welfare and did not 'inherit' a house from the old
system. But, quite surprisingly, the 'Labour Market Survey'
revealed no relevant difference between SOEs, COEs and POEs,
with regard to the percentage of workers living in 'public houses'
(gongfang): 83 percent, 78 percent and 81 percent respectively.l06
Only 15 percent of the urban workers investigated (nevertheless a
meaningful slice) already lived in private homes. t07
The reform of housing in urban centres has introduced the pos-
sibility for workers to purchase houses and for enterprises or the
state to sell them, thereby boosting the real estate market.
However, this process has not until recently substantially reduced
the role of work-units in housing assignment, either as owners of
the buildings or as the distributing body. In 1990, 59 percent of
urban housing was still owned by work-units/DB with significant
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differences from place to place. In Shanghai, for example, the per-
centage of work-unit-owned housing space was only 12 percent in
1990, but about 86 percent of the new investment for public hous-
ing construction in the same year had actually been raised by enter-
prises, a sharp increase from 55 percent in 1980.109 While an
increase in the speculative use of funds for construction projects
should be taken into account, this still could be indicative of a
tendency by enterprises to continue to maintain their original
'comprehensive' approach towards workers, even in the new,
almost 'privatised' system of wealth distribution.
From the perspective of the commoditisation of the housing
market, work-units will be able to cash in from their control over
such a scarce commodity as housing (4.0 square meters per capita
in 1980, 7.5 square meters in 1993),110 in a market with increasing
demand.
As the data on the influence of housing on the household budget
show, the major aim of the housing reform (to increase rent and
convince workers to purchase housing) has not been achieved and
has allegedly been abandoned by many work-units. The increase in
private real-estate investment in these years has mainly been due to
the greater availability of capital and the profitability of housing
investments rather than to increased housing costs or the reduced
availability of rented housing on the 'public' or private markets.
Private housing, however, accounting for 71 percent of the total
in 1950, had declined to 24 percent by 1976 and decreased further,
despite the reform drive, until 1990 when it reached a low of 21
percent. The reform of housing allocations that began in 1993 -
again in an experimental way - and culminated in 1998 with the
end of assignments did not entirely eliminate danwei control over
housing and its distribution. In many cases, the sale of houses
followed the same criteria as assignments, by privileging one's own
workers and insiders over outsiders (sometimes with housing facil-
ities sold considerably below their market values) and the work-
unit did not become a market oriented real-estate agency as might
have been expected.
As observed by commentators, after the reform 'the distribution
of commodified housing is similar to the old system, except that
housing is no longer free,'111 while the reform increased, rather
than reducing, the role of work-units in housing. Housing is still
considered a reward or way of preventing key staff from leaving
the unit (in many cases such decisions as wedding arrangements
are largely influenced by the time and conditions of a housing
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assignment - fen fangzi). The market is, in fact, still very much
influenced by the intervention of the work-unit, in the form of
housing distribution (as production bonuses or incentives), 'soft
loans' (or loans whose repayment scheme is extremely long), and
discounts,112 making the alienation of public housing a part of the
redistributive process rather than the result of market behaviour.
Work-units, therefore, remain in control of many of the distrib-
utive processes (in the form of both monetary remuneration and
nonmonetary or welfare benefits), reaffirming their role in marke-
tised labour relations.
The kind of labour market emerging in the urban formal sector
is thus also one in which workers maintain a certain degree of
dependency on the work-unit while they are increasingly exposed
to outside pressures - a labour market in which the socialist work
unit is tIying to redefine its role as 'marketised,' 'cost-reducing,' or
'independent', but is, in the end, still all-encompassing. This situa-
tion does not contradict the general aim of the reform of China's
industrial system. The marketisation of labour relations in SOEs
may resemble models supplied by Korean or Japanese corpora-
tions. ll3 Their integrated economic strategies allow the large SOE
with low profits to enjoy the advantage of market mechanisms and
to keep consumer spending under control, without releasing high
rates of independence to the workforce.
7.7 A Highly Institutionalised Labour Market
In China, the 'labour market' is basically seen as a mechanism able
to solve employment problems related to the restructuring of the
economic system and the development of a market economy
affecting labour relations. Therefore, the concept of a labour mar-
ket that has emerged during this transitional stage is a highly insti-
tutionalised engine, confronted on one side by the challenge of
informalisation, and on the other by the difficulties of managing
formal unemployment and the so-called 'rational flow' of the
labour force dismissed from the SOEs.
The control and development of such a labour market will face
some major difficulties in the future:
A. A narrowing of 'relocation' opportunities, growing in tan-
dem with the saturation of the ability of SOEs to absorb new
labourers.
Because of the redundant labour force inside the units, SOEs are
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not eager to hire new personnel. Therefore, demand remains
largely insufficient for the growing supply, and the role played by
nonstate-owned enterprises (although increasing) is still too small
to insure the absorption of large numbers of urban and rural
dwellers, thus forming a urban reserve army. In Tianjin, for
example, of the 87,000 workers relocated during 1995, only 15
percent accepted jobs in the nonstate sector, while the number of
unemployed grew by another 32,500 persons, thereby reaching an
official unemployment rate of 2.6 percent. 114 But even official data
tend to paint a much worse picture: according to the 1996 1%
population surveyl15 - excluding xiagang - the number of urban
unemployed had already reached 9.98 million, that is, 7.5 percent
of the active population (against an official 2.9 percent for the
same year). Including only the part of xiagang workers (that is, the
workers who have been made redundant but who still receive sub-
sidies from the enterprise) who receive less than 100 RMB of
subsidies per month from the employer (72.5 percent), the unem-
ployment rate is 9.2 percent.
B. Constraints on the free choice of workers.
Despite the growth of managerial autonomy in SOEs, both hiring
and dismissal of employees are subject to policy limitations.
Although dismissals have grown at an increasing rate in some
urban centres (the case of Mudanjiang is noteworthy, where 60 to
80 percent of SOE workers has been forced to xiagang) , the
Chinese authorities have complained that, while the demand for
labour in the nonstate sector is still the highest, redundant work-
ers in SOEs are reluctant to accept posts in the private or collective
sectors due to the bad reputation these enterprises have as below-
standard employers with little or no respect for labour regula-
tions. 116 46 percent of the redundant workers who have not been
relocated never applied for new jobs and relied only on the bureau-
cratic re-employment system, while 11 percent did not accept
positions they were offered in the labour market. ll7
On the other side, driven by economic interests, the demands of
enterprises privilege the advantaged segments of the market (gen-
der, age and specialisation are among the most important criteria
for selection), thereby excluding most of the workers made redun-
dant by readjustments, who make up the largest proportion of
urban workers seeking employment or relocation. About 62 per-
cent of redundant xiagang workers have primary school education
while only 3.77 percent have university degrees. ll8
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C. The inadequacy of labour management tools at the enterprise
level.
From the point of view of a competitive market for labour
resources, the reform of the labour system is still incomplete.
Nevertheless, there continues to be a clear contradiction between
the differing status of workers inside the enterprises (permanent,
contract, and temporary workers), which are mainly the result of
their different administrative positions (urban dwellers, rural
migrants, or floaters) at the time of employment. The contract sys-
tem, which was expected to be a way to foster a stratified labour
market, is still far less effective than expected. Again in Tianjin, in
1995 only 50 percent of the enterprises implemented a 'full con-
tractualisation' policy (quanyuan laodong hetong zhi ).119
According to the Guthrie's findings, the full implementation of
contracts is faster and more comprehensive in enterprises in poor
finanCial and economic shape, while well-performing enterprises
generally tend to maintain a portion of the old workers under the
iron rice bowl system. l2O An analysis inside the enterprises, much
deeper than what I have presented here and focused on the imple-
mentation of labour policies, would be necessary to explain more
clearly to what extent labour policy at the work-unit level is a
result of central stimulation, or rather of the economic constraints
faced in the local, national, and international markets.
D. The incomplete reform of employment agencies.
Employment agencies have been growing in importance in China's
institutionalised labour market, even though they are not yet able
to exercise control over labour market dynamics which should be
their main task as government agencies. Apart from in some urban
cases, in fact, the agencies still lack the infrastructure and ability to
spread the information needed to develop contacts between
demand and supply. Furthermore, they are not able to create viable
training or retraining opportunities for young workers and for
those dismissed or made redundant by production readjustments,
and they are often constrained by their role as 'hubs' for unem-
ployed waiting for rare second opportunities.
The agencies develop their activities according to the shape of
demand. In one municipal laowu shichang (labour market) I
visited in Tianjin in 1995, where the focus should have been on the
allocation of low-skilled workers, I found that due to pressure
from enterprises (mainly looking for skilled workers), special
meetings were organised for skilled workers and enterprises.
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Agencies operate differently in different areas of the country: the
lower the influence of the labour market the higher the importance
of the state-led recruitment system, and vice versa. In areas where
private business dominates there is much more unofficial recruit-
ment, and kinship networks and private employment agents playa
dominant role, while inland areas with scarce employment oppor-
tunities still rely on the regulatory power of state agencies.
E. The role of work-units as organisers of distribution.
This has not changed much since the start of the reform. The for-
mal market is strongly influenced by the distributive role played by
work-units: while a cynical and productivist attitude has emerged
in labour relations, work-units, despite the increased independence
of economic management, continue to playa major role in the
redistributive system. Worker dependency is probably even more
extensive since the reform, as the enterprise is now a direct actor
and no longer the long arm of state welfare.
Thus the labour market that has emerged in the early 1990s is
replete with contradictions that will not be solved in the short or
even the medium term. The ability to control the flow of labour
was greatly reduced in the twenty years of reform as a consequence
of the decentralisation of the economy and the emergence of new
social and economic phenomena such as large scale informalisa-
tion, previously less relevant or even absent.
In trying to establish a labour market using the tools of a com-
mand economy, the Chinese leadership radically divided the urban
labour economy into two disparate sectors, over only one of which it
has partial control. Macro labour allocation policies and the actions
of state-led labour market institutions are aimed at assuring that
the central government does not lose the limited control it has over
that sector, but it is forced to deal with the contradictions between
a highly bureaucratic system of allocation and a dynamic market
economy in which the rules of the market and their consequences
are becoming increasingly clear to both managers and workers.
The emergence of widespread market behaviour among actors
(enterprises, workers, and the state) will probably not be the final
act of China's enigmatic transition towards a commodity economy.
The behaviour of enterprises and workers might well be led by
apparently non-market considerations, in particular as a response
to the infrastructural inadequacies of public structures to replace
the previously state-led distributive system.
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7.8 Conclusion
The aim of this work has been to place the entire process of labour
reform in an historical perspective and to describe, in parallel, the
goals, actions, and the eventual achievements of the policymakers,
while highlighting the institutional as well as economic roots of
China's labour market in the making.
To achieve this goal, this book focused mainly on the evolution
of labour discourse, in some cases as a reflection of broader
processes going on in society at large, in other cases as an internal
constituent of the decision-making process. In an historical
perspective - a longer term picture of the evolution of a society and
of its leading organisational discourse - the outcome, partly
unexpected initially, was the emergence of major paradoxes in the
relationship between the initial goals and final outcomes, as well
as major clashes in the ongoing and contradictory relationship
between theory and practice.
Continuities in the political leadership, the behaviour of the
elite, and policymaking, have only been marginally challenged by
the emergence of these paradoxes. However, the deepening of the
reform has contributed to transforming labour-related social prob-
lems into major factors of instability, and therefore from a future-
oriented perspective, into a social threat and a challenge to the
elite.
In 1977-78, China was emerging from an intense and violent
period of political struggle, and was confronted with a labour
economy that had dramatically impoverished the working class
whose role, as 'vanguard of the people,' was itself in danger.
Politics had gone too far in manipulating individual destinies and
the dominance of administrative constraints over individual and
social mobility had clearly put China on a dual track development
path sharply dividing city and countryside.
Even the most audacious among the reformist thinkers who
took part in the 1977-78 conferences on the reassessment of
'distribution according to labour' as a guiding principle for the
redistribution of wealth, probably did not expect the final outcome
of both theory and practice to result in the final dismantling of the
public labour-based welfare system outlined in the most recent
policy steps; nor was it likely that they expected that the making
of a legal environment in the field of labour would grow in tandem
with the deregulation and informalisation of the labour economy.
Even less was it likely that they envisaged that the foundation and
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referent ideology for 'theoretical work' on labour would change so
sharply, in a smooth and silent escape from the narrow boundaries
of socialist thinking towards the proud embrace of a policy-driven
form of capitalism that has recently become the new scientific
foundation for the socialist economy.
This book also places the theoretical debates in the context of
policymaking and sheds historical light on the contradictions
which emerged within a process of reform generally seen to be
straight and univocal. To challenge this view, it should be noted,
the clarity of one political objective (stability) and one economic
goal (efficiency) are balanced by the experimental nature of virtu-
ally all policy steps undertaken in these twenty years. The focus on
experiments during the entire process of labour reform continues
to this day and is still confronting challenging and worrying diffi-
culties - raised by the rebuilding of the welfare system on the ashes
of the danwei system (the privatisation of health care and pensions
in particular) and the reallocation of millions of xiagang workers,
victims of the necessary reform of the state ownership system.
To mark even more sharply the distance between the present sit-
uation and the labour economy in 1977-78 (a mere 20 years ago!),
Chinese newspapers, in the period of the Fifteenth Congress and
the 'fourth generation' of leaders, are filled with stories of the
success of experiments to retrain unskilled personnel, and with
personal stories of workers forcefully - but successfully - 'diving
into the sea' of petty private business (xia hail after being laid-off
from factories where they had worked for decades. The govern-
ment recognises the need to create 160 to 180 million new jobs
during the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000),121 a number that
includes both the 'geographic'movement of the labour force away
from the countryside and the 'administrative' movement of redun-
dant workers (for whom mobility means unemployment) from
inside to outside the subsidised state labour system.
The dimension of unemployment in China sets a new agenda for
labour reformers. While the theoretical clashes of the late 1970s
were mainly the result of artificial attempts to combine socialist
ideology and market forces, the new theoretical positions are
largely liberated from this constraint and thus regard labour as a
factor of production. This new interpretation of the political
meaning of the word 'labour' has been accompanied by an unex-
pected 'minimal' interpretation of the socialist ideal (a leading
economist recently declared socialism to be nothing but 'social
justice plus a market economy').122
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At the end of the second decade of the reform, labour policies in
China are completing a privatisation process characterised by
political and economic decentralisation on one side, as a direct
result of political options, and by increased mobility and infor-
malisation of economic and labour relations on the other - two
features (resulting from the so-called process of the 'liberation of
productive forces') that appear difficult to control.
Labour underwent some major contradictory readjustments as it
was progressively privatised, initially as a result of spontaneous
involvement by farmers in private business and then as a conse-
quence of the restructuring process and labour 'diet' of state
owned enterprises. Although a conscious privatisation (that is, the
osmosis of industrial state labour into a private industrial sector
and an urban tertiary sector) of labour relations was not a theo-
retical goal of the debate until recently, its emergence has been
cashed in on by economic reformers as a positive result for the aim
of raising productivity both inside industrial units and in the over-
all economic system, as it was related to the growth of the non-
industrial and urban service economy that remains a major pre-
requisite for China's marketisation.
The privatisation of the economy, although advancing at
unprecedented speed for a socialist country, could not avoid the
problem of redundant personnel in SOEs. Once the political and
theoretical disputes on DATL were settled, the focus slowly shifted
from wealth distribution (in the years of economic recovery in the
late 1970s) to the relationship between efficiency and employment,
thereby creating theoretical categories that will eventually lead to
the final abolition of the danwei system. These all-encompassing
structures that were once the major social, economic and political
reference for the largest majority of urban workers and employees
during the 'classical' period of Chinese socialism lost their appeal
step by step as the dependency of workers began to decline and the
urban market began to offer diversified and better opportunities to
cope with basic needs and economic desires.
Industrial work-units, once the only source of wealth redistrib-
ution, became self-accounting economic entities that behave in a
profit-driven manner. They have lost their political and social roles
and accordingly their very essence as an organising unit of social-
ist society.
In the light of recent steps in industrial policy (such as the estab-
lishment of so called 'pillar-industries' and the rush to merge
industrial enterprises into huge conglomerates), the danwei system
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may not be simply dismantled but more concretely transformed
into a feature of chaebol-like state conglomerate. This would mean
that, while eliminating the idea of a work-unit based economic and
political society, China is ready to reshape and modernise the
concept for the organisation of large, high-tech, and less labour-
intensive industrial SOEs. This would coherently respond to the
socialist claim that the urban industrial economy is a strategic
national resource and must be maintained under the direct control
of the state, while, at the same time, it is given a sufficient level of
strategic and operational autonomy to deal with both internal
labour relations and with an increasingly hostile national and
international market. The claim recently aired by the Chinese
media,113 that China lacks any multinational enterprises able to
compete with international competitors and to maintain a domi-
nant position in the domestic market seems to envisage a 'large
enterprise' strategy for the next decade. This is a field where the
danwei dream might be revisited. Economies based on large state-
protected conglomerates of the Korean type have proved very
effective in fast developing countries, where the state is still able
(albeit in spite of regional contradictions, and decentralisation,
and its weaknesses during the recent Asian financial crisis) to
maintain control over major macro-economic indicators.
From the point of view of labour relations such 'new' work-
units might reignite in a different form the paternalist socialist
danwei discourse, although the process of informalisation and
privatisation of the labour economy, as well as the global economic
conditions within the country, envisage a much larger differentia-
tion of activities and employment opportunities in China in the
next decades than those in Korea in the 1970s.
An unprecedented number of unemployed have been released in
the urban centres, reinforcing the reserve army of unskilled labour
already present in great numbers in the once-closed Chinese cities.
A report from the World Bank124 identifies rates of unemployment
as high as 20 percent in some cities in 1995, while official rates are
still under 3 percent due to underestimation and non-consideration
of those workers still formally belonging to a work-unit even
though they have no jobs and do not receive salaries. The fast and
disorderly growth of tertiary activities is still largely insufficient to
cope with the masses of workers expelled from enterprises, and the
excess of unskilled workers generally has been accompanied by a
shortage of skilled personnel. Back-up strategies, such as the
bureaucratic re-employment network, have not been efficient;
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retraining is not as valuable a tool as the authorities had hoped as
most xiagang workers are uneducated, while there is a labour
shortage only for a highly specialized segment.
This situation, together with the flow of farmers from the coun-
tryside and the so-called floating population, fostered an informal-
isation of the labour economy. Informalisation can be considered to
be among the unexpected results of the economic reform, which,
paradoxically, emerged when Chinese official policy and theory
aimed at creating a legal environment for labour relations, thus
replacing political correctness with basic individual rights. This
eventually resulted in the enforcement of the labour law in 1995.
The entire process that led to the political and legal achieve-
ments of labour reform was one of experimentation, such that my
initial time-frame would have probably been useless had events
(rather than major discontinuities) been taken into consideration.
One of the processes largely untouched upon here - and that I
hope will enter the agenda of future research - is that of the rela-
tionship between enterprise decision making and central policies.
The reform can be described as an elastic process of experimentation
> success> policy formulation> implementation, where the central
policies (on which I focus in this study) were only the final outcome
of local experiences and pioneering initiatives, and were themselves
experimental and underwent major readjustment over time.
The 'history' (historians will excuse the improper use of the
term) of labour reform depicts a process that has generally been
understood as gradual (probably because it did not originate with
any radical political or elite changes) but, due to the enormous
contradictions with which it had to deal, had a tremendous impact
on both social life and political ideology. The 'experimental devel-
opment' of labour policy produced a scattered and contradictory
environment in the labour arena that resulted in deregulation and
localisation of labour organisation as well as different levels of
depth and coherence in the implementation of central policy.
Furthermore, labour reform implied a diversification of players
and an adaptation of their behaviour to the unexpressed forces of
market rules. Despite a late (early 1990s) ideological recognition
of the regulatory mechanism of market forces in the labour arena,
internal competition, the search for further efficiency, and the
booming private and semi-private economies in both city and
countryside had sown the seeds of market rules much earlier and
much deeper than the cryptic and contradictory descriptions of
theoreticians during the 1980s might have predicted.
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CONCLUSION
This reality-driven recognition of a deregulated labour market
(taking clearer shape in urban centres but involving most of the
rural population as well) and the influence of market forces on the
increasing labour mobility do not mean, however, that China has
consciously taken the road towards 'sole-market' management of
the labour force. China's policymakers are conscious of the funda-
mental lack of social institutions able to manage the dismissal of
the 15 percent of SOE workers who are now redundant. Recent
efforts to establish a pension system (based on social pooling plus
individual contributions) and an unemployment fund still suffer
from both administrative (eligibility is still mainly limited to urban
registered workers) and financial limitations emerging from
decades-long soft-budget constraints and the hoarding of redun-
dant personnel.
My conclusion is that the economic and political environment in
China today is one in which the labour market has been assimi-
lated, both at a theoretical level and in the daily life experience.
This assimilation has been the result of both the internationali-
sation of the economy which requires higher rates of efficiency for
survival, and the decentralisation of political and economic con-
trol, accompanied, as I have tried to show, by privatisation and
informalisation.
Although highly deregulated at the lower levels, what we now
(at the risk of oversimplification) call the Chinese labour market is
still dominated by a high level of institutionalisation, mainly in the
urban areas, primarily concerned with the reform and reorganisa-
tion of SOE employment.
A labour market is up and running, while the most problematic
issues continue to exist under a highly institutionalised adminis-
trative umbrella. Keynesian and neo-liberal views contend in the
theoretical field, while policymakers are confronted with the need
to balance demand (too low in both industrial and service sectors
compared to the rate of development of the economy) and supply
(abundant in unskilled but lacking highly needed skilled labour).
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shop organised by the Institute of Economics of CASS (August 1995)
in Beijing. The 1992 survey collected information from 438 enter-
prises with different ownership structures and in different industries,
as well as from 9,432 staff and workers who were interviewed indi-
vidually. I will hereafter refer to the survey as 'Labour Market Survey'
4 'Labour Market Survey'; see also Zhu Jianfang, Dai Yuanchen and
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